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Introduction
Federal crimes have been accompanied by death penalties since
the First Congress's first crime bill in April 1790.1 However, unlike
state prosecutors, federal prosecutors have not had to evaluate potential death penalty cases until the last few years.2 From 1972,
when the Supreme Court declared fully discretionary death penalty
statutes unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia,3 until 1988, when
Congress enacted statutory procedures for imposing the death penalty for certain violations of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
("CCE") statute, 4 no constitutional federal death penalty provisions were on the books. The 1988 procedures, however, applied
only to a single federal code section (CCE), which is infrequently
charged.6 It was not until 1994 that Congress enacted generalized
1. See 1 Stat. 112-19 (1790).
2. In response to the Supreme Court's invalidation of all extant death penalty
procedures in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257, 314 (1972), "the legislatures of at
least 35 states ... enacted new statutes that provide[d] for the death penalty." Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (per curiam) (Stewart, J.). Although some of
these new State statutes have had to be revised in light of other post-Furman decisions, see, e.g.,Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 328 (1976) (invalidating mandatory capital punishment statutes
enacted in response to Furman), it is still the case that many states have been implementing capital punishment since the mid-1970s.
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7701, 102 Stat. 4181,
4387-95, (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)-(r) (Supp. 1998); see infra Part I.E. (discussing
the 1988 statute).
5. Of course, many federal statutes enacted before Furman did provide for death
as a possible penalty, and they remained on the books after Furman. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 794, 1111, 2031 (1986). David Bruck of the Federal Death Penalty Resource Center has aptly described these surviving but likely unconstitutional death
penalty provisions as "zombie statutes." RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

(1995-96 Supp.) at 105 n.4. Between

1972 and 1988, Congress did enact three new federal death penalty provisions, for air
piracy, witness-killing, and espionage (military personnel only). See infra notes 174178 and accompanying text; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

1993 (1994), [hereinafter

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

19931. But be-

cause no federal statutory procedures responsive to Furman and Gregg existed,
neither the pre- nor post-Furman death penalty statutes were employed because of
grave doubts regarding their constitutionality. See 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 224
(1981) (opining that general federal death penalty provisions are unconstitutional after Furman and Gregg); see, e.g., United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216, 1224-26 (9th
Cir. 1984) (declaring unconstitutional the death penalty provision of the general espionage statute, 18 U.S.C. § 794, due to lack of statutory procedures).
6. See infra note 187. This is not to say never charged. In fact, five of the 20
federal defendants currently on death row have been convicted and sentenced under
the 1988 CCE provisions. Death Penalty Information Center, Federal Death Row
Prisoners (visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/fedprisoners.html>
[hereinafter Federal Death Row Prisoners].
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federal death penalty procedures and extended them to over forty
federal offenses, in the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994
("FDPA"). 7 In 1996, Congress added another four federal offenses
to the death-eligible list.8 Thus, as a general proposition, the current generation of federal prosecutors has been in the business of
death penalty prosecution for only the last four years. 9
There has been virtually no scholarly presentation of the history
of the federal death penalty, and little discussion of the new federal
death penalty statutes.' 0 Little has been said about this changing
aspect of the federal prosecutor's role, although it is well underThe U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of the 1988 CCE
death penalty procedures. Lower courts have uniformly upheld them, however. See
infra Part I.E.; see also Peyton Robinson, Comment, Judge Over Jury: JudicialDiscretion in the Federal Death Penalty Under the Drug Kingpin Act, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
1491, 1494 n.25 (1997). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a federal death
penalty case involving the 1994 statutory procedures, which are substantially similar
to the 1988 CCE procedures. See United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 39 (Oct. 5, 1998). In Jones, the Court will likely put to rest any
major doubts regarding the constitutionality of both the 1988 and 1994 systems.
7. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 60002(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1959-82 (1994) (codified at
18 U.S.C. 3591-99 (1994)); see infra Part I.F.3. (discussing the 1994 Act in more
detail).
8. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1286, 1292, 1296, 1330 (1996).
9. Of course, earlier generations of federal prosecutors did prosecute death penalty cases. One well-known example was prosecuted in New York, when Assistant
United States Attorney Roy Cohn and others prosecuted Julius and Ethel Rosenberg
for espionage under 18 U.S.C. § 794. See United States v. Rosenberg, 109 F. Supp.
108 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (re-affirming death sentence).
10. Historical accounts tend to focus on the States' implementation of capital punishment, and discuss the federal provisions tangentially if at all. See, e.g., JOHN LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 19 (1960) (one sentence); HUGO ADAM
BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA

1-14 (1964) [hereinafter

BEDAU

19641

(two sentences). As for the new federal death penalty provisions, one chapter in Randall Coyne and Lyn Entzeroth's casebook, see COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 5, at
649-84, does address "The Federal Death Penalty." Three pre-1994 articles address
the 1988 CCE provisions. See Brian Serr, Of Crime and Punishment, Kingpins and
Footsoldiers, Life and Death: The Drug War and the Federal Death Penalty Provision
- Problems of Interpretation and Constitutionality, 25 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 895 (1993);
Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Drugs and Death: Congress Authorizes the Death Penalty for
Certain Drug-RelatedMurders, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 47 (1992); Sandra D. Jordan, Death
for Drug Related Killings: A Revival of the Federal Death Penalty, 67 CHICAGO-KENT
L. REV. 79 (1991). One student comment addresses the constitutionality of a proposed "Drug Kingpin Death Penalty Act." See Sandra R. Acosta, Recent Development, Imposing the Death Penalty upon Drug Kingpins, 27 HARV. J. LEGIs. 596
(1990). Four student Comments address the 1994 FDPA. See Charles C. Boettcher,
Comment, Testing the FederalDeath Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-98 (1994):
United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th cir 1998), 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1043
(1998); John P. Cunningham, Comment, Death in the FederalCourts: Expectations and
Realities of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 939 (1998);
Robinson, supra note 6; Charles Kenneth Eldred, Recent Development, The New
FederalDeath Penalties, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293 (1994).
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stood that the availability of the death penalty can dramatically affect the prosecution of a death-eligible case.11 In addition, the
Department of Justice's ("DOJ") internal death penalty review
procedures have not been subjected to scholarly analysis, despite
their inclusion in the United States Attorneys' Manual since 1995.12
The job of a high-level committee at "Main Justice, ' 13 which reviews and approves all federal death penalty prosecutions across
the country, is a new role that began only five years ago.
Overview of the Article
This Article provides a detailed exegesis and evaluation of the
federal death penalty, including .its 209-year history, recent developments in federal death penalty case law, and the process for national administration of the federal death penalty implemented by
Attorney General Janet Reno in 1995. The Article is both descriptive and evaluative, and is divided into two respective parts. While
lengthy, it is by no means exhaustive. Rather, in many regards it
and resource for further
should serve merely as a starting point
4
scholarship in this specialized area.'
A.

11. For example, "death qualified juries," which are said to be more "conviction
prone," can be, although they ethically should not be, sought strategically. Conversely, because of its daunting moral force, a potential death penalty can make already hard-to-win cases impossible. See infra Part II.A.2.
12. At the height of the UnaBomer case, the Washington Post did publicize what it
called the Department's "secret" capital case review panel in a newspaper article. See
Roberto Suro, How a Federal Case Becomes a Capital Case; Secret Panel Must Weigh
Legal Issues, Cost of Prosecution and Public Demands for Vengeance, WASH. POST,
Jan. 11, 1998, at A14. However, the existence of the Department's Capital Case Review Committee and its procedures are no secret to those familiar with the process.

They are published in the U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED
UAL § 9-10.000 (Aspen Law 1987) [hereinafter DEP'T OF

STATES ATTORNEYS' MANJUSTICE MANUAL].
The UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL is a detailed set of guidelines issued by

the DOJ to guide interpretation of criminal statutes. A copy of the UNITED STATES
ATrORNEYS' MANUAL was published in 1987 by Prentice Hall under the title DEP'T
OF JUSTICE MANUAL (currently Aspen Publishers, Inc.) in a multi-volume looseleaf
format. It is updated annually. The DOJ has more recently made the guidelines
available in an online format that is updated with greater regularity by the DOJ. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (updated Jan. 8, 1999)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/> [hereinafter UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL].
13. See JIM McGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE

7 (1996) (noting that the
DOJ's headquarters in Washington D.C. is "known as Main Justice").
14. It is a bit intimidating to attempt to write anything in the area of capital punishment. Some of the greatest legal intellects of this generation, such as Professors
Charles Black and Anthony Amsterdam, have concentrated on the topic, and as
noted capital punishment expert Professor Hugo Adam Bedau wrote in the preface in
1996 "the wealth of relevant literature is little short of overwhelming." HUGO ADAM
BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES

vi (1997)
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Part I presents the history of the federal death penalty, the recent statutes and relevant case law, and the DOJ's procedures for
administering federal death penalty prosecutions. This part begins
with history, because little, if any, detail regarding the legislative
history of the federal death penalty has been published over the
past two centuries. Much original source-mining is summarized
here. Nevertheless, given the burden of the remainder of the Article, this historical account is more brief than the topic could
support.
Part I also describes the 1988 and 1994 statutory procedures for
imposing the federal death penalty, and briefly reviews some of the
case law leading to, and resulting from, those statutes. There
seems little doubt that in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Furman,15 Gregg,16 and McCleskey, 17 the new federal statutory
procedures for imposing capital punishment are constitutional on
their face.18 However, providing a definitive analysis of the statutes and their constitutionality is not the objective of this Article.
Rather, Part I concludes by presenting in some detail the procedures that Attorney General Janet Reno implemented in January
1995 to attempt to regulate the national administration of the federal death penalty. New statistical data regarding the results of
DOJ's review process is also presented here.
[hereinafter BEDAU 1997]. Professor Bedau begins his 1997 book by apologizing that
"no one volume can do full justice to all the important" issues. Id. Imagine the temerity, then, of a single, if overlong, law review article. This Article is limited to
discussion of the federal death penalty, and even then it is incomplete on many points.
For example, this note is the only mention of the international law aspects of capital
punishment, which generate rich contemporary scholarship regarding the domestic as
well as worldwide arena. See, e.g., Hernan de J. Ruiz-Braug, Suspicious Capital Punishment: InternationalHuman Rights and the Death Penalty, 3 SAN DIEGO JUSTICE J.,
379 (1995); Ved P. Nanda, Recent Developments in the United States and Internationally Regarding Capital Punishment: An Appraisal, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 523 (1993);
Ariane M. Schreiber, Note, States that Kill: Discretion and the Death Penalty - A
Worldwide Perspective,29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 263 (1996). Finally, I also apologize to
the many authors whose works I have read but been unable to cite here.
15. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
16. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
17. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
18. The Jones case, in which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari,appears to
raise only "as applied" challenges regarding the 1994 FDPA. See supra note 6; United
States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 39 (Oct. 5, 1998)
(No. 97-9361) (presenting three questions regarding jury instructions under the
statutue and application of the statute's "harmless error" appellate review standard).
Yet in the course of deciding the difficult as-applied challenges presented in Jones, the
Court is likely to comment on the predicate question of the constitutionality of the
federal statutory provisions on their face.
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Part II evaluates the Attorney General's capital case review process and suggests a number of possibilities for improvement. For
over a decade, the United States Attorneys' Manual has required
federal prosecutors to obtain prior written authorization from the
Attorney General before proceeding with a federal death penalty
prosecution. 19 More recently, the establishment of a high-level
Capital Case Review Committee within the DOJ in 199520 and the
effort to regularize the national prosecution of federal capital cases
is a unique and laudable effort by Attorney General Janet Reno to
attempt to secure fair and consistent administration of the death
penalty at the federal level. This Committee theoretically reviews
every potentially death-eligible federal prosecution in the country,
in order to advise the Attorney General about whether or not to
authorize a pursuit of a death penalty. The Committee produces
written, although currently non-public, memoranda explaining its
recommendations. This Article posits that, in effect, the DOJ
Committee acts as a national moderator of capital punishment, and
its written recommendations represent a developing body of "common law" precedent regarding the appropriate interpretation of,
and standards for applying, the death penalty at the federal level."'
So that my presumed biases are clear, for roughly seven months
in 1996-97, I served as a member of this Committee. Without
breaching confidences, I hope to present an accurate picture of the
Committee's work and praise the positive approach I think it represents. At the same time, however, I criticize the Attorney General's review system for not reviewing enough, and I suggest
19. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12 § 9-10.000 (Oct. 1,
1988); accord id. § 2-148 (1999).
20. See id. § 9-10.050.
21. It should be noted at the outset that this Article evaluates the DOJ's death
penalty administration efforts within the framework of a "national uniformity" objective that has been set by the Attorney General and Congress. This objective embodies concepts of "procedural" uniformity as well as rough "substantive" uniformity.
This Article accepts national "consistency" as the preferred policy goal stated by the
Attorney General, and elimination of "disparities" as Congress's general position regarding federal sentencing. See infra Part II.B.1. While one can imagine a different
system - one which accepts or even encourages regional differences in death penalty
administration - such a statutory system has not been expressly written by Congress
nor endorsed by the DOJ. This Article does not attempt to evaluate further the merits of a different statutory system, not proposed by the Attorney General or enacted
by Congress, which might endorse national lack of uniformity in administration of a
federal death penalty. Cf. Charles P. Sifton, Theme and Variations: The Relationship
Between National Sentencing Standards and Local Conditions, 5 FED. SENT. REPTR.
303 (1993). The author hopes to take on the intriguing questions raised by a concept
of "uniformity" in federal criminal sentencing in a future article.
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possible changes to address some serious concerns that remain.
Regional disuniformity, unconscious racial bias, and the manipulability of language are among the concerns addressed below. Despite the Department's efforts, such issues continue to give pause
regarding human administration of the "awesome responsibility"
that death penalty statutes necessarily impose on all involved. 2
Here is a quick summary of concerns and suggestions detailed in
Part II. First, the current DOJ review system almost certainly does
not capture all cases in which a federal death penalty might potentially be sought. Yet national uniformity is not possible so long as
many exercises of prosecutorial discretion continue to go unreviewed. Second, it seems likely that "unconscious racial empathy"23 on the part of federal prosecutors also contributes to a lack
of uniformity in administration of the federal death penalty. This
Article suggests that to address regional lack of uniformity and unconscious racial empathy, the Department should institute, at least
on a trial study basis, a broader and more rigorous national review
system for potential federal death penalty cases. A system that enables Main Justice personnel to study all cases that are eligible to
enter the federal system as capital cases might enable the Department to root out gross instances of regional disuniformity as well as
racial disparities of the sort discussed in McCleskey.
In addition, the written criteria of post-Furman statutes are necessarily general and, therefore, capable of manipulation in the
hands of talented attorneys. This again leaves in doubt the likelihood of uniform application. Yet the inherent manipulability of
language cannot be eliminated. The Department could, however,
benefit from a study of its Review Committee's written memoranda, which are (consciously or otherwise) developing, case-bycase, more precise and regularized standards for applying federal
death penalty legislation.24
22. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 226 (White, J., concurring) ("Imposition of the death penalty is surely an awesome responsibility for any system of justice and those who participate in it."). In this regard, this Article is self-consciously agnostic regarding the
advisability of the death penalty. Instead, accepting the status quo, the Article attempts to suggest how to improve federal death penalty administration if we are to
have it.
23. This concept is explained and developed below. See infra Part II.
24. Notably, the authority to promulgate standards for federal criminal punishment has been delegated by Congress for most federal offenses to the United States
Sentencing Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 994. Over ten years ago, however, the Commission decided not to go forward with an effort to promulgate guidelines for death
penalty cases, questioning whether it had legal authority to do so as well as noting the
"political" dangers of attempting to regulate in such a sensitive area. See Mistretta v.
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Finally, after discussing these concerns and possible remedial
measures, the Article posits that, by selecting from a pool of federal "death-eligible" cases only those that are most aggravated for
authorization of capital prosecution, the Attorney General and her
Review Committee are in effect implementing a variation of Justice
Stevens' suggestion in McCleskey that only the most aggravated
capital cases should be eligible for imposition of the death penalty.25 If a broader and more certain Main Justice review of all
possible death penalty cases from all federal districts in the country
were instituted, it would force a national dialogue about capital
punishment among all federal prosecutors, including those who
doubt the validity of the death penalty but currently remain silent
about their opposition. Such a broad prosecutorial dialogue could
produce even more rigorous standards for federal death penalty
prosecutions. This de facto implementation of the "Stevens Solution" is not inconsistent with the 1994 federal death penalty legislation, which was a product of political compromise by some
members of Congress who did not favor capital punishment, and
which requires federal prosecutors to "believe" that the death penalty is "justified" in a specific case before seeking death.26
B. From the Hanging of Victor Feguer to the Millennium
It has been over thirty-five years since the last federal execution.
At 5:30 a.m. on February 15, 1963, twenty-seven year-old Victor H.
Feguer was publicly hanged at Fort Madison in Iowa for the kidnapping and murder of a young doctor. 27 Feguer had kidnapped
his victim in Iowa and then made the mistake of driving with him
ten miles across the state line into Illinois before shooting him.28
By accident, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Feguer
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 378 n.11 (1989); Gubensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d
1245, 1256 (9th Cir. 1988) (describing the controversy); 'Political Realities' Scuttle
Death Penalty Plan, NAT'L L.J., March 23, 1987, at 5. The field having been left open,
then, the DOJ may properly seek to develop its own standards. Moreover, Departmental standards seek to guide the discretion of its own executive branch personnel,
rather than that of judges.
25. See 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994); see infra notes 368-369 (discussing legislative history of the FDPA).
27. See Neil Shively, Feguer Dies for Dubuque Slaying, TELEGRAPH-HERALD,
Mar. 15, 1963, at 1; Kelley Matt, Ex-Governor Condemns Capital Punishment, DES
MOINES REG., March 16, 1993, at 4.
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1959) (kidnapping where person is "willfully transported in interstate ... commerce" is a federal crime); Feguer v. United States 302
F.2d 214, 218-20 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962); Last Execution Was
in Iowa, DES MOINES REG., June 14, 1997, at 6.
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(who was by then in Alabama) and the case was charged federally
and tried in U.S. District Court in Iowa.29
Then, as now, once Feguer's jury recommended that he receive
the death sentence, imposing that sentence was mandatory. 30
There is no "judge-override" procedure in federal capital sentencing. Moreover, while today's post-Furman federal death penalty
statutes provide some guidance to the jury regarding what factors
they may consider, Feguer's jury received none. Nevertheless, if
the federal government had declined to prosecute the case or had
accepted a plea bargain, Feguer could have avoided the death penalty. This constant remains: the exercise of charging and plea-bargaining discretion on the part of federal prosecutors is a hugely
important factor in determining which criminal defendants live or
die.
Before Victor Feguer was executed, Iowa's then-governor Harold Hughes is reported to have asked President Kennedy to commute the sentence.31 It thus seems clear that Feguer would not
have been executed had state rather, than federal, prerogatives
controlled. 32 Similarly today, the states are not in agreement regarding capital punishment. Almost one-quarter of the States
(twelve) currently do not authorize the death penalty at all, and
another seventeen States rarely implement it. 33 But meanwhile,
Congress has enacted a nationally-applicable federal death penalty
structure and has stated a general sentencing policy that regional
"disparities" should be avoided. 34 In addition, the Attorney Gen29. See Feguer, 302 F.2d at 223-26. The actual murder was committed in the state
of Illinois; federal venue in Iowa resulted from the location of the kidnapping. Of
course, Feguer had also committed serious state offenses: murder chargeable in Illinois, and a kidnapping which Iowa state authorities could have charged. See United
States v. Feguer, 192 F. Supp. 377, 379-83 (N.D. Iowa 1961). Instead, mere chance
brought the FBI into Feguer's life - they mistook him for a different federal fugitive.
See 302 F.2d at 224. This random fortuity together with his crossing state lines landed
Feguer in federal rather than state court, in a State where the governor opposed
Feguer's capital punishment but could do nothing to prevent it.
30. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1959) (kidnapping where victim not released
unharmed "shall" be punished by death, "if the jury shall so recommend") with 18
U.S.C. § 3594 (1998) (where federal jury recommends death sentence, "the court shall
sentence the defendant accordingly").
31. See Matt, supra note 27.
32. The Supremacy Clause, of course, appears to render this a legally irrelevant
point. See U.S. Const., art. VI, cl.2 ("The ...Laws of the United States... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby
33. See infra notes 487-490.
34. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1998) (stating a federal sentencing policy of
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eral has announced national guidelines to govern "all Federal cases
in[volving] ... an offense subject to the death penalty," in order to
achieve "consistency and fairness. '35 Thus, while the Attorney
General seeks to achieve national uniformity in the administration
of the federal death penalty, no such conformity among the states
exists. Significant federalism and state sovereignty issues lurk beneath the surface of a nationally uniform federal death penalty.36
Although Feguer's hanging generated a banner headline in the
Dubuque Telegraph-Herald,it received no mention at all in The
New York Times or other newspapers of national note. 37 The significance of this execution becomes clear only now: Victor Feguer's
hanging was likely the last federal execution in the twentieth
century.38
"avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct").
35. UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12 §§ 9-10.010-10.080.
36. Perhaps the most interesting sovereignty and federalism questions arise in Puerto Rico, whose Constitution expressly prohibits capital punishment. Puerto Rico is
not a State, but it does constitute one of the 94 federal judicial districts in the United
States. Because of Puerto Rico's commonwealth relationship with the United States,
Congress effectively had to approve its constitution when accepting the relationship.
Thus, it can be argued that Congress has effectively stated two competing policies for
Puerto Rico: prohibition of capital punishment in the constitutional document, while
providing applicable death penalties in the 1988 and 1994 federal statutes. Moreover,
because violent crime is unfortunately prevalent in Puerto Rico, the local authorities
have entered into a "Memorandum of Understanding" with the local U.S. Attorney's
office, agreeing that the federal authorities will prosecute much of the "local" violent
crime, such as car-jackings, in Puerto Rico. As a result, the Puerto Rico U.S. Attorney's Office has submitted the largest number of potential death penalty cases (59) of
any of the 94 federal districts since the Capital Case Review protocol was issued in
1995. Yet, the local, largely Catholic population opposes capital punishment. The
effect, if any, of this complex set of facts on federal death penalty prosecutions remains uncertain.
37. Shively, supra note 27. Proof of this is based upon the negative results from a
review of microfilm indices of the New York Times, Wall Street Journal,Christian Science Monitor and the Los Angeles Times for March 15, 1963, and the following week.
38. Other interesting points about the Feguer case: (1) his hanging reportedly
took over nine minutes, see id., yet, in 1994, the Ninth Circuit upheld hanging as a
constitutional execution method, assuming it caused "rapid unconsciousness" and
death "within... seconds," Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 681-87 (9th Cir. 1993) (en
banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1215 (1994), 511 U.S. 1119 (1994); (2) Feguer's conviction
and death penalty were affirmed by an opinion authored by then Eighth Circuit Judge
Harry Blackmun, who three decades later concluded that the death penalty cannot be
constitutionally administered, see Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)); (3) after his arrest in Birmingham, Alabama, Feguer was briefly represented by Hugo L. Black, Jr., described by
the Eighth Circuit simply as "a competent lawyer and one experienced in federal
court matters." 302 F.2d at 226. This likely was the son of then-Supreme Court Justice
Hugo L. Black. See 371 U.S. 872 (1962) (Justice Black took no part in considering
Feguer's petition for certiorari).
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Surely the next federal criminal execution will receive more national attention; 39 and it seems just as certain that such an execution will occur. After sixteen years of federal stalemate in the
wake of Furman, Congress enacted procedures in 1988 for constitutionally imposing a death penalty for violation of a serious narcotics statute, and extended similar (although not identical)
procedures to over forty different federal offenses in 1994.40
Then, on April 19, 1995, "a massive explosion tore apart the
Murrah [Federal] Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing a
total of 168 people and injuring hundreds more. '41 In 1997,
Timothy McVeigh was sentenced to death for the bombing after
conviction under two newly death eligible federal offenses, and his
42
conviction and sentence have been affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.
The enormity of the Oklahoma City bombing places a human face
on the certainty of further federal executions. It was the largest act
of domestic terrorism ever visited upon the United States; even an
appellate court's relatively dry account of victim testimony at McIn his dissent in Furman, Justice Blackmun, who had been the 1962 author of
Feguer's appellate affirmance, perspicaciously noted that Feguer "may have been one
of the last to be executed under federal auspices." 408 U.S. at 406. Feguer's execution was also the last execution in the state of Iowa, which repealed its death penalty
in 1965 and remains one of 12 states with no death penalty. 41 Executions;None Since
'63, DES MOINES REG., March 3, 1995, at 2.
Of course, it is possible that a federal prisoner could be executed prior to the year
2001. For example, David Paul Hammer, who was sentenced to death in November
1998 for murdering a fellow inmate while serving a 1,200-year Oklahoma state sentence in a federal prison facility, filed a pro se motion a month later asking to withdraw his appeal in order to "facilitate the expeditious implementation of ...death."
See Memorandum... In Opposition to Appellant's Pro Se Motion to Withdraw His
Appeal, United States v. Hammer, No. 98-9011 (3rd Cir. Dec. 7, 1998) 1-2. Hammer
later withdrew his motion and issues regarding his mental competence have been
raised, making further deviation from the normal capital review process unlikely.
Nevertheless, there is precedent for allowing a competent prisoner to drop all appeals
and "volunteer" to be executed. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). See also
infra notes 199-205 (discussing Chandlerand Garza cases).
39. Consider the intense media and judicial focus when California carried out its
first state criminal execution in 25 years, of Robert Alton Harris in 1992. See, e.g.,
Katherine Bishop, After Night of Court Battles, a California Execution, N.Y. TIMES,
April 22, 1992, at A2; Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000 (1992) (forbidding any further
stays of Harris' execution). The Harris execution even generated a thoughtful essay
by one of the federal judges who was deeply involved in the last-minute stay efforts at
the Ninth Circuit. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Horses of the Night: Vasquez v. Harris, 45
Stan. L. Rev. 1011 (1993), and law review commentary in a leading journal, see Evan
Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton Harris,102
YALE L.J 225 (1992).
40. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-98 (1994).
41. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998).
42. See id. at 1193-1222.
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Veigh's sentencing brings tears to one's eyes.43 While others may
be on a faster track to execution," none seem more certain than
Timothy McVeigh.
Today the death penalty is now available under at least forty-one
different federal code sections, 5 and there are twenty persons
under sentence of death imposed by a federal court.46 While the
appellate and habeas processes are lengthy, constitutional attacks
on the new federal death penalty procedures have uniformly been
rejected.47 Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a
federal death penalty case which, while appearing to present difficult as-applied issues under the FDPA, seems likely to provide a
vehicle for validating the new federal death penalty statutes on
their face.48 Thus, a thorough understanding of the federal death
penalty and its implications is now an important part of the federal
prosecutor's job.

43. See id. at 1218-22. Indeed, the crime was so extreme that the normally cautious Attorney General responded to a question about a potential death penalty at a
Presidential news conference that same day by saying simply, "[w]e will seek it."
Nichols v. Reno, 124 F.3d 1376, 1377 (10th Cir. 1997). Two and a half years of litigation ensued to rebut the argument that Ms. Reno had improperly prejudged the case.
Id. Of course, the emotional impact of victim testimony in death penalty cases is
precisely what makes its admission so controversial. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808 (1991) (affirming admission and overruling contrary precedent); Beth E. Sullivan,
Harnessing Payne: Controlling the Admission of Victim Impact Statements to Safeguard Capital Sentencing Hearingsfrom Passion and Prejudice, 25 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 601 (1998) (proposing guidelines to regulate the use of victim impact statements
during capital sentencing proceedings).
44. See infra notes 199-205 (discussing Chandler case).
45. See infra note 242. The precise number of federal crimes currently subject to a
death penalty is open to dispute, depending on how you count. The number of separate U.S. Code sections that provide a potential death penalty is 41, see U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1997 4,
(Dec. 1998) [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1997]. However, some code

Table 2
sections

define more than one offense. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(d), (f), (i) (1998).
46. Federal Death Row Prisoners,supra note 6.
47. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 6. In Jones, the Fifth Circuit approved a jury instruction which
suggested that Jones might receive some undefined "lesser sentence" if the jury deadlocked, and ruled that two improperly-duplicative non-statutory aggravating factors
had been erroneously presented to the jury but were nevertheless "harmless" in determination of the sentence "beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones, 132 F.2d at 242-48,
252. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari is limited to two questions regarding the
jury instructions and one regarding application of the statutory harmless error standard. 119 S. Ct. 39, 40 (1998). While these questions raise serious issues about how
the FDPA should be applied in specific cases, none of them are broad attacks on the
statute itself.
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A History of the Federal Death Penalty

The death penalty is not new to federal criminal law - only its
current procedures are, after a quarter century hiatus. While the
Constitution itself did not mention the death penalty, its framers
did. Less than a year after the nation's constitutional formation, on
April 30, 1790, Congress enacted mandatory death penalties for
roughly a dozen newly-created federal offenses, and provided that
the method of federal execution would be by hanging.4 9 The history of the federal death penalty can be described in three broad
historical movements: (1) establishing mandatory death penalties
in 1790; (2) granting juries absolute discretion to not impose the
death penalty in 1897; and (3) reinstating numerous "guided discretion" death penalties in 1994. In each of these actions, Congress
has acted not as a leader, but rather as a follower of well-established state law trends.
A.

The Framers' Actions

When establishing the Union in 1787, the Framers appear to
have given little attention to the death penalty. This is unsurprising. Death as a penalty for serious felonies was common in the
eighteenth century, and the Constitution simply assumes, without
ever stating expressly, that capital punishment will be imposed.
For example, the Fifth Amendment explicitly assumes that there
will be "capital" crimes and suggests that persons may be deprived
of "life," if such is accomplished with due process of law.50
In the body of the Constitution itself, the death penalty is never
mentioned. However treason, traditionally a capital offense, is
mentioned in Article III, and Congress is expressly authorized to
"declare the punishment of treason."' 5 1 The debate regarding this
clause in the Constitutional Convention strongly indicates that the

49. 1 Stat. 119 § 33 (1790). The First Congress also provided that prisoners
charged with federal capital offenses were entitled to counsel which the court was
"required ...to assign." 1 Stat. 118 § 29 (1790).
50. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime... nor shall any person... be deprived of life... without

due process of law") (emphasis added). See

ANTONIN SCALIA,

PRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gatman

(1996).
51. U.S.

CONST. art.

III, § 3.

A MATTER OF INTERed., 1966) 46, 145-46

FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

19991

Framers assumed that treason would be punished by death,52 and
the First Congress soon so provided.53
In its First Session, from March to September 1789, 54 the First
Congress addressed criminal law topics only tangentially, when
necessary to the complete definition of other legislative structures.'5 Although a Senate Committee was appointed early in the
First Session to "defin[e] the crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States, and their punishment," and the Senate passed such a bill, House action was
deferred until the Second Session. 6 The First Session closed in
September by proposing a twelve-article Bill of Rights to the
States, ten articles of which were ratified by a sufficient number of
States in 1791. 57 Thus our most basic constitutional criminal procedure tenets were not even drafted until the end of the First Session,
and it seems unsurprising that the substantive definition of federal
crimes and their punishment were not a discrete focus of attention
until the Congress returned for its Second Session in January
1790.8
Nevertheless, capital punishment was occasionally mentioned in
the First Congress' First Session, particularly in the first Judiciary
52. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966) 347 (describing that on Monday, Aug. 20, "Mr. King observed that the
controversy relating to Treason might be of less magnitude than was supposed, as the
legislature might punish capitally under other names than Treason."). The "controversy" referred to revolved around how specifically "Treason" should be defined in
the constitutional document, and whether treason committed against a State (as opposed to against the United States) could be separately punished. See id. at 345-50.
53. See 1 Stat. 112 Ch. 9 § 1 (1790).
54. The First Session of the First Congress ran from March 4 to September 29,
1789, in New York City. See 1 Stat. 23 (1789). The Second Session ran from January 4
to August 12, 1790. See 1 Stat. 99 (1790).
55. For example, in a lengthy "Act to regulate the collection of... Duties," 1 Stat.
29-49 (1789), which was only the fifth Act passed for the new nation, Congress stated
a number of "offence[s]" requiring "conviction." Id. at 43 (§ 25, concealing or buying
goods knowing that they are subject to seizure); 44 (§ 27, forcibly resisting or impeding customs officer); 46 (§ 35, dealing with bribes and false entries).

56. 1 ANNALS

OF CONGRESS

35-6 (1834) (Senate committee appointed on May 13,

1789); id. at 55 (Senate Committee reports bill on July 28, 1789); id. at 55 (Senate
passes bill on Sept. 1, 1789); id. at 866 (House receives bill on September 1, 1789); id.
at 84 (on September 18, 1789, House informs Senate that it has agreed to postpone
consideration of crime bill until the next session). Id.
57. See 1 Stat. 97-98 (1789). The proposed Bill of Rights contained 12 provisions,
id., but only 10 were ratified by a sufficient number of states. See 1 Stat. 21, n.(a)
(1789). Thus, for example, the First Amendment to the Constitution was actually
enumerated as the Third Article in the Bill of Rights that Congress proposed. See
DAVID

P. CURRIE,

THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD

1801, 5 (1997).
58. 1 Stat. 99 (1790).

1789-
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Act. For example, Section 29 of the Act contained an explicit
death penalty venue and jury selection provision.5 9 Section 33 provided that "where the punishment may be death," bail could be
granted or denied only by order of, and at the discretion of, a federal court or judge. 60 Yet, it was not until Section 35 of the Judiciary Act that Congress provided for federal prosecutors, by
directing the appointment in each federal district of a "meet person
learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States" - the
first mention of the office of U.S. Attorney in our nation's
history.61
Having adjourned after establishing federal district courts in
September 1789,62 the First Congress turned to completing the first
attempt at drafting a federal criminal code when it returned for its
Second Session in January 1790.63 Four months later, on April 30,
1789, Congress enacted a lengthy "Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States."64 Federal offenses of treason, murder, piracy and forgery were defined and, as was common
59. See 1 Stat. 88 sec. 29 (1789). "[I]n cases punishable with death, the trial shall
be had in the county where the offence was committed, or where that cannot be done
without great inconvenience, 12 petit jurors shall be summoned from thence." Id.
Whether there were any such federal death penalty cases at this time is an interesting
historical question. Although there were no federal capital statutes yet, it is possible
that there were federal prosecutions based on common law since it was not until 22
years later, in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812), that the
Supreme Court definitively ruled that federal district courts have no jurisdiction to
handle non-statutory "common law" criminal offenses.
60. 1 Stat. 91 (1789). Consideration of bail issues in capital cases was thereby
reserved for federal officials, while state judges were expressly permitted to act on
bail in non-capital federal cases. See id.
61. See 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (according to Webster's, "meet" as an adjective means
"suitable" or "qualified" (WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1529 (2d ed. 1956))).
The office of Attorney General was created in the same Section of the Judiciary Act,
but only after the establishment of U.S. Attorneys for each federal district. See 1 Stat.
93 (1789). Many U.S. Attorneys would applaud the sense of priorities shown by the
First Congress in this ordering.
62. 1 Stat. 98 (1789).
63. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 977 (1790) (Senate passes amended crime bill and
sends it to the House on January 28, 1790).
64. 1 Stat. 112-19 (1790); see 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1519-22 (House takes up
and passes crime bill, April 5-10, 1790); id. at 999-1000 (on April 12 and 14, 1790,
Senate reconsiders crime bill and "sundry amendments" passed by the House, and
resolves to disagree with three proposed House amendments); id. at 1001 (House
agrees to Senate version of crime bill on April 19, 1790). See generally CURRIE, supra
note 57, at 93-7. It should be noted that a number of page citations regarding the
crime bill in the Index to the ANNALS are erroneous. To keep the significance of the
first crime bill in perspective, it should also be noted that the bill was not nearly as
long nor as detailed as the First Congress's "Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties"
on ships, vessels, and imports. See 1 Stat. 29-49 (1789).
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for that age, the mandatory penalty upon conviction was set at
death.65 Death was also stated as the penalty for more arcane federal offenses.66 While these offenses are arguably separate, some
were described within a single section of the Act. 67 Thus, depending on how the offenses are counted, a federal death penalty was
enacted in 1790 for roughly twelve federal offenses.68
Notably, the death penalty provisions generated the only reported debate in either House regarding the entire crime bill.69 In
both instances, the legislative debate was eerily similar to debating
points heard regarding capital punishment today. First, when the
Senate returned to the crimes bill in January 1790, it added a provision, macabre by today's standards, to allow judges to order delivery of an executed defendant's body "to a surgeon for
dissection. ' 7° When the House took up the bill in April 1790, a
motion was made to strike the dissection provision as "wounding
the feelings of the living, and it could do no good . . . . It was
65. See 1 Stat. 112, sec. 1 (1790) ("treason... shall suffer death,"); 1 Stat. 113, sec.
3 ("willful murder" on federal property "shall suffer death"); 1 Stat. 113-14, sec. 8
(piracy "shall suffer death"); 1 Stat 115, sec. 14 (forgery and counterfeiting "shall suffer death"). See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976) (stating that by
1791, "the States uniformly followed the common-law practice of making death the
exclusive and mandatory sentence for certain specified offenses") (citing HUGO
ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA

5-6, 15, 27-8 (rev. ed. 1967)).

66. These offenses included: offenses committed on the high seas when punishable
by death "if committed within the body of a county;" violent acts committed on a
ship's commander to hinder defense of the ship or its goods; "mak[ing] a revolt in the
ship;" "any act of hostility against the United States, or any citizen thereof, upon the
high sea under colour of authority from any foreign prince or state;" aiding and abetting piracy; assisting forgery or uttering forged public securities; and rescue or freeing
of anyone convicted of a federal capital offense. See 1 Stat. 113-14 sec. 8-10, 115 sec.
14, 117 sec. 23 (1790).
67. Just as today a number of separate offenses may be found within a single section of the U.S. Code.
68. See infra notes 241-242 (discussing the variable counting of federal offenses
subject to the death penalty). Other federal crimes with lesser penalties were also
defined in this first federal crime bill. See Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of
Federalization,46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1063-64 (1995) [hereinafter Little, Myths and
Principles of Federalization]. In addition, other punishments now fallen out of favor
were stated: public whipping ("not exceeding thirty-nine stripes") for larceny, military
supply theft, receipt of stolen goods or harboring felons or thieves, 1 Stat. 116, secs.
16-17 (1790), and one hour of "stand[ing] in the pillory" for perjury, 1 Stat. 116, sec.
18 (1790).
69. Other debate plainly occurred; however, it was not recorded in the ANNALS OF
CONGRESS summary reports. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1522 (1789) (reporting, without additional detail, "further discussion" on the bill on April 8-9, 1789, and
"several amendments.").
70. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 977 (January 28, 1790). Cf An Organ DonationOffer
on Death Row is Refused, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at 23 (reporting refusal of Texas
officials to allow condemned inmate to donate his organs at a hospital).
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making the punishment wear the appearance of cruelty, which had
a tendency to harden the public mind."' 71 Supporters of the provision, however, argued that the provision made "those who had injured society to contribute to its advantage by furnishing subjects
of experimental surgery," and noted the "important improvements
which had been made in surgery from experiments. '72 They also
argued the benefit of general deterrence: the provision "was attended with salutary effects, as it certainly increased the dread of
punishment. ' 73 After two days of debate, with James Madison
among others supporting the dissection provision, the motion to
strike it failed.74
Second, the House debated whether to remove the death penalty
for passing counterfeit currency. 75 Opponents of the penalty noted
that "the degrees of punishment ought to be proportioned to the
malignancy of the offence," and also argued that capital punishment for uttering "would tend to prevent convictions. ' 76 Proponents, however, argued that there was little difference between
forgery and uttering a forged bill, and forgery is a "crime against
the most important interests of society, and of a peculiarly malignant tendency in the present and probable situation of the United
States. ' 77 The unlikely prospects of rehabilitation were also
stressed: "[p]ersons addicted to forgery are seldom, if ever, reclaimed - the security of the society, therefore, appears to depend
on a capital punishment." 78 . In the end, the death penalty for uttering remained in the bill.
The First Congress also seemed to recognize that cases involving
a potential death sentence are different, 79 specifying special procedures for the handling of federal capital cases. Such procedures
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1520 (April 5, 1789).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. (April 6, 1789). The provision as enacted appears at 1 Stat. 113, sec. 4
(1790). The First Congress was quite serious about the dissection option: they made it
a separate federal crime to forcibly rescue or attempt to rescue an executed federal
offender's body. See 1 Stat. 113, sec. 5 (1790).
75. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1521 (April 7, 1789).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Justice Stewart appears to have coined this phrase, see Furman, 408 U.S. at 306
(Stewart, J., concurring) (opening sentence: "The penalty of death differs from all
other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind"), although the sentiment had previously been expressed by others. See e.g., United States v. Palmer, 16
U.S. 610, 628 (1818) ("in expounding a law which inflicts capital punishment, no over
rigid construction ought to be admitted"). See generally Daniel Ross Harris, Capital

71. 1
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included the appointment of up to two "counsel learned in the
law," required to be given "free access at all seasonable hours" to
their client, full rights of compelled process for witnesses, and the
required production of an advance copy of the jury list "two entire
days at least before the trial." 80 In addition, the "benefit of
clergy," a common law mechanism that had developed as a way of
avoiding the mandatory death penalty for first offenders, was expressly prohibited for any federal defendant convicted of a capital
crime."s Finally, the First Congress specified the manner of federal
execution as "by hanging the person convicted by the neck until
dead."82
The federal death penalty thus has been part of our national
structure since our country's earliest origins. At least a dozen federal capital offenses were defined by the First Congress, with death
penalties mandatory upon conviction and special procedures specified for the trial of capital punishment cases. While there has been
a hiatus in federal executions for thirty-six years, and constitutional
implementation procedures were not enacted until sixteen years after Furman, the federal criminal code 3 has never lacked specified,
statutory death penalty offenses, from 1790 to the present day.84

Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreatfor the "Death Is Different" Doctrine,40
AM. U. L. REv. 1389 (1991).
80. 1 Stat. 118-19, sec. 29 (1790). The Sixth Amendment, which guarantees "compulsory process" for all criminal prosecutions, had of course not yet been adopted.
81. See 1 Stat. 119, sec. 31 (1790). See GEORGE W. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF
CLERGY IN AMERICA (1955); BEDAU 1964, supra note 10, at 4 n.6 (noting that "without benefit of clergy" meant "not that a condemned man must go to his grave without
the consolations of a spiritual advisor ... but that his conviction for a capital crime
was not subject to a reduction").
82. 1 Stat. 119, sec. 33 (1790).
83. The phrase "federal criminal code" is a misleading euphemism, describing
hundreds of criminal provisions scattered throughout dozens of Titles in the United
States Code. See Little, Myths and Principlesof Federalization,supra note 68, at 1035
n.21; Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BuFF.
CRIM.

L. REv. 45, 53 (1998).

84. Accord Furman, 408 U.S. at 465 (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (stating "our Nation's legislators have thought [capital punishment] necessary since our country was
founded"); 137 CONG. REC. S8496-01, 8499 (daily ed. June 24, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Hatch: "There has always been a federal death penalty"). See also COYNE &
ENTZEROTH, supra note 5, at 683 & 1995-96 Supp. at 105 n.4 (noting that while all
federal death penalty statutes were likely unconstitutional after Furman, they were
"never amended nor.., deleted," and thus survived as "zombie statutes").
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B.. From 1790 to the 1897 Act to Making the Federal Death
Penalty Fully Discretionary
Thirty-five years after federal capital crimes were first defined,
the House of Representatives directed the President to report on
the number of convictions, pardons, and executions for such offenses.85 In 1829, the President reported that in the Nation's first
thirty-six years, there had been 138 federal capital trials, yielding
118 convictions. 86 Of these, forty-two offenders hadbeen executed
and sixty-four had been pardoned.87 The perceived harshness of
mandatory death penalty statutes appears to have been demonstrated early on by this high percentage of pardons.
Indeed, by the mid-nineteenth century, a national movement
had formed to ameliorate the States' mandatory capital punishment structures, in response to merciful instincts as well as a more
pragmatic concern regarding acquittals due to "jury nullification"
in sympathetic cases.88 In 1845, the American Society for the Abolition of Capital Punishment was founded.8 9 By the 1890s (the
Civil War having provided an intervening distraction), a number of
states had made capital punishment discretionary even after conviction. 9° The shift to discretionary capital punishment was a compromise between ardent capital punishment abolitionists and those
who still favored the death penalty. 91 Postbellum race prejudice
likely also played a role, as discretionary capital sentencing enabled all-white juries to dispense death penalties "in the desired
manner," along racial lines.92
85. H. REs. 545 (Jan. 13, 1825), reported in H.R. REP. No. 53-545, at 6 (1894).
86. H.R. EXEC. No. 20-146 (1829), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 53-545, app. at 6,
table 1.
87. See id. Of the 12 remaining federal capital offenders, "[o]ne suicided; 3 died; 2
escaped; and 6 [were] unaccounted for." Id. This rather sanguine presidential report
of escaped and "unaccounted for" federal capital offenders seems quite unimaginable
today.
88. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 9-10 (3d ed. 1982)
[hereinafter BEDAU 1982]. See Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 310 (1899)
(noting "the reluctance of jurors to concur in a capital conviction"); see generally
ROBERT H. LOEB, JR., CRIME AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 29 (1978) (containing a
brief description of nineteenth century movement against widespread capital
punishment).
89. See BEDAU 1964, supra note 10, at 21; LOEB, supra note 88, at 29.
90. See BEDAU 1982, supra note 88, at 9-10; see also BEDAU 1964, supra note 10, at
28.
91. See BEDAU 1964, supra note 10, at 27-28; BEDAU 1982, supra note 88, at 11;
H.R. REP. No. 54-108 at 2 (1896) (recommending passage of 1897 ameliorating bill
because "the people are not ... ready for total abolition").
92. BEDAU 1982, supra note 88, at 11; see also Kenneth M. Murchison & Arthur J.
Schwab, Note, Capital Punishment in Virginia, 58 VA. L. REV. 97, 106-07 (1972).
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In 1892, Newton M. Curtis, a Civil War hero of some note and
later a Congressional Representativefrom New York, introduced a
bill for "the total abolition of the [federal] punishment of death."93
In 1894, Curtis published an influential report on capital punishment, designed to support his federal abolition bill and described
by his House colleagues as "probably the most thorough and exhaustive [study] ever made in this country."94 Representative Curtis appears to have been the single most influential force behind
the first alteration in federal death penalty policies in over a
century.
Congress did not entirely abolish federal capital punishment in
response to Curtis's report. But it did enact a bill in 1897 entitled
"An Act To Reduce The Cases In Which The Death Penalty May
Be Inflicted," 95 a law which is now largely forgotten. This statute
abolished the death penalty for all but five federal statutory sections, substituting a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor for
many previously capital offenses. 96 Moreover, the 1897 Act effectively made all federal capital punishment completely discretionary
by expressly authorizing the jury in any federal murder or rape
case that remained death-eligible to qualify its verdict of conviction
by adding the words "without capital punishment," in which case a
life imprisonment sentence had to be imposed.97 Because the
other three federal code sections for which death remained a possi93. Newton M. Curtis, The Death Penalty Undesirable and Not Sustained by Divine Authority, reprinted in VOICES AGAINST DEATH 143 (Phillip English Mackey,

ed., 1976) (describing H.R. 7197 of the 52d Congress). Curtis joined the Union army
and rose to the rank of Brigadier General before the age of 30. He must have been a
remarkably persuasive person; he was elected to the New York State Legislature in
1884 and by 1890 persuaded the Assembly to vote 75-29 for the abolition of the death
penalty. He spoke convincingly of his experience as a military commander who had
to administer martial law, presumably including ordering military executions. See id.
at 141 (detailing Curtis's biographical information); id. at 146 (Curtis notes "[t]he
large number of executions which took place in the Army during the late war").
94. NEWTON M. CURTIS, CAPITAL CRIMES AND THE PUNISHMENTS PRESCRIBED
THEREFOR BY FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS AND THOSE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES,
WITH STATISTICS RELATING TO THE SAME (1894) [hereinafter CURTIS REPORT], reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 53-545, app. at 1, 5 (1894). General Curtis's Report was

appended to this 1894 House Report as well as to an 1895 Senate Report and an 1896
House Report, all of which addressed the proposed death penalty legislation that was
finally enacted in 1897. See S. REP. No. 53-846 at 2 (1895); H.R. REP. No. 54-108 at 3
(1896).
95. Act of Jan. 15, 1897, ch. 29, 29 Stat. 487 (1898).
96. See id., sec. 3.

97. Id., sec. 1. The 1897 Act was a separate, free-standing section in the federal
code, and the offense-defining statutes for murder and rape still indicated that the
death penalty was mandatory. See Rev. Stat. of the U.S. §§ 5339, 5345 (2d ed. 1878).
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ble penalty already included discretionary provisions,98 mandatory
federal death penalties were in fact entirely eliminated by the 1897
Act.
The Congressional Reports on the 1897 legislation all included
Curtis's claim that the conviction rate from 1789 to 1826 for federal
capital cases had been 85%, but by 1897 was "less than 20 percent
in the Federal courts and still less in the State Courts." 99 They also
reproduced Curtis's statistics showing that from 1890-1894, while
there had been 727 lawful executions in the States and territories,
there had been 1,118 lynchings. 100 Curtis decried the "uncertain
and abortive" status of statutory capital punishment, leading to
what he suggested was the consequent increase in extra-legal resorts to "Judge Lynch's Court." '' The final House Report also
reprinted an interesting letter from the U.S. Attorney in Paris,
Texas, who represented that he currently had seventy-three murder
cases set for trial and urged speedy passage of the bill because the
"severity" of the mandatory death penalty "prevents the juries
from either reaching a verdict or leads them to acquit the
defendant."' 2
In 1899, the Supreme Court approved the 1897 Act which lodged
absolute discretion regarding imposition of the federal death penalty with the jury, in three companion cases heard under the caption of Winston v. United States.10 3 The Court noted "[t]he
difficulty of laying down exact and satisfactory definitions of degrees in the crime of murder, applicable to all possible circumstances," and explained the broad legislative grant of discretion to
capital juries as a "more simple and flexible rule."'10 4 The Court
98. The other three sections in the Revised Statutes for which death remained an
available, but discretionary, penalty were two military codes, Rev. Stat. § 1342, Articles of War for the Army, and Rev. Stat. § 1624, Articles for the Navy, and the treason
statute, Rev. Stat. § 5332. See, e.g., Rev. Stat. of the U.S. at 232, 239; 276-77; 1036 (2d
ed. 1878). The military sections both provided that offenders "shall suffer death or
such other punishment as a court-martial may direct," and the treason statute provided for punishment by death or no less than five years at hard labor in the discre-

tion of the judge. Id.
99. H.R.

100. See

REP. No. 54-108 at 3.
CURTIS REPORT, supra

note 94, at 6-7, table 3.

101. Id. at 3.
102. H.R. REP. No. 54-108 at 1.
103. See Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303 (1899). All three cases came from
the District of Columbia, an exclusive federal enclave; and by coincidence or otherwise, all involved murders committed by men upon their female lovers. See id. at 30408.
104. Id. at 312. This foreshadowed the debate regarding the feasibility of drafting
written capital punishment criteria that separated Justices Harlan and Brennan in Mc-
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reversed the death sentences in the cases because the trial judge
had instructed the juries that the 1897 statute did not permit them
to qualify their capital verdict unless "mitigating or palliating circumstances were proved."' °5 This was error because the statute
did not so limit the juries' discretion. Instead, federal law now
committed "to the sound discretion of the jury, and of the jury
that
alone," the decision to be lenient whenever the jury 1concluded
06
such would be "just or wise," for any reason at all.
C. The Twentieth Century to Furman: Unguided Federal
Discretion
The absolute and unguided discretion granted to federal juries at
the turn of the twentieth century remained the heart of federal
death penalty procedural law until Furman was decided in 1972.107
Although the United States Code was revised twice, in 1909 and
1948, the discretionary "without capital punishment" option was
carried forward for murder. 08 It was dropped with regard to rape
in the 1948 revision of the federal criminal code, because the substantive sentencing provision for rape was amended to permit imposition of "death or imprisonment for any term of years or for
Gautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). See infra notes 689-690 and accompanying
text (discussing McGautha).
105. Winston, 172 U.S. at 313, 305-09.
106. Id. at 313. The Court cited similar judicial decisions in four states with similar
statutory provisions. See id.
107. See Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
108. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, reprinted in 35 Stat. 1088-1159; Pub. L. No. 80772 (1948), reprinted in 62 Stat. 683-868. The 1948 revision of the federal criminal
code, which first created Title 18, was a mammoth five-year project labelled "Epochal
Legislation" on the cover of the special (and now hard-to-find) 668-page "pamphlet"

of the 1948 U.S.

CODE CONG. SERVICE

issued to report the Act's legislative history.

In the 1909 revision, the substantive murder and rape sections were kept separate
from the 1897 ameliorating legislation, so that a mandatory death penalty appeared to
be stated where the offenses were defined but a separate section still gave the jury the
option of stating "without capital punishment." Compare 35 Stat. 1143, 1152, sec. 273
(murder) and sec. 278 (rape) with sec. 330 (without capital punishment). In a significant ameliorating development, the 1909 revision also subdivided federal murder into
first and second-degrees, and limited the death penalty to only first-degree murder
convictions. See 35 Stat. 1152 sec. 273, 275.
In the 1948 revision, the discretionary "without capital punishment" language from
1897 was merged into the substantive murder offense section, as it was no longer
needed for rape in light of the amendment to that statute's punishment provision as
quoted in the text. H.R. REP. No. 80-304 (1947) at A90 (Revisor's Notes); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1111 (1946 & Supp. V 1952). See also infra note 109.
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life."' 10 9 Also in 1948, the Supreme Court ruled that the jury must
be unanimous for death to be imposed under the 1897 statute."'
Meanwhile, federal executions in the twentieth century were relatively infrequent. From 1927 through Victor Feguer's execution in
1963, only twenty-four federal executions were carried out."1
Eight of these were for wartime espionage or sabotage, including
the Rosenberg executions in 1953.112 Feguer's hanging was the
only federal execution in the 1960s; the federal death penalty was
virtually moribund. 113 In 1967, a bill to abolish the death penalty
for federal crimes was introduced in the Senate, although it went
no further than hearings held in 1968.114
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1946 & Supp. V 1952). Interestingly, the 1947 Revisor's
Notes stated that the 1897 statute's language was not included in the revised statute
"since the rewritten punishment for rape removes the necessity for a qualified verdict." H.R. REP. No. 80-304, at A90. However, the 1897 statute had lodged the discretion not to impose death with the jury; the 1948 revised language had the effect of
removing the discretion from the jury and lodging it with the sentencing judge. This
change was not noted in the legislative history and appears to have been overlooked.
But only a few years later, it became the dispositive basis for a (temporary) reversal
of federal rape death sentences imposed on the Krull brothers for a national park
rape in the 1950s. See Krull v. United States, 240 F.2d 122, 131-34 (5th Cir.), cert. den.
353 U.S. 915 (1957).
110. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 749 (1948).
111. Death Penalty Information Center, Executions of FederalPrisoners1927-1998
(visited Nov. 12, 1998) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/fedexec.html>. In 1937, Congress amended the federal capital sentencing statute to allow any state-approved
method of execution, as opposed to requiring hanging. See Andres, 333 U.S. at 745,
n.6.
112. See id; see also supra note 9. In addition to the Rosenbergs, six male prisoners
were executed for sabotage in 1942, just two months after they were arrested and one
month after they were tried by a Presidentially appointed military commission. See
id.; see also Ex ParteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The speed of this extraordinary case is
breathtaking and can be explained only by the dramatic wartime atmosphere of
World War II. The prisoners entered the United States covertly in mid-June 1942 and
by July 2 had been arrested and were subject to a special military trial proclaimed by
President Roosevelt. See id. at 21-2. The case was argued to the Supreme Court over
two days in July during a special session called by Chief Justice Stone; the case was
decided the day after oral argument and the prisoners were executed a week later. See
id. at 1, 5.
113. The same cannot be said, however, regarding State executions. From 1930 to
1962, over 3,700 executions were carried out. See BEDAU 1964, supra note 10, at 110,
Table 3 (reprinting excerpts from U.S. Dep't Of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National
PrisonerStatistics (No. 32, April 1963)). Subtracting the 26 federal executions during
this period from the total of 3,812 executions leaves 3,786.
It should also be noted that the United States Army also executed 160 prisoners
from 1930-1962, although 148 of these were carried out from 1942-1950 when wartime
and post-war exigencies likely produced unusual pressures for military executions.
See BEDAU 1964, supra note 10, at 107-08.
114. See S.1760; Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, Sen. Jud. Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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Yet the roster of death-eligible federal crimes expanded from the
reduced list of 1897. The Lindbergh Baby incident led Congress to
provide a discretionary death penalty for violent kidnapping in
1932.115 In 1940, a federal offense of train-wrecking was enacted,
with a possible sentence of death if the wreck resulted in the death
of passengers. 116 In 1956, death was made a potential penalty for
the crimes of providing narcotics to a minor as well as espionage
violations under the Atomic Energy Act.117 A rash of airplane
bombings and hijackings in the late 1950s led Congress to define
such conduct as capital crimes. 1 8 Finally, even as significant challenges to capital punishment were pending in the Supreme Court,
Congress added a death penalty for killings by explosives in
1970.119
As is apparent from this list, Congress authorized the death penalty for a number of offenses that, while serious, might not cause
death. The decision in Coker v. Georgia12 that death is an unconstitutionally "excessive penalty" for an offender (or at least an
adult rapist) who "does not ...

take human life" lay years in the

future.121 In fact, the two federal executions prior to Victor
1 22
Feguer's, of the Krull brothers in 1957, were for non-lethal rape
Meanwhile, concerns regarding the disparate imposition of the
death penalty on racial minorities gained prominence in the Civil
Rights era of the 1960s. In 1967, a Presidential Commission concluded that the "imposition of the death sentence and the exercise
of [judicial and executive] dispensing power ...follow discriminatory patterns."'1 23 Opponents of capital punishment linked arms

with civil rights advocates to produce landmark capital punishment
litigation. Witherspoon v. Illinois,124 the 1968 decision that permitted persons with "general objections" to capital punishment never115. See 18 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1946).
116. See Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 286, 54 Stat. 255, 255-56 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1992) (1948) ("[w]recking trains" which "result[s] in ...death")).
117. See, ch. 629, 70 Stat. 571 (1956) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 176(b) (repealed Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, Title III, § 1101(a)(2), (9), 84 Stat. 1291, 1292))
(narcotics to a minor); ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 71 (Aug. 10, 195) (current version at 10
U.S.C. § 906).
118. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902d(i); BEDAU 1964, supra note 10, at 14.
119. See Pub. L. No. 91-452 (adding 18 U.S.C. § 844(d)), 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
120. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
121. Id. at 598; see infra note 230.
122. See Executions of FederalPrisoners1927-1998, supra note 111; Krull, 240 F.2d

at 128.
123.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 143 (1967).

124. 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968).
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theless to serve on capital juries, and McGautha v. California,121
the 1971 challenge to capital punishment which upheld unguided
discretionary capital sentencing, 126 were briefed for the Supreme
Court by both the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. and the American Friends Service Committee. 127 Finally, in
1972, concerns about racial discrimination expressly motivated a
number of Justices to join in declaring unconstitutional all capital
punishment statutes that provided unguided and unchecked discretion to jurors in deciding who should live or die in Furman v. Georgia.1281 Thus, tthe federal era of unguided but complete discretion
begun by legislation in 1897 ended by judicial decision seventy-five
years later.
D.

Cases and Legislative Efforts from Furman through Gregg
and McCleskey

Irrespective of execution rates, at the time Furman129 and its
companion cases were decided, the death penalty was authorized
in forty-one states, in additional jurisdictions such as the District of
Columbia, and in federal cases. 130 Two state statutes provided for
mandatory death penalties upon conviction; the rest of the states
and federal jurisdictions permitted the entirely open capital sentencing discretion found to violate the Eighth Amendment in
Furman, and their statutes were thus invalidated.13 '
The epochal constitutional moment that was Furman needs little
explanation. A majority of the Supreme Court Justices agreed to
strike down open-discretion death penalty statutes as "cruel and
unusual" in violation of the Eighth Amendment (via the Fourteenth). But the majority could not agree on a rationale. All nine
Justices published separate opinions, and only two of them de125. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
126. McGuatha was overruled a term later in Furman after the retirement and
death of its author, Justice Harlan.
127. 391 U.S. at 510, 512, 522.
128. 408 U.S. at 240, 257, 306, 310, 314 (Douglas, J., Brennan, J., Stewart, J., White,
J., Marshall, J., each concurring separately). As Professor Jeffries has described, statistics regarding the death penalty for rape from 1930-1965 "fairly screamed racial
bias" and, in general, by 1972 "it seemed reasonably clear that the selection of those
who should die for their crimes was based partly on race." JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 407 (1994).
129. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
130. Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., concurring).
131. See id. at 417 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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clared that capital punishment was unconstitutional in all forms. 132
"Untrammeled discretion" was condemned, 33 because it permitted
"arbitrary" or, worse, improper "discrimination" to occur in the
administration of capital punishment.13 1 In the face of that decision, as Chief Justice Burger noted in his dissent, "if the legislatures
are to continue to authorize capital punishment for some crimes,
juries and judges can no longer be permitted to make the sentenc1 35
ing determination in the same manner they have in the past.'
The immediate response to Furman was a short-lived movement
toward statutes that eliminated all jury discretion by mandating imposition of a death penalty upon establishment of certain predicate
facts. 1 36 Self-consciously reacting to Furman, Congress enacted a
new "procedure in respect to the penalty for aircraft piracy" in
1974.37 The House report noted that Furmanhad effectively invalidated all existing federal death penalties and, as a result, "federal
138
prosecuting attorneys simply do not ask for the death penalty.'
132. See id. at 305, 371 (Brennan, J., concurring, Marshall, J., concurring). Justice
Douglas wrote only that "these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional." Justices
Stewart and White similarly limited their views. Id. at 256, 306, 310. The other four
members of the Court dissented in separate opinions.
133. 408 U.S. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 249-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing improper racial and economic discrimination); id. at 293-95 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing arbitrary infliction of death penalty, "little more than a lottery system"); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (noting the "capriciously selected random handful" of executed prisoners;
death is "wantonly and freakishly imposed"); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring)
("There is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [death] is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not"); 408 U.S. at 364-66 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (discussing improper discrimination).
135. Id. at 397 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also id. at 400 (stating "significant
statutory changes will have to be made").
136. See Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox:Reconciling Guided Discretionand
Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1152-53 & n.19
(1991) (noting that 22 states enacted some form of mandatory capital punishment
statutes in response to Furman).
137. See Pub. L. 93-366 (93d Cong. 2d Sess.), 88 Stat. 409, 411-413, originally codified at 49 U.S.C. App. § 1472(i), 1473(c) (1983 ed.), repealed by Pub. L. 103-322, sec.
60003(b), 108 Stat. 1970 (1994). In proposing the 1974 air piracy provisions, the
House Committee stated that it "believe[d] that the provisions.., meet the requirements of the Furman case." H.R. REP. No. 93-885 (Mar. 7, 1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3981. See also 120 CONG. REC. 6522 (daily ed. March 13, 1974)
(remarks of Rep. Dennis: Air Piracy bill is "an attempt to meet the standards of the
court in Furman against Georgia.... [N]o one really knows whether that does it or
not").
138. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3981. Some 15 years later Paul Kamenar argued that, in
fact, Furman need not be interpreted as invalidating all federal death penalty provisions and that open discretion death penalty statutes could still be constitutionally
applied so long as federal judges followed Gregg-like procedures. Paul Kamenar,
Death Penalty Legislation For Espionage and Other FederalCrimes is Unnecessary, It
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The Antihijacking Act embraced a new procedural structure, bearing many similarities to modern capital sentencing statutes: a bifurcated sentencing hearing, a list of mitigating factors, and a list of
aggravating factors. 139 However, the statute ultimately made a
death sentence mandatory: "the death penalty must be imposed if
any one of the aggravating factors.., is found.., and none of the
mitigating factors is found. ' 140 The House Report confirmed the
mandatory nature of the air piracy provision, describing the bill as
establishing "rational criteria for the mandatory imposition of the
death penalty."''
The air piracy procedures were derived from more comprehensive legislation proposed to reform the federal criminal code, which
142
contained generally-applicable capital punishment procedures.
The DOJ supported these bills, which would have provided a similar structure for imposing the death penalty after conviction for a
number of serious federal offenses; 143 however, this broader legislation was never enacted. Then, in a set of five capital cases in
1976, the Supreme Court struck down mandatory death penalty
Just Needs a Little Re-enforcement, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 881, 898-99 (1989).
Indeed, in 1988 the DOJ announced a revised view of its prior position that "[a]ll
federal death penalty provisions were void" after Furman; the Department now argued that "certain narrow federal statutes ... such as assassination of the President
•. .might survive an Eighth Amendment challenge," so long as judges applying those
statutes established constitutionally sufficient procedures for imposing the death pen-

alty in each case.

UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL,

supra note 12, § 9-10.010

(Oct. 1, 1988); but see, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 224, 226-29 (1981). According to
Coyne and Entzeroth, the Department twice sought death penalties under this revised
view of Furman, but received an acquittal in one case and rejection by the court in the
other. See Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 684; see United States v. Woolard, 981
F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming district court's rejection of the DOJ's new
theory, and holding that federal courts cannot devise their own constitutionally sufficient death penalty procedures because "[t]he choices are for the Congress and it has
not acted"). Passage of the comprehensive Federal Death Penalty Act in 1994 effectively mooted this line of argument.
139. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3981; 88 Stat. 411-12 (1974). This structure was derived
from the American Law Institute's earlier Model Penal Code proposal.
140. 88 Stat. 412 (1974).
141. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3981; accord 120 CONG. REc. 6522 (daily ed., March 13,
1974) (interchange between Congressmen Dennis and Kuykendall) ("the death penalty is mandatory, as I understand it. MR. KUYKENDALL: Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is correct.").
142. See 120 CONG. REc. 6522 (daily ed. March 13, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis)
(air piracy provision "is an approach which is taken in general legislation pending
before the Committee on the Judiciary which revises the entire U.S. Criminal Code").
143. H.R. 6028, 93rd Cong. (1973) (introduced by Congressman Gerald Ford on
March 22, 1973); see 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3981 (describing the bill); S.1401 (93rd
Cong.), introduced by Senator Hruska on March 27, 1993; see 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3999
(Conf. Rep. 93-1194 (July 12, 1974)).
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"guided disstatutes in Woodson"' and Roberts,'4 5 while it upheld
46 Proffit,'47 and Jurek.14 8
Gregg,'
in
cretion" statutory structures
Thus, although the air piracy provision remained on the books for
character likely rendered its death
twenty years, its mandatory
1 49
penalty unconstitutional.

It is not entirely surprising that the immediate reaction of the
DOJ and some state legislatures to Furman was to enact
mandatory capital punishment procedures, for such statutes had
been distinguished, with a hint of approval, in Justices White and
Stewart's pivotal opinions in Furman'50 as well as in Justice Douglas's. 151 Largely unnoticed, however, was Chief Justice Burger's
statement in dissent that
[i]f this [mandatory death sentencing] is the only alternative that
the legislatures can safely pursue under today's ruling, I would
have preferred that the Court opt for total abolition .... I could
more easily be persuaded that mandatory sentences of death...
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
The DOJ never conceded this, however. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.010 (Oct. 1, 1988) ("the Department's view [is] that
[the air piracy] procedure is constitutional"); DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note
12, § 9-63.134 (Prentice Hall 1993 supplement, p. 9-1311) (describing air piracy death
penalty provision, "which the Department believes complies with ... the Furman
decision"). But the Department also apparently never sought to obtain a death penalty under the 1974 air piracy statute. The issue was mooted when the separate air
piracy death penalty provision was expressly repealed in the 1994 FDPA.
150. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring), 310 (White, J., concurring). Justices White and Stewart's separate opinions provided the necessary votes for
striking down the death sentences in the 5-4 Furman decision. Justice White began
his opinion by distinguishing mandatory sentencing schemes and noting that "I do not
at all intimate that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se." 408 U.S. at 310-11.
As for Justice Stewart, after noting the mandatory death sentence provisions in the
federal military espionage statute (10 U.S.C. § 906) and various state statutes, he
wrote that "[o]n that score I would only say that I cannot agree that retribution is a
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

constitutionally impermissible ingredient in the imposition of punishment ....

[It]

serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law."
Id. at 308. See also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 662 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that "one might have supposed [after Furman] that curtailing or eliminating
discretion in the sentencing of capital defendants was not only consistent with
Furman, but positively required by it").
151. See Furman,408 U. S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Whether a mandatory
death penalty would otherwise be constitutional is a question I do not reach."). Some
of the immediate scholarly reaction to Furman also speculated that mandatory
schemes would pass muster. See, e.g., Carol S. Vance, The Death Penalty After

Furman, 48

NOTRE DAME LAW.

850, 853 (1973).
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are so arbitrary
52

and doctrinaire

that they

violate

the

Constitution.1

Although the Chief Justice apparently changed his opinion regarding mandatory death penalties, 5 3 three of his Brethren
adopted it wholeheartedly in 1976, deciding in Woodson v. North
Carolina that "consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense"
is a "constitutionally indispensable part" of any capital punishment
scheme. 154 Together with Justices Brennan and Marshall's condemnation of capital punishment in any form, 1 55 the Woodson plurality's view provided a majority to hold mandatory capital
punishment schemes unconstitutional 56 - a majority that appears
157
to endure, albeit with different members, to the present day.
The seemingly mandatory federal air piracy death penalty procedures enacted soon after Furman were thus never applied.
152. Furman, 408 U.S. at 401-02 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
153. When the Court struck down mandatory death sentences in Woodson and a
companion case, Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, (1976), Chief Justice Burger
merely wrote, "I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent in Furman." Id. at 337.
He did not reconcile this with his Furman dissent that had appeared to condemn
mandatory capital sentencing. See 408 U.S. at 401-02. See also Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 306 (1976) (Burger, C.J., joining Justice White's dissent without separate statement). The Woodson and Roberts plurality, however, did note Chief
Justice Burger's apparently conflicting prior view. See 428 U.S. at 297 (citing Chief

Justice Burger's Furman dissent).
154. 428 U.S. at 304 (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.). Professor
Sundby has called this holding one part of the Court's "Holy Text for the eighth
amendment." Sundby, supra note 136, at 1148. The Holy Text was, however, written
by only a 5-4 margin, and Justice Scalia has now famously called it into question in his
concurring opinion in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Sundby, supra note 136, at 1165.
Woodson also produced an interesting "switch" in positions between Justices
White, who had voted to condemn capital punishment statutes in Furman, and Powell,
who had voted to uphold those capital punishment statutes. In the four years between Furman and Woodson, Justice Douglas died but was replaced by Justice Stevens, who voted as Justice Douglas probably would have. Justice White, however,
who had voted to uphold capital punishment in McGuatha, now voted again to uphold mandatory capital punishment statutes in Woodson. Thus Justice Powell, who
had dissented in Furman, became the controlling vote in a narrow majority to strike
down mandatory death penalty statutes and thereby endorsing individualized capital
sentencing as a constitutional article of faith. See JEFFRIES, supra note 128, at 422-27
(describing the episode).
155. See 428 U.S. at 305-06 (citing their dissents in Gregg, at 227, 231).
156. It must be noted, however, that the Woodson plurality expressly reserved judgment on mandatory death statutes applicable to prisoners serving life sentences who
commit intentional murder. 428 U.S. at 292-93 n.25. Ten years later, the Court declared just such a statute unconstitutional in Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 78, 85
(1986).
157. See id.; Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994).
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Meanwhile, general legislation to revise federal death procedures was introduced repeatedly between 1972 and 1988 (when the
CCE death penalty procedures were enacted). 58 Nine months after Furman, bipartisan legislation backed by the Justice Department was introduced in the Senate "to provide constitutional
procedures and criteria for imposition of the death penalty for
most" federal offenses that then authorized the penalty. 159 Hearings were held and the Senate passed the bill, but the House did
not act. 6 ° Instead, the House enacted the more narrow air piracy
legislation. This was likely a direct reaction to a recent district
court decision that had specifically declared the air piracy death
penalty unconstitutional in light of Furman.6 ' One might also
speculate that the narrower air piracy legislation was enacted as a
"trial balloon" in light of further anticipated challenges to capital
punishment.

62

In the next Congress (1975-76), a number of death penalty bills
were introduced, but legislative action was deferred until the Gregg
group of cases was decided by the Supreme Court in 1976.163 Then,
during the ten years following Gregg, general federal death penalty
procedure bills were repeatedly introduced, hearings were held,
and congressional action was occasionally taken, but no legislation
was enacted.' 64 As one proponent noted in 1985, "[t]he U.S. Conpenalty ....
gress has never repealed the1' death
65
in limbo .. . after Furman.'

It was simply held

Possible explanations for the lack of completed federal legislative action are various. While individual state legislatures were
158. See infra notes 186-205 (discussing the CCE procedures); see generally,

Tobolowsky, supra note 10, at 48-50.
159. See S.REP. No. 99-282, at 2 (1986). Republican Senator Hruska and Democratic Senator McClellan introduced S.1401 on March 27, 1973. Their bill would also
have eliminated the death penalty in cases of rape or kidnapping if death did not
result. Id. at 2 & n.5.
160. Id. at 3; 120 CONG. REC. 6757 (daily ed. March 13, 1974) (Senate passes bill S.
1401, by a vote of 54-33).
161. See United States v. Bohle, 346 F. Supp. 577 (N.D.N.Y. 1972).
162. See 120 CONG. REC. 6522 (daily ed. March 13, 1974) (Rep. Dennis: "Now, the
gentleman is lifting that out of the [general legislation] ... and is trying to do it for air
piracy in this one particular case. That is the situation, is it not? Mr. Kuykendall: Mr.
Chairman, the gentleman is exactly correct.").
163. See S.REP. No. 99-282, at 3 (1986).
164. See id. Hearings were held in 1977, 1981, 1983, and 1985. Id. at 3-4 & nn.15,
21, 26.
165. Hearings on H.R. 2837 (Nov. 7, 1985) at 4 (statement of Gekas (R-Pa.)); see

also supra note 5 (noting description of the federal death penalty provisions left in
place after Furman as "zombie statutes").
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able to reach consensus as to the death penalty - some for and
some against - such local agreement led directly to national political deadlock in Congress. This political deadlock seems unsurprising in a federalist system governed by congressional delegations
from states that fundamentally disagree about the death penalty.166
Moreover, the Supreme Court was, with relative frequency, issuing
opinions that adjusted constitutional requirements for imposing the
death penalty. 167 Proposed Federal legislation repeatedly had to
be revised to accommodate such decisions,168 and opponents could
argue, with some justification, that Congress should await controversial decisions still in the pipeline before acting. 169 Finally, serious concerns continued to be raised about "racial and economic
discrimination in the imposition of th[e death] penalty.' 170 Mc166. Interestingly, while the Senate thrice passed general death penalty procedure
bills, in 1974, 1984 and 1986, the House consistently declined to act on the legislation.
See S. REP.No. 99-282 at 3, 4. This possibly could reflect the more locally politicized
character of that body. See also infra note 169 (noting Rep. Conyers' (D-Mich.)
power in the House).
167. "Tinker[ing] with the machinery of death," in Justice Blackmun's words. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
168. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-282, at 3 ("[i]n 1977, a bill (S. 1382), that reflected
the latest decisions by the Supreme Court, was introduced .. ");Hearings on S.239
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 4 (1985) (statement of Sen.

DeConcini (R-N.M.)).
169. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2837 and H.R. 343, 99th Cong. 1 (1985). For exam-

ple, in the House, long-time Congressman John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.) was the Chair
of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, to which
death penalty legislation was referred. Chairman Conyers made it clear that he "believe[d] that the death penalty is cruel and unusual" in all circumstances. Id. In light
of the congressional subcommittee system for considering legislation, the opposition
of the Chairman was plainly a serious obstacle to action in the House. See Nelson W.
Polsby, The Making of the Modern Congress in KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND THE CONGRESS 83-84 (William H. Robinson & Clay H. Wellborn eds., 1991); see generally
CHANGING CONGRESS: THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM (Norman J.Ornstein ed., 1974).
170. Hearings on H.R. 2837 and H.R. 343, 99th Cong. 2 (1985) (statement of Chair-

man Conyers). Chairman Conyers also noted apparent "gender discrimination" in
imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 3. In fact, only two of the 34 federal executions from 1927 to the present were of women. See Death Penalty Information
Center, FederalDeath Penalty (last modified Dec. 16, 1998) <http://www.essential.org/
dpic/feddp.html>. Similarly, of 3,829 State executions between 1930 and 1980, only 32
were of women. See BEDAU 1982, supra note 88 at 58, 62, Tables 2-3-2 & 2-3-3. Finally, none of the 20 federal prisoners currently on death row are female, and at the
end of 1996, only 44 of the 3,335 prisoners on death row in the United States were
female. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1997, supra note 45, at 6, 7. See generally Lorraine
Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia: Women, the Death Penalty and Commutation, 11
Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 283 (1996); Thad Rueter, Why Women Aren't Executed: Gender
Bias and the Death Penalty, 23 HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (Fall 1996); Victor L. Streib, Death
Penalty for Female Offenders 58 U. CINN. L. REV. 845 (1990); Jenny E. Carroll, Note,
Images of Women and Capital Sentencing Among Female Offenders: Exploring the
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Cleskey v. Kemp, 17 ' which considered disturbing statistical evidence of such discrimination but rejected it as a basis for a
constitutional challenge, was not decided until 1987.172 Prior to

McCleskey, legislative concern about racial disparity in administering the death penalty clearly contributed to the legislative deadlock
on the issue. 73
Nevertheless, in 1986, Congress did amend a lone federal statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1512, to add a possible death penalty for "killing witnesses."1 74 Entitled "Minor and Technical Amendments," the 1986

bill had originally proposed only to amend § 1512 to address a recent decision that made killing a witness not prosecutable as the
crime of "witness intimidation.' 1 75 As enacted, however, the punishment section of the amendment stated that "in the case of a killing" the defendant would be punished under 18 U.S.C.§ 1111 (the
general federal murder statute). 176 Although the Congressional reports did not note it, the cross-referenced § 1111 still contained the
pre-Furman open discretion death-penalty possibility. 177 Because
the expressed purpose of the amendment was not to create a new
death penalty, and because the penalty would be unconstitutional
under Furman to the same extent that § 1111 was, this change

either escaped all Congressional notice or was178viewed as inconsequential by opponents of capital punishment.
Outer Limits of the Eighth Amendment and Articulated Theories of Justice, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 1413, 1415 n.16 (1997) (collecting authorities).
171. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
172. 481 U.S. at 282 (decided by a 5-4 majority).
173. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-282, at 51 (1986) (minority views of Senators Metzenbaum, Kennedy and Simon) (describing the statistical evidence of racial disparity as
"another sinister aspect of capital punishment").
174. Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 61, 100 Stat. 3592, 3614 (1986).
175. See H.R. REP. No. 99-797 (Aug. 15, 1986) at 30 (Sec. 44 of the bill designed to
counter United States v. Dawlett, 787 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1998)).
176. 100 Stat. 3614.
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-797, at 30 (no mention of death
penalty); S. REP. No. 99-278 (1986) (same).
178. See H.R. REP. No. 99-797, at 30 (no mention of death penalty); S. REP. No. 99278 (1986) (same). In addition to the 1974 air piracy death penalty provisions and the
1986 witness-killing provision, Congress enacted one other death penalty provision
between Furman and 1988. In a 1985 amendment attached' to the Department of
Defense Authorization Act of 1986, Congress amended the Uniform Military Justice
Act to establish "weighing" procedures for court martials considering the death penalty for espionage. See Pub. L. No. 99-145, § 534, 99 Stat. 583, 634-35 (1985) (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 906(a)). In an effort to comply with Gregg and its progeny, the new
provision specified four aggravating factors, granted defendants "broad latitude to
present matters in extenuation and mitigation," and directed that the death penalty
may not be imposed unless the court martial members unanimously found that the
aggravating factors "substantially outweigh" any mitigating circumstances. 10 U.S.C.
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The McCleskey decision in 1987 was a watershed for death penalty litigation. Based upon a foundation of long-standing concern
regarding racial disparity in the administration of capital punishment, a powerful group of death penalty opponents acting as counsel and amicii attempted to prove unconstitutional race
1 79
discrimination by introducing an elaborate statistical study.
Professors Baldus, Pulaski and Woodworth studied over 2,000 capital murder cases in Georgia and concluded, after redacting thirtynine "nonracial variables" from their analysis, that race nevertheless played a statistically significant role in determining which defendants received the death penalty. 8 ° While "assum[ing] the
study is valid statistically," the five-Justice majority of the Court in
McCleskey seemed to hold that, in the capital sentencing context,
statistics alone are not sufficient to establish the element of intentional discrimination required by constitutional Equal Protection
cases.'
The Court also disagreed that the statistical evidence
proffered made out a valid Eighth Amendment claim. 8 2 Despite
the close margin and strong objections to the McCleskey holdings, 83 once the case was decided, a major constitutional argument
by federal death penalty opponents was no longer available. 8
§ 906(a) (b) & (c). The Supreme Court has suggested that military capital punishment may be treated differently for constitutional purposes, and the topic is not further discussed here. See infra note 233.
179. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282 & n.* (1987) (listing counsel).
180. Id. at 287. Specifically, Baldus and his colleagues concluded that black defendants who killed white victims were over four times more likely to receive the death
penalty than would be the case if the victims were black. Id. In addition, blacks who
killed white victims were far more likely to be charged with a capital offense than
were whites who killed black or white victims, as well as blacks who killed blacks
(70% versus 32%, 19%, and 15% respectively). Id. See generally BALDUS ET AL.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY

(1990) (detailing the results of two mas-

sive studies, and evaluating McCleskey as well as other death penalty precedents).
Thus the Baldus study showed a clear "race of victim" influence on capital cases, and
a more equivocal "race of defendant" influence. Accord, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 6 (Feb. 1990) [hereinafter 1990 GAO REPORT].

181. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292-97. The McCleskey court may have left a small
door open for statistical studies that provide "far stronger proof" than did the Baldus
study, id. at 296, but it is difficult to envision such proof coming purely from statistics.
See also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) ("clear evidence" is
required to demonstrate an equal protection violation by prosecutors).
182. See id. at 308-13; Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. The case was decided by only one vote, with Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens dissenting. See 481 U.S. at 320, 345, 366; see also infra notes
607-610 and accompanying text (noting some of the scholarly criticism of McCleskey).
184. Of course, concerns regarding racial disparity did not disappear after McCleskey. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. 13,978 (1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy (D-Mass.))
(stating that McCleskey made statistical evidence of racial disparities "constitutionally
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E. The 1988 CCE Death Penalty Statute
In 1988, the repeated efforts to enact constitutional federal death
penalty procedures culminated in the successful addition of a death
penalty and implementing procedures to the federal "Continuing
Criminal Enterprise" ("CCE") offense. 85 While the legislative history for the CCE death penalty statute in the 1987-88 Congress was
minimal,186 procedural death penalty legislation had received extensive legislative review by prior Congresses.
Similar to the air piracy death penalty statute of 1974, the CCE
legislation was limited to a single offense, which itself is a relatively
1 87
complicated, and consequently infrequently used, federal charge.
Nevertheless, the 1988 statutory procedures were responsive to the
requirements imposed by Supreme Court precedent, and the CCE
statute provided a template for future federal death penalty legislation. Among other things, the CCE death penalty procedures provide for a bifurcated guilty/penalty proceeding, 88 limit eligibility
for the death penalty to offenders who "intentionally kill[ ] or...
cause[ ] [an] intentional killing,' 89 narrow the class of eligible ofinsufficient" but "not morally insufficient"); 1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 180. But
the Supreme Court's decision reduced the persuasive and rhetorical force of such
concerns in the minds of some congressmen and (to the extent the Supreme Court's
decisions are popularly comprehended) their local electorates. See 134 CONG. REC.
13,988 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch (R-Utah)) (stating that McCleskey is the authoritative judgment of the Supreme Court "that racial animus will not be allowed to
taint the criminal justice system").
185. Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001(a), 102 Stat.
4181, 4387 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)-(r) (1988)). Although it is unknown
whether the Supreme Court's resolution of the racial disparity issues in McCleskey a
year earlier in fact helped break the legislative logjam, it seems likely that the case
was a factor.
186. See United States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758, 764 n.4 (D.N.J. 1991) (statute
was enacted without committee review and its debate consisted only of "a handful of
debates on the Senate floor"); 134 CONG. REC. 13,976 (1988).
187. The substantive CCE offense requires proof of many elements, including a
"continuing series of violations" of federal narcotics laws, committed by the defendant "in concert with five or more other persons," with whom the defendant "occupies
a position of ...

management," and from which the defendant obtains "substantial

income or resources." 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988). Its complicated structure continues
to provide fodder for Courts of Appeal disagreements requiring Supreme Court attention. See Richardson v. United States, 130 F.3d 765, cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 39
(Oct. 5, 1998) (granting certiorari on question arising out of "series of violations"
element).
188. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(i)(1) (1988); see also McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 302; Gregg,
428 U.S. at 155.
189. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1) (1988). The statute further specifies four death-qualifying mens rea states as possible aggravating factors, ranging from "intentionally killed"
to "intentionally engaged in conduct which the defendant knew would create a grave
risk of death," a form of recklessness. 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1) (1988). See Tison v.
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fenders to those against whom some additional "aggravating" factor is unanimously found, 190 require the jury to consider
"mitigating" factors,' 91 permit non-unanimous consideration of
such mitigating factors, 92 make it express that "regardless of...
findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors," the
jury is "never required to impose a death sentence,"' 93 and direct
that a death sentence "shall not be carried out" upon the mentally
retarded, the insane, or persons who are under eighteen when the
crime is committed. 94
The 1988 CCE legislation introduced additional capital punishment protective measures not required by any Supreme Court
case. For example, the statute requires reasonable advance notice
from the government of its intent to seek the death penalty and of
the aggravating factors it will seek to prove. 95 It also provides that
no prison employee or agent may be required to attend or "participate in" any execution. 196 Moreover, responding to McCleskey
concerns, the statute also requires trial judges to explicitly instruct
the jury that it
shall not consider the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or victim, and that the jury is not to
recommend a sentence of death unless it has concluded that it
would recommend a sentence of death for the crime in question
no matter what [such characteristics] ... of the defendant, or the

197
victim, may be.

Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). To impose the death penalty, however, a CCE jury
must find not only one of the (n)(1) mens rea aggravators, but also an additional
aggravator under § 848(n)(2)-(12). 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1994).
190. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1994); see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163.
191. 21 U.S.C. § 848(m) (1994); see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
192. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1994); see Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 382-383 (1988).
193. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1994); see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 (noting that there is no
prior case which suggests that the decision to afford an individual mercy violates the
Constitution); Woodson, 428 U.S. 280 (holding that mandatory capital punishment
statutes unconstitutional). In addition, the 1988 statute requires that "the jury shall
be so instructed." 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1988).
194. 21 U.S.C. § 848(1) (1994); see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)
(discussing minors under 16); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (discussing the
insane).
195. 21 U.S.C. § 848(h) (1994).
196. 21 U.S.C. § 848(r).
197. 21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(1). Although this provision was enacted after McCleskey,
similar language had been proposed in earlier bills. See S.REP. No. 99-282, at 24
(1986) (stating that the proposed S.239 contained such a provision regarding improper
consideration of such characteristics of the defendant; the Committee noted that
"[o]bviously" such characteristics "of the victim" would also constitute inappropriate
bases for capital sentencing).
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Finally, the 1988 CCE legislation mandated, for the first time in the
federal arena, the appointment of competent lawyers for federal
capital appeals as well as for "any post-conviction [habeas] proceeding ... seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence," and
necesthe provision of "investigative, expert, or other reasonably
198
defendant.
the
of
representation
the
sary services" for
The first federal death penalty imposed under the CCE "drug
kingpin" procedures - indeed, the first federal death penalty imposed in the present generation - fell upon David Ronald Chandler.199 According to the evidence at trial, in the course of running
a large-scale, multistate marijuana production and distribution operation, Chandler arranged for one of his dealers to execute a
snitch. 20 0 After convicting Chandler of the CCE offense, the jury
went on to find that although he had not committed the murder
himself, he had intentionally caused the death and had procured it
by promise of payment, both explicit aggravating factors in the
CCE statute.20 1 The jury unanimously recommended the death

Directly in response to McCleskey, the 1988 CCE provisions also required the
Comptroller General to study and report on state death penalty procedures and their
possible racial-disparity effects. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(2). This report was issued in
February 1990, when the U.S. General Accounting Office reported that its review of
28 pre-existing studies on the topic found "a pattern of evidence indicating racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty after the
Furman decision." 1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 180, at 5.
198. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4). Appointment of counsel "learned in the law" had of
course been required for federal trials since 1790. See supra note 49. The CCE statute broadened this requirement in two significant ways: it now applies to appeals and
post-conviction habeas proceedings; and appointed counsel now must be not only
"learned".but specifically members of the Bar for at least five years and experienced
for three years in handling felony criminal cases. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(5) (1994).
199. See Chandler v. United States, 996 F.2d 1073, 1079 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1227 (1994), habeas appealpending, No. 97-6365 (orally argued on October 28, 1998).
200. Chandler, 996 F.2d at 1080-81. The trial testimony was that Chandler offered
$500 to his dealer, Charles Ray Jarrell Sr., to kill Marlin Shuler. Jarrell then shot
Shuler dead while engaging in "target practice" with Shuler. Chandler helped Jarrell
bury Shuler's body, but then reneged on his promise to pay Jarrell. Jarrell confessed
and agreed to testify for the government, and the foregoing account is based on his
testimony. Id. at 1080-82. In 1996, however, Jarrell recanted his testimony regarding
acting on Chandler's behalf, and offered personal reasons for killing Shuler, which if
true would eliminate Chandler's responsibility for the intentional killing. This recantation provides one basis for Chandler's recent argument in his habeas appeal. See
Alabamian on Death Row Could Win a New Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at A17;
Benjamin Wittes, Executions and the Innocent, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1998, at A15.
201. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1), (6) (1994).
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penalty, which the district judge, lacking discretion once the jury
recommends death, then imposed.2 °2
Interestingly, of the first four cases in which the Justice Department sought a CCE death penalty, only Chandler resulted in a
death penalty verdict.203 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Chandler's
death sentence in 1993.204 By 1994, the CCE death penalty procedures had been upheld consistently against multiple constitutional
attacks.205

202. See Chandler,996 F.2d at 1082 ("Upon the recommendation that the sentence
of death be imposed, the court shall sentence the defendant to death."). See 21 U.S.C.
§848(1) (1994). See Robinson, supra note 6, at 1506-08, 1526 (comparing the Chandler
death penalty to another, more aggravated CCE case in which the jury rejected the
death penalty, and arguing for introduction of a federal "override" provision that

would allow a judge to override a capital jury's recommendation).
203. See United States v. Pitera, 795 F. Supp. 546, 550 n. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (reporting that the juries in United States v. Cooper, 754 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. I11.1990), and
United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. year) had declined to recommend
death, and that the defendant in United States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758 (D.N.J.
1991), committed suicide before verdict). Cooper was reportedly "the first case in the
country" in which the United States sought a death penalty under the 1988 CCE provisions. 754 F.Supp. at 620.
204. United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1993). The Chandler
Court noted that the CCE statute did not provide specifically for a method of execution (nor did any other federal statute at the time), but rejected this as a constitutional
impediment to imposing the death penalty. See id. at 1095-96; accord, Pitera, 795 F.
Supp. at 571 (relying on Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), which held that
changes in death sentencing procedures do not violate the expost facto clause). The
ChandlerCourt held that Congress could lawfully enact a method of execution in the
future. See 996 F.2d at 1095-96. The ChandlerCourt also rejected the argument that
not knowing "when or how" one will be executed violates the Eighth Amendment.
See id. at 1096.
Interestingly, the 1986 bill that ultimately evolved into the 1994 FDPA had included
an "implementation" section, similar to what became 18 U.S.C. § 3596 in the 1994
FDPA. See S. REP. 99-282, p. 25. It is unclear why this section of the 1986 proposal
was not included in the 1988 CCE legislation.
205. See Chandler, 996 F.2d at 1084-96; Pitera,795 F. Supp. at 552-67; Pretlow, 779
F. Supp. at 761-76; Whiting, 771 F. Supp. at 477; Cooper, 754 F. Supp. at 621-27.
The CCE provisions have also been consistently upheld against attacks since 1994.
See United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 895-901 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2414 (1997); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106-11 (10th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1699 (1997); United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1367 (5th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Walker, 910 F.Supp. 837, 844-60 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). In McCullah, the court reversed the CCE death sentence, ruling that "duplicative" aggravating factors had improperly been submitted to the jury. 76 F.3d at 1111-12. This
argument, however, was an "as applied" argument and the court rejected facial attacks on the CCE statute itself. Id. at 1110. See also United States v. Bradley, 880 F.
Supp. 271, 279-292 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (granting discovery as to alleged racial bias in
federal death penalty selection, while rejecting constitutional attacks on the statute).

1999]

FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

F. The 1994 Federal Death Penalty Act ("FDPA")
1. Political Origins of the FDPA
By the fall of 1994, the enactment of generally applicable federal
death penalty procedures was all but inevitable. Congress had
studied the issues for two decades. Thirty-six states had reinstituted capital punishment since Furman, and executions by states
were being carried out with some regularity.2" Public support for
some form of the death penalty remained unwaveringly high.2" 7
The Supreme Court had fine-tuned many constitutional guidelines
for imposing the death penalty, and had made it clear that within
the general bounds of "guided discretion," very different capital
punishment regimes could pass constitutional muster.20 8
Meanwhile, in McCleskey the Court had rejected evidence of
statistical race disparity in imposition of the death penalty as a basis for striking death penalty legislation.20 9 Since 1988, lower federal courts had consistently upheld the CCE death penalty
procedures and, in 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari
in its first CCE death sentence case. 210 Little more could be offered as a principled ground for opposing more general federal legislation, other than moral opposition to capital punishment. While
206. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1993, supra note 5. The states carried out 38 executions in 1993, for a total of 226 since Gregg had been decided. Id. at 1-2.
207. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 181, Table 2.68 (1995) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1995] (reporting that 79 percent of Americans say they support death
penalty for murderers). But see Sean Durkan et al., Capital punishment confuses
Canadians, EDMONTON SUN, Jan. 20, 1999, at 10 (reporting that in Canada, a poll
shows that 75% of Canadians support "capital punishment" but only 48% say they
support it if the phrase is changed to "death penalty"); William J. Bowers, et al. A
New Look at Public Opinion on Capital Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators
Prefer,22 AMER. J. CRIM. L. 77, 142 (1994) ("The data suggest that public support for
capital punishment is an illusion that has become a self-perpetuating political myth.")
208. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1992) (citing Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 464 (1988)). See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984) (holding
that the absence of "proportionality review" on appeal does not invalidate statute
because "each distinct system must be examined on an individual basis") (quoting
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (examining
Louisiana's death penalty scheme individually).
209. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
210. See supra note 205 for cases. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Chandler on June 20, 1994. See 512 U.S. 1227, 1227 (1994). The general federal death
penalty procedures were finally voted on in August 1994 and became law on September 13, 1994. See 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801; Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1800 (1994).
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some members of Congress eloquently held fast to this ground,
211
they comprised substantially less than a majority.
Moreover, in 1992, a Democratic President, who supported capital punishment and had authorized executions while governor,212
had been elected. Thus, the traditional party of opposition to federal capital punishment had no White House leadership. In fact, in
August 1993, President Clinton and the Democratic Senate Judiciary Committee Chair announced a comprehensive "anti-crime initiative," which included "expansion of the federal death
penalty. '213 When Janet Reno was confirmed in March 1994, she
stated that she "looked forward to ... developing death penalty
statutes" with Congress.2

14

Overall, the President's DOJ consist-

ently supported new federal death penalty legislation. 215
In addition, since at least 1991, respected Democratic members
of the House had been introducing broad death penalty legislation.21 6 When the House Judiciary Committee first attempted to
write a crime bill that did not address the federal death penalty in
1993, the Republican minority strongly protested. 217 By March
1994, the Committee reported two bills, H.R. 4032 and 4035, that
ultimately became (with a few amendments) the Federal Death
Penalty Act ("FDPA") of 1994.18 Although the legislation would

211. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S16292 (Nov. 13, 1993) (Sen. Hatfield, noting "immorality" of capital punishment; "travesty of justice" and "just plain wrong"). The
final vote that day, however, on the Senate crime bill containing the death penalty
provisions, was 95-4. See id. at S16301.
212. See Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 118.
213. See Crime Prevention and CriminalJustice Reform Act. Hearings on H.R. 3315
Before the Subcomm. On Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. On the
Judiciary, 1994 WL 214216 (F.D.C.H. 1995) (statement of Jo Ann Harris, Deputy Attorney General).
214. Hearings on the Nomination of Janet Reno to be Attorney General of the
United States, S.Hrg. 103-513, (Judic. Comm., March 9 & 10, 1993) at 100 [hereinaf-

ter

RENO CONFIRMATION HEARINGS].

215. See, e.g., Taking Back Our Streets Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 3 Before the
Subcomm. On Crime of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 1995 WL 18436
(F.D.C.H. 1995); Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Bill McCollum, Chairman, Subcomm. On Crime and CriminalJustice of the
House Comm. On the Judiciary (Sept. 28, 1995) (reprinted in 1995 WL 579349
(F.D.C.H. 1995) (supporting new legislation regarding implementation of the federal
death penalty).
216. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. E438-01 (Feb. 6, 1991) (Rep. Hughes introduces bill
to make "the death penalty.., constitutionally available for over 20 Federal crimes").
217. See H.R. REP. No. 103-324 (1993), at 26 (11 members note that "restoration of
the federal death penalty" is needed if "comprehensive reform" is to be had), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1802, 1815.
218. See "Death Penalty for Certain Crimes," H.R. REP. No. 103-466 (1994); "To
Establish Constitutional Procedures for the Imposition of the Death Penalty," H.R.
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implement the federal death penalty for the first time in thirty
years, it was perceived as moderate Democratic death penalty legislation. In fact, thirteen Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee dissented on the ground that the new federal death
penalty procedures would so favor capital defendants that they
would "make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to enforce a
219
federal death penalty.

Indeed, as enacted, the FDPA plainly was a compromise between moderate Democrats and Republicans. In previous Congresses, the Senate had passed new federal death penalty
legislation, but the House had consistently declined to act on it.
This time, the situation in the House was different. When the
crime bill came to the floor of the House in April 1994, some members of both parties opposed it because it did not go far enough, in
either direction, regarding the death penalty. 220 Nevertheless, moderate Democrats with misgivings about the death penalty still voted
in favor of the bill.221
Meanwhile, the Senate had overwhelmingly passed its own version of the bill, as it had in years past.222 In an August 1994 conference, the Racial Justice Act provisions passed by the House were
eliminated on threat of a Republican filibuster in the Senate, and a
few other provisions were the object of bipartisan compromise.2 2 3
A bipartisan scenario involving members of Congress normally opREP. No. 103-467 (1994). A favorable report of the "Racial Justice Act," H.R. REP.
No. 4017, was also a part of the House Judiciary Committee's package at this time.
See H.R. REP. No. 103-458 (1994). That Act, which ultimately was not enacted,
would have permitted statistics to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination,
thereby requiring prosecutors to demonstrate a non race-related basis for seeking a
death sentence. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discriminationin Administering
the Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519,
520 (1995).
219. See H.R. REP. No. 103-467, at 21 (dissenting views). This same group also
dissented from the Committee's favorable report on the Racial Justice Act. See H.R.
REP. No. 103-458, at 14.
220. See, e.g. 140 CONG. REC. H2601 (daily ed. April 21, 1994) (Rep. Collins (DMich.) opposes the bill because it includes death penalty and does not sufficiently
address racial concerns); id. at 2602-04 (Reps. Dolittle (R-Cal.) and Doman (R-Cal.)
oppose bill because it includes the Racial Justice Act).
221. Representative of this position are the remarks of Congressman Bruce Vento
(D-Minn.), who voted in favor of the Bill while stating that "the death penalty is...
an admission of frustration not a solution." 140 CONG. REC. at H2604.
222. 140 CONG. REC. S16302 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (95-4); see supra note 166
(noting prior Senate approvals of death penalty legislation); see also 140 CONG. REC.
S12600 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1994) (Senate passes final bill 61-38).
223. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711 (1994) at 388 ("Title VI - Death Penalty")
reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1856; Chemerinsky, supra note 218, at 520. See supra
note 218 (describing the Racial Justice Act).
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posed to capital punishment again played out in the House on the
final Conference Report.224 In both April and August 1994, the
legislation with the new federal death penalty provisions passed the
House with significant opposition from both sides of the aisle,
somewhat surprising for a crime bill in an election year.225 On September 13, 1994, the FDPA became law.2 26
2. Summary of the FDPA
Before delving into the detail of the new federal death penalty
procedures, a brief summary of the entire FDPA may be helpful.
The Act consisted of twenty-six separate Sections, combining the
procedural provisions and the substantive offense provisions of the
two separate House bills.227
Section 60001 simply provided the "Federal Death Penalty Act"
title. Section 60002 then detailed the new "constitutional procedures for the imposition of the sentence of death. ' 228 In addition,
on a substantive level Section 60002 authorized imposition of a
death penalty in two new situations, both involving non-homicide
events: very large-scale drug dealing and major CCE offenders
("super drug kingpins") who simply "attempt" to kill. 229 The sig224. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. H8956 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (Rep. Shays (DConn): "I do not believe in the death penalty but I am not going to vote against a
good bill that includes the death penalty"). Similar statements of support were heard
in the Senate. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S16297 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (Sen. Levin
(D-Mich.): "As a consistent opponent of the death penalty, I wish this bill did not
contain the new provisions" . . . but "on balance ... I will vote for it"); 140 CONG.
REc. S12282 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1994) (Sen. Kennedy making similar statement).
225. See 140 CONG. REC. H2608 (daily ed. April 21, 1994) (recorded vote, 285-141);
id. at H9004-05 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (recorded vote, 235-195). By August, much
of the Republican opposition had shifted away from the death penalty provisions to
opposition to a ban on assault weapons and concern over spending on other crimerelated programs. See, e.g., id. at H8957 (remarks of Rep. Derrick (D-S.C.)). Nevertheless, Republican opposition in the House to what were perceived as over-protective "unenforceable" death penalty provisions also remained high. See, e.g., id. at
H8949 (Rep. Gekas (R-Pa.)); id. at 8959 (Rep. McCollum (R-Fla.)). The broader
political concerns about non-death penalty issues likely explain the final vote of 61-38
in the Senate, id. at S12600 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1994), which was much closer than the
November 1993 vote of 95-4 to approve the original Senate bill.
226. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801.
227. See 108 Stat. 1959-82, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801.
228. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1959-68 (1994); see infra notes
232-240 and accompanying text.
229. 108 Stat. at 1960, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591(b)(1) & (2) (1994). The CCE
statute already provided a mandatory life imprisonment sentence for such "super
drug kingpins" if they were "principal administrator[s]" and their operations either
grossed $10 million in a year or involved 300 times the quantity required for lowerlevel offenders. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1986).
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nificance of these particular new death penalty provisions ought
not be understated: the Supreme Court has not approved a death
penalty for a defendant who "does not take human life" since it
constitutionally struck down the death penalty for rape in Coker v.
Georgia,2 30 and, unlike espionage or treason, there is no common
law tradition of execution for these modern non-homicide crimes.
The non-homicidal "super kingpin" death penalty provisions have
not yet been applied by the DOJ, and their constitutionality hangs
in some doubt.23 '
Moving to substantive offenses, Section 60003 of the FDPA authorized application of its new procedures "if death results" for fifteen federal statutory sections that already contained a death
penalty.232 Section 60004 specifically exempted capital prosecuSignificantly, the two new provisions in § 3591(b) do not appear to define new federal "offenses;" rather, they authorize the imposition of death after a defendant "has
been found guilty of" predicate narcotics offenses under Title 21, upon proof of further aggravating facts. Cf. Serr, supra note 10, at 898-906 (arguing that the CCE statute does not define separate federal capital offenses, but rather provides a sentencing
enhancement). The Supreme Court has recently struggled with the question of
whether significant statutory sentencing enhancements should be treated as separate
offenses requiring proof of their elements before a jury beyond reasonable doubt; to
date, the Court has ruled (5-4) that such treatment is not required. See Monge v.
California, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 2250 (1998); Alamendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S.
Ct. 1219 (1998) (finding that prior convictions are sentencing factors and not "elements" of a separate offense). However, a variant of the same issue is before the
Court again this term. See Jones v. United States, No. 97-6203, cert. granted, 118 S. Ct.
1405 (1998) (listing the questions presented to include whether "serious bodily injury"
is an element or merely a sentencing factor in the federal car-jacking statute). Justice
Scalia's unexpected dissent in Monge attracted two of the Court's more pro-defendant
Justices. See 118 S. Ct. at 2255 (Scalia, dissenting, joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.).
Justice Stevens dissented separately. See id. at 2253. Because the Monge majority
agreed that "[o]ne could imagine circumstances in which fundamental fairness would
require that a particular fact be treated as an element of the offense," id. at 2250, it is
uncertain how the Court would treat the facts required to impose the death sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b). See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Towards A Model Penal
Code, Second (Federal?):The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 ButF. CRIM. L. REv.
297, 316-25 (1998) (discussing issue of "elements" versus "sentencing factors").
230. 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality). But see id. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring
and providing fifth vote) (death penalty may not be disproportionate for "aggravated
rape"); Louisiana v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (1996) (holding that a statutory provision
providing possible death penalty for rape of juvenile is constitutional, and distinguishing Coker). Because Wilson was an interlocutory decision, it did not produce a final
judgment available for Supreme Court review.
231. See Boettcher, supra note 10, at 1060-61 (1998) (opining that the two new
"drug kingpin" death penalty provisions have "less chance of passing constitutional
muster").
232. 108 Stat. 1968-70 (1994). These were the so-called "zombie statutes," containing death penalty provisions likely unconstitutional after Furman but never repealed.
See supra note 5. This section made the general death penalty procedures applicable
"if death results" for violations of: 18 U.S.C. §§ 34 (destruction of aircraft, motor
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tions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice from the new
procedural provisions.233 Sections 60005 through 60024 then newly
provided possible death penalties for at least seventeen preexisting,
and ten new, federal offenses.234 Section 60025 legislatively endorsed the possibility of anonymous jury venires and witnesses in
capital cases where an identifying "list may jeopardize the life or
safety of any person.

' 235

Finally, Section 60026 provided some-

thing that had never previously been required in any jurisdiction's
death penalty statute: appointment of two lawyers in all federal
capital cases and at
least one lawyer "learned in the law applicable
36
to capital cases.

2

Accordingly, there were two categories of offenses in the 1994
Act for which death was a newly-authorized possible penalty: envehicles, or facilities); 794(a) (espionage); 844(d) (transportation of explosives), (f)
and (i) (destruction of property by fire or explosives); 1091(b)(1) (genocide); 1111(b)
(first degree murder); 1201(a) (kidnapping); 1203(a) (hostage-taking); 1716 (mailing
injurious articles); 1992 (wrecking trains or railroad property); 2113(e) (bank robbery); 1958 (murder for hire); 1959(a)(1) (murder in aid of racketeering); and 2119(3)
(car jacking).
Significantly, in amending the espionage provision, Section 60003 also authorized
the death penalty in a non-homicidal context: espionage where the information "directly concerned nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or satellites," or other types of
significant national defense information. 108 Stat. at 1969 (1994); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (1994). Similarly, treason, 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1948) remains punishable by
death under new § 3591(a)(1) (1994) without mention of a "death results" requirement. See 108 Stat. 1960 (1994). Although the constitutionality of imposing a death
penalty for a non-homicidal criminal offenses has not been tested since Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality), when the Senate in 1986 considered the legislation that ultimately (and with relatively few changes) became the 1994 FDPA, its
Judiciary Committee reported that it had considered Coker and had "concluded that
it would be constitutional to impose the death penalty for treason and espionage." S.
REP. No. 99-287 (April 16, 1986), p. 10. But see James G. Wilson, Chaining the Leviathan: The Unconstitutionalityof Executing Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U. Prrr. L.

99 (1983).
233. See 108 Stat. 1970 (1994); see 10 U.S.C. § 801 (1983). In 1996, the Supreme
Court unanimously approved the somewhat different military courts martial system
for imposing capital punishment, reserving the question of whether Furman and its
progeny should apply even to that system. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,
755 (1996). This Article does not further consider the separate federal Military death
penalty procedures. For an overview, see Dwight Sullivan, A Matter of Life and
REV.

Death: Examining the Military Death Penalty's Fairness,45

FED. LAW.

38 (June 1998).

234: See 108 Stat. 1970-82 (1994).
235. 108 Stat. 1982 (1994).
236. Id. (emphasis added) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1994)). Although, federal
law had required appointment of counsel in capital cases since 1790, 1 Stat. 118
(1790), capital defendants could receive two lawyers only if specifically requested and
neither had to be "learned" in death penalty law. See United States v. McCullah, 76
F.3d 1087, 1098 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1699 (1997) (discussing capital
counsel in context of trial conducted under prior version of law); United States v.
Davis, 365 F.2d 251, 254 (6th Cir. 1966).
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tirely new federal offenses,2 37 and pre-existing offenses whose language had not previously contained a possible death penalty.238
Aside from the new "super drug kingpin" provisions in Section
60002 and the new non-homicidal espionage provision in Section
60003,239 all the new offenses and penalty provisions limit availability of the death penalty to violation in which death results. 240 Because some U.S. Code sections may contain more than one offense
for which death is now available, and because alternative elements
in a single statutory section might arguably be labeled as separate
offenses, 24 1 the exact number of federal offenses made death-eligible by the 1994 Act is "open to interpretation. ' 24 2 Needless to say,
by any estimate the 1994 FDPA substantially increased the availability of the death penalty for federal offenders.243
237. Murder by a federal prisoner, § 60005, 108 Stat. 1970 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1118 (1994)); drive-by shooting, § 60008 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994)); foreign
murder of U.S. nationals, § 60009, 108 Stat. 1972 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1119 (1994));
murder by escaped [life] prisoners, § 60012, 108 Stat 1973 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1120 (1994)); killing persons assisting federal investigations, § 60015, 108 Stat, 1974
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994)); retaliatory killings of witnesses, victims, and
informants, § 60017, 108 Stat. 1975 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a) (1994)); violence
against maritime navigation and fixed platforms, § 60019, 108 Stat. 1975-79 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2280, 2281 (1994)); violence at international airports, § 60021, 108
Stat. 1979-80 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 37 (1994)); and, use of weapons of mass destruction, § 60023, 108 Stat. 1980-81 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (1994)).
238. Civil rights offenses and conspiracies, § 60006, 108 Stat. 1970-71, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241, 242, 245(b), 247(c) (1994) (focused on religious persecution); murder of a federal law enforcement official, § 60007, 108 Stat. 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994); sexual
abuse and child molestation, § 60010, 108 Stat. 1972-73, 18 U.S.C. § 2245 (1994) (penalty); sexual exploitation of children, § 60011, 108 Stat. 1973, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)
(1994); gun murders during crimes of violence or drug trafficking, § 60013, 108 Stat.
1973, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994) (penalty); possession of dangerous weapons in, or
in attack upon, a federal facility, § 60014, 108 Stat. 1973, 18 U.S.C. § 930 (1994); obstruction of justice ("protection of court officers and jurors"), § 60016, 108 Stat. 1974,
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994); murder of federal witnesses, § 60018, 108 Stat. 1975, 18
U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A) (1994); terrorist death penalty act, § 60022, 108 Stat. 1980, 18
U.S.C. § 2232(a)(1) (1994); and, alien smuggling, § 60024, 108 Stat. 1981-82, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a) (1994).
239. See supra notes 229-232.
240. See 108 Stat. 1970-82 (1994).
241. For example, retaliatory killings of "witnesses, victims, and informants." See
§ 60017, 108 Stat. 1975 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a) (1994)).
242. Eldred, supra note 10, at 297 n.21 (1994); see also Boettcher, supra note 10, at
1059 n.126 (noting that counts of death-eligible offenses under the 1994 FDPA have
ranged from 30 to 60). The number is at least 44. See supra notes 229-238 and accompanying text (discussing two new "super drug kingpin" provisions, 15 "zombie" statutes, 17 pre-existing non-death penalty statutes, and 10 entirely new offenses).
243. Also, as previously noted, supra note 8, in 1996 Congress added at least four
additional federal death penalty offenses.
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3.

Detail About the 1994 Procedures
and Comparison to CCE

The procedures enacted in the 1994 Act are similar, but not identical, to the 1988 CCE procedures, and they are somewhat more
detailed. Moreover, the 1988 procedures may still apply in CCE
cases; the situation is unclear. Some detailed, but by no means exhaustive, comparison is therefore warranted.
The 1994 Act states that its procedures apply generally to "any
2'' 44
[federal] offense for which a sentence of death is provided.
This immediately raises the question of which statute applies in a
death-eligible CCE case, since the specific 1988 CCE death penalty
procedures were not expressly repealed in the 1994 Act. Any contention that the 1988 procedures should be considered "repealed
by implication" seems questionable, in light of extremely important
provisions of the 1988 statute, such as mandatory appointment of
habeas counsel and of investigative and expert services, 45 that
were not replicated in the FDPA. Whether, and precisely how, the
1988 procedures would apply in post-1994 capital cases filed under
21 U.S.C. § 848 is an unsettled question, but in light of a number of
potentially significant differences, it is an important one.24 6 It appears that, so far, courts in post-1994 CCE cases have responsibly
attempted to "meld" the two statutes, opting for the measures most
protective of the capital defendant when confronted with meaningful differences. 47
The gross mechanics of the 1994 Federal Death Penalty structure
are by now familiar. Like most post-Gregg capital punishment
statutes, the 1994 Act requires a separate, "bifurcated" sentencing
hearing, after a guilty verdict is returned on a death-eligible offense. 48 The sentencing hearing normally occurs before the same
jury or judge that heard the guilt evidence. 49 In order to proceed
244. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a) (Supp. 111998).
245. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (1995).
246. See infra notes 255-269, 276, 287 (noting specific differences between the CCE
and FDPA provisions).
247. Telephone Interview with David Bruck (Dec. 9, 1998). Bruck is one of three
federal capital defense specialists that manage the Federal Death Penalty Resource
Project ("Project"), coordinating and advising appointed counsel in federal capital
cases and serving as liaison to federal courts on the topic. See 1998 JUDICIAL CONF.
REPORT ON COSTS, at 29 & n.43 (describing the Project).
248. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (Supp. 11 1996). A guilty verdict may be arrived at in

three ways: by a jury, by a judge sitting as fact-finder without a jury if agreed to by the
parties, and by a defendant's own guilty plea.
249. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b) (Supp. II 1996). Exceptions are if the defendant

waives a sentencing jury and the government agrees, or if the parties waived a guilt
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to a death penalty sentencing hearing, the government must previously have served on the defendant a written notice of intent 2to
5 0°
seek the death penalty, within a "reasonable time before trial.
This advance notice must specify what aggravating factors the government will seek to prove at sentencing, and it thereafter limits
the government to the identified factors. Although the notice may
be amended "upon a showing of good cause," courts have split regarding the ease with which25 1the government should be permitted
to make such amendments.

Capital sentencing juries are usually reconvened very quickly after they return a guilty verdict. After both sides present evidence
and arguments, the jury normally has three basic determinations to
make: (1) whether the defendant acted with a requisite mens rea
making him death-eligible; and, if so, (2) whether other aggravating and mitigating factors are present; and, if SO, 2 5 2 (3) whether a
sentence of death is "justified.

'25 3

Each determination, in turn, in-

volves more detailed consideration.
First, the 1994 Act describes four death-eligibility screening factors, which require that a death result from the defendant's conduct and provide differing possible causative acts and mens rea.
Unless the sentencing jury concludes beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant caused a death and acted with one of the four
jury but the defendant then requests a sentencing jury, or if the defendant entered a
guilty plea, or if the defendant is being re-sentenced for some reason (such as an
appellate reversal) after the original jury has been dismissed. Id.
250. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (Supp. II 1996).
251. Id. Compare United States v. Battle, 979 F. Supp. 1442, 1468 (1997) (allowing
amendment "because some of the new evidence did not exist until after the government's original notice was filed") with United States v. Pretlow, 770 F. Supp. 239, 24142 (D.N.J. 1991) (under identical CCE provision, 21 U.S.C. § 848(h)(2), court rejects
view that stringent "excusable neglect" standard should control). The 1986 Senate
Judiciary Report on the legislation that later became the 1994 FDPA stated that the
"good cause" amendment provision "recognizes that unforeseen information may become available after notice is given." S. REP. No. 99-282, at 21 (1986). This suggests
that a more generous amendment standard, not dependent on the government's discovery of new information, may not be consistent with congressional intent.
252. If no aggravating factor is proven, then "the court shall impose a sentence
other than death." 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (1994). Similarly, except for the three nonhomicide provisions (super drug kingpin, espionage, and treason), if one of the requisite homicidal mens rea standards is not found, then the defendant is not eligible for
death. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) (1994).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2). This is the basic structure approved in Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), one of the companion cases to Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, where
the Court ruled that "the requirements of Furman are satisfied when the sentencing
authority's discretion is guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific
factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty." Profitt, 428
U.S. at 258.
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described mental states, the defendant is simply not eligible for the
death penalty. 4 The mens rea qualifiers range from "intentionally
killed" to a form of recklessness defined as intentionally engaging
in violence knowing that a "grave risk of death" was created and a
victim died as a "direct result" of such conduct. 5 The four FDPA
mens rea qualifiers are similar, but not identical, to the four mental
states listed as "aggravating factors" in the CCE provisions.256 The
small language differences between the wording of the FDPA and
CCE mens
rea criteria could nevertheless be powerful in particular
7
cases.

25

By specifying mens rea from intentionality to recklessness, the
1994 Act prohibits sentencing negligent killers to death. It also
bars capital sentencing for anyone "less than 18 years of age at the
254. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2). Again, treason, espionage, and "super drug kingpin" provisions are not subject to this statutory limitation. However, each is still limited by the specific mental states required to prove substantive guilt.
255. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(A), (D) (1994). Thus other killings are not eligible for
the federal death penalty despite the death of some person. Under the FDPA the
death must result to a person "other than a participant" in the crime. Id.; see also 18
U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(C), (D). This limitation does not appear in the CCE statute. See
21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(2)(c).
The federal mens rea criteria appear to narrow the class of "death eligible" killers
slightly more than the. Constitution itself would require. See Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987) (permitting death penalty for "knowingly engaging in criminal
activities known to carry a grave risk of death," not just violence as specified in 18
U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added)). That the slight word difference between
the federal standard and Tison might be dispositive in some cases is a demonstration
of the significant power of semantics in death penalty litigation. See infra notes 647688.
Because the described mental states all relate to conduct causing death, these
screening factors cannot apply to the non-homicidal "super drug kingpin" death penalty provisions or to non-homicidal treason or espionage. It was presumably for this
reason that these provisions were separately described in subsections 18 U.S.C.
§ 3591(a)(1) and (b), so that the mens rea screens for killers described in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3591(a)(2) do not apply. Similarly, the FDPA lists separate aggravating factors for
"treason and espionage" and "drug offense[s]." 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(b) and (d) (1994).
256. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(A)-(D) (1994). The first two CCE factors are identical to the FDPA mental states, but the last two are slightly different. The CCE statute
also separately defines as death-eligible any person who "intentionally kills ... or
causes the intentional killing" of another. Id.; § 848(e)(1)(A). Because 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(1) also requires that one additional statutory aggravating factor be found, in
addition to mens rea, before a jury may recommend death, the fact that the four more
specific CCE mental states are listed as "aggravating factors" rather than as initial
eligibility criteria would appear to be of no practical consequence.
257. One example is that the FDPA requires an "act of violence" under its recklessness factor. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(D). The equivalent CCE provision simply requires "conduct." 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(D). Death can turn on such differences; the
power of language and interpretation in the death penalty context cannot be
understated.
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time of the offense." The equivalent CCE provision is slightly different, apparently permitting the sentencing of such a youth
to
'258
death but prohibiting the sentence from being "carried out.
If one of the screening mental states is found, then the jury must
consider evidence about possibly aggravating and mitigating factors. This stage is considered in some detail below. As for process,
both the FDPA and CCE statutes tilt the jury's consideration of
aggravating and mitigating factors somewhat in the defendant's
favor. For example, aggravating factors must be proven by the
government beyond reasonable doubt and must be unanimously
Tcnr
agreed upon by the jury.259 In
contrast, mitigating factors need be
proven by the defendant only by a preponderance of evidence, and
may be found by any member of the jury individually, "regardless
of the number of jurors who concur. ' 260 Moreover, while the government is prohibited from presenting evidence regarding aggravating factors for which it did not provide proper advance notice,
the defense "may present any information relevant to a mitigating
factor ' '261 - there is no statutory advance notice requirement for
the defense.262
Regarding the sentencing hearing, the FDPA and CCE statutes
both provide that "[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials. '263 Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence appear not to
apply in federal death penalty hearings. 64 Instead, each statute
contains its own evidence exclusion rule, with a significant word
difference. The CCE statute directs that "information may be ex258. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3591 with 21 U.S.C. § 848(1).
259. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), (d) (1994).
260. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d). In the predecessor legislation to this provision (S. REP.
No. 99-239, introduced in 1985 by Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)), aggravating
and mitigating factors would have been treated equally, permitting jury findings of
either based simply on "a majority" of the jury's members. Establishing Constitutional Procedures for the Imposition of Capital Punishment, S. REP. No. 99-282, at 1,
5, 7 (1986). The Supreme Court subsequently ruled, however, that "each juror" in a
capital case must be "permitted to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence,"
whether or not other jurors agree. McKoy v. North Carolina,. 494 U.S. 433, 442-43

(1990). In the FDPA Jones case currently pending before the Supreme Court, various
jurors found a total of 11 separate mitigating factors, none of them unanimously. 132
F.3d at 238 n.3. Interestingly, the number of jurors agreeing on each factor was apparently recorded in Jones. The statute does not require this.
261. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), (b).
262. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b).
263. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); 21 U.S.C. § 848 (j).
264. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) ("The rules (other than with respect to privileges)
do not apply in the following situations: ... sentencing .... ").
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cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.'' 265 The FDPA provides identical language except that the
word "substantially" is omitted.266 The CCE provision tracks Federal Rule of Evidence 403; the word "substantially" operates to
favor admission of relevant evidence. 67 The absence of the word
"substantially" from the 1994 statute could prove extremely significant if it led to the exclusion of more evidence, 68 and judges handling CCE death penalty cases should probably apply the
unrepealed CCE provision. 69
Rather than return a general verdict - "Death" or "No Death"
a federal capital jury must complete what amounts to a detailed
special verdict form. The statute requires the jury to "return [presumably in writing] special findings identifying" any aggravating
factor they unanimously find to exist in the case. 7 ° In contrast, the
statute does not contain similar language requiring "special findings identifying" any mitigating factors the jury considers (perhaps
because mitigating factors may be found by a single member of the
265. Neither statute indicates whether "if" is intended to mean "only if."
266. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 848 (j) with 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (c).
267. See Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United States v.
Kerr, 778 F.2d (11th Cir. 1985).
268. See Boettcher, supra note 10, at 1071 (1998). It is unclear whether a tighter
evidentiary admission test in capital sentencing proceedings favors the government or
the defense; such evidentiary rulings are case-specific and highly dependent on an
individual judge's discretion. One can imagine more exclusion of prosecution, as well
as defense, evidence under the 1994 standard. For example, grisly photographs of
victims, which the prosecution often seeks to admit in death penalty proceedings,
would seem to be more easily excluded if a "substantial" outweighing is not required.
269. See 21 U.S.C. § 8480) (1995). See supra notes 244-247 (noting that the 1994
FDPA did not expressly repeal the 1988 CCE death penalty procedures, although the
FDPA purports to apply to "any . . . offense for which a sentence of death is
provided.").
270. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d). This includes any non-statutory factors found. See infra
notes 291-294. The failure to require jury findings regarding non-statutory aggravating factors had been one objection to the 1986 predecessor bill. See S. REP. No. 99282 at 52 (1986).
In addition, although the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) does not expressly require the
jury to make any other "special findings," that subsection (which directs the jury to
determine whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating, and whether they
"justify" a death sentence) is captioned "return of a finding concerning sentence of
death." Accord, 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) ("return of findings"). This creates some ambiguity regarding whether written jury findings on these other important issues are statutorily required. Although written jury findings can increase the opportunity for a
later claim of jury error, they also provide clear evidence of the jury's deliberation. A
trial court might be well-advised to request a federal capital jury to return written
findings on the issues listed in § 3593(e), as well as on the required mens rea factors
specified in § 3591(a).
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jury). Nevertheless, capital juries are often asked in practice to reregarding the mitigating factors they find
turn written findings
271
well.
as
proven
The final stage of the federal capital sentencing process is one of
"weighing" all the information and considering "justification." If
at least one statutory aggravating factor is proven, the statute directs that the jury must determine whether all the aggravating factors "sufficiently outweigh" the mitigating factors, so as "to justify
a sentence of death. '27 2 Weighing is a non-mathematical process,
not determined merely by whether there are more aggravating or
mitigating factors on the jury's list of findings. It requires "qualitative," not quantitative, evaluation. 73 Moreover, weighing and the
justification determination are distinct inquiries: even if the jury
finds that a case presents no mitigating factors to be weighed
against the aggravators, the jury must still decide whether a death
penalty is "justified. '274 The statute provides jurors with no further
guidance on the ultimate task of deciding whether death is "justified," a point that seems worthy of further scholarly attention. 75
271. For example, in the Jones case each mitigating factor found by one or more of
the jurors was reported, together with the number of jurors concurring. Jones, 132
F.3d at 238 n.3. Whether the defense should, as a strategic matter, acquiesce in requiring the jurors to report their mitigating factors or their votes on them, when the
statute does not require it, is an interesting question.
272. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e). It should be noted here that "non-statutory" aggravating
factors are permitted to be used by the prosecution. See infra notes 291-294. Also, it
should be noted that a statutory scheme that does not require a finding that aggravating factors "outweigh" mitigating factors, but rather requires a death sentence if the
balance is found to be equal, has been declared unconstitutional by one state court.
See Colorado v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 839 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
273. This was noted in the Senate Report for the 1986 predecessor to the FDPA. S.
RaP. No. 99-282, at 20 (1986) ("aggravating and mitigating factors . . . are not
mechanically determinative of the sentence to be imposed."). See People v. Brown,
40 Cal. 3d 512, 541 (Cal. 1985) (weighing is "a metaphor for a process which by nature
is incapable of precise description,... but certainly not one which calls for a mere
mechanical counting of factors on each side of the imaginary 'scale', or the arbitrary
assignment of 'weights' to any of them."). Thus, for example, in Jones, 132 F.3d at
252, the jury and the appellate court both found a death sentence to be "justified"
although jurors listed eleven mitigating factors and there were, ultimately, only two
legitimate aggravating factors to be weighed against them.
274. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e).
275. Some scholars have, of course, already contributed thoughtfully on this point.
See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of CapitalPunishment, 109 HARV. L. REV.
355, 381-82 & n.129 (1995). The Supreme Court has stated that "reliance on extraneous emotional factors" is not permitted. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543
(1987). In her controlling concurrence, Justice O'Connor interpreted this to mean
that "capital sentencing decisions must not be made on mere whim, but instead on
clear and objective standards.... [T]he sentence imposed at the penalty stage should

398

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI

However, the ultimate language of justification does make it
clear that in no event is a death sentence mandated. 76 Even if the
jurors find that aggravating factors "outweigh" any mitigating factors, they can decline to impose death unless they conclude that the

greater weight of the aggravators is "sufficient to justify a sentence
of death." '77 Also, as in any criminal case, a single juror can block
a sentence of death, for a jury's "recommendation" of death must

be unanimous. As such, only a final, unanimous determination by
the jury that a death sentence is "justified" by at least one statutory
aggravating factor may.yield imposition of that penalty.2 78 Finally,
reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and
crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion." Id. at 544-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). As Professor Sundby has noted, Justice O'Connor's formulation might still be read to permit "human responses outside the traditional realm of
logic and reason." Sundby, supra note 136, at 1198. Thus whether Brown actually
provides jurors with much useful guidance is questionable.
276. This conclusion flows logically from the statutory structure; but notably, the
FDPA does not so state expressly. In contrast, the 1988 CCE statute states that "[t]he
jury or the court, regardless of its findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating
factors, is never required to impose a death sentence and the jury shall be so instructed." 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1994) (emphasis added). In 1994, the House's proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) repeated this sentence. See H.R. REP. No. 103-467 at 18
(1994). Thus its omission from the final bill must have been a conscious decision,
possibly as a compromise to balance the rejection of the "Gekas amendment" which
would have mandated death when aggravating circumstances were found to outweigh
the mitigating factors. See H.R. REP. No. 103-467, at 21-22 (1994) (dissenting views).
In any case, omission of the explicit CCE sentence removes the requirement that the
jury in a non-CCE capital case must be so instructed. This difference provides another
example in which it seems that the non-repealed CCE procedures would have to be
followed, rather than the FDPA, in a CCE death penalty case. See generally, supra
notes 246, 256-269.
277. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (1994). A similar determination is required even if no
mitigating factors at all are found: the jury must still decide "whether the aggravating
factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of death." Id. As previously
noted, supra notes 219, 276, some House Republicans opposed the 1994 legislation in
the Judiciary Committee because it did not mandate the death penalty in the absence
of mitigating factors or where the aggravators outweighed the mitigators. H.R. REP.
No. 103-467 at 21 (1994).
278. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (1994). A subtle, but possibly important nuance, is that
under the federal death penalty statutes as written, the jury must find that it is the
aggravatingfactors that "justify" a sentence of death in the particular case at hand,
and not some sense of morality, the case in general, or some other non-statutory
consideration. This could be important for a defendant to stress in a case involving
disturbing facts which, for some reason, are not captured within aggravating factors
for which proper notice has been given.
Interestingly, the 1986 predecessor bill to the FDPA contained a provision that
would have granted the factfinder discretion not. to impose the death penalty even if
the factfinder found that a sentence of death was "justified" after weighing all the
factors. S. REP. No. 99-282, at 23 (1986). This provision ultimately was dropped,
however, possibly because such a provision would have given juries completely un-
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if the jury properly "recommends" death under this scheme, the
court "shall sentence the defendant: accordingly," and if the jury

does not recommend death, the sentencing judge may not override
that verdict. Thus the jury's sentence' is not a "recommendation"
at all, but rather a binding determination. 9
Like the 1988 CCE statute, the 1994 federal death penalty procedures contain antidiscrimination provisions. The FDPA requires
the judge to instruct the sentencing jurors (1) that they "shall not
consider" race, gender, religious beliefs or other inappropriate
characteristics of the defendant or of any victim, and (2) that they
must conclude that they would recommend a death sentence for
the crime in question "no matter what" such racial, gender, or
other factors might be. 8 ° In addition, a certificate to this effect,

signed by each juror, must be submitted to the court with the sentencing verdict.28 '
a. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Under the CCE and
FDPA Statutes
Increasing the magnification of our focus on the statutory federal

death penalty procedures, let us consider aggravating and mitigating factors in some further detail. The statutory lists of potential
aggravating and mitigating factors in the 1994 Act are substantially
the same as -

CCE

statute. 8 2

but again not identical to -*the

lists in the 1988

For example, the 1994 statute lists seven specific

checked and unguided discretion to decide who lives and dies, a seemingly unconstitutional breadth of discretion under Furman and Gregg.
279. 18 U.S.C. § 3594 (1994). The 1986 Senate Report explained the non-literal use
of "recommendation" as follows: "[wlhile, by virtue of this provision, the jury finding
in effect determines whether the sentence shall be death, it remains the province of
the court to impose sentence." Congress expressly considered and rejected a different
system used in Florida, where the judge may "override" the jury's sentence recommendation. S. REP. No. 99-282, at 24 (1986). Cf. Robinson, supra note 6, at 1525-26
(arguing that the CCE statute should be amended to permit a "one-way" judge override only of jury recommendations of death).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (1994). See 21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(1) (1994) (containing the
same language).
281. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f). This certificate appears to be intended to impress upon
the jurors the importance of the non-discrimination requirements. Indeed, a formal
oath may carry moral force with some jurors. Moreover, though it is difficult to envision in practice, a federal capital juror probably could be prosecuted for returning a
false certificate. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1503 (1994).
282. This section compares 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(a) (1994) ("Mitigating factors") and
(b), (c), (d) (1994) ("Aggravating factors") to 21 U.S.C. §§ 848 (m) (1994) ("Mitigating factors") and (n) (1994) ("Aggravating factors for homicide").
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mitigating factors while the 1988 Act listed nine;283 both Acts also
included a "catchall" mitigation category.284 Omitted from the
1994 statutory mitigation list are (1) that the defendant was
"youthful, although not under the age of 18," and (2) that the defendant "could not reasonably have foreseen that [his] conduct...
would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death .... 285
The CCE "forseeability" factor is arguably accounted for in the
FDPA's initial mens rea eligibility factors, the least stringent of
which provides for death eligibility only if the defendant "intentionally ... engaged in an act of violence, knowing that the act created
a grave risk of death .... 286 But this statutory change is more
than just style: the shift of this mens rea factor from the mitigation
category in 1988 to being a death-eligibility screening factor in 1994
can be of vital significance. If a mitigator is proven by a defendant,
it merely places the factor into the "weighing" process - death can
be imposed despite the existence of the mitigator. On the other
hand, if a screening factor is shown not to be applicable, then the
death sentencing process stops - the defendant is not eligible for
death under 18 U.S.C. § 3591. Thus a single juror's conclusion that
a capital defendant was not reckless can end the matter under the
FDPA, but possibly not under the CCE.2 87
283. The 1994 Act also provides short descriptive headings for each factor, such as
"impaired capacity," "duress," "minor participation," and "equally culpable defendants," not found in the CCE statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a).
284. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(8) (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(10) (1994). A "catchall" mitigation category is constitutionally required under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982). See Skipper
v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (stating that "the sentencer may not ... be
precluded from considering 'any relevant mitigating evidence"'). The 1988 statute
described its catchall category as any "other factors in the defendant's background or
character [that] mitigate against imposition of the death sentence." 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(m)(10) (1994). In the 1994 Act, the catchall category was expanded to encompass "other factors in the defendant's background, record, or character or any other
circumstanceof the offense .. " 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(8) (emphasis added). The new
phrase tracked a state statute upheld by the Supreme Court in 1990. See Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305-08 (1990).
With regard to unconstrained mitigating factors, Justice Scalia has written that the
two leading principles of post-Furman capital punishment jurisprudence - the Gregg
principle of guided discretion and the Lockett principle of unconstrained individualized consideration - "cannot be reconciled." Walton, 497 U.S. at 664 (Scalia, J., concurring). Professor Sundby has suggested that, while perhaps the two principles may
seem a paradox, they may not be irreconcilable. See Sundby, supra note 136, at 1167.
285. 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(4), (5) (1994). See 18 U.S.C. §3592(a).
286. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(D) (1994) (emphasis added).
287. Because of this significant difference, if a CCE capital case involved a close
question on such a mens rea issue, the defendant might want to argue, contrary to
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As for the youthful-but-over-eighteen factor, while it is omitted
from the FDPA, a defendant may still seek to prove it under the
"catchall" category of mitigating evidence and Lockett.288 Thus,
while one hesitates to find insignificance in even the slightest alteration of death penalty language, its omission in 1994 seems to be of
little significance.
With regard to potential aggravating factors, the 1994 statute is
significantly more detailed than the 1988 CCE statute. Because the
1994 Act addresses a broad array of federal criminal offenses, including some not requiring killings, it provides separate lists of aggravating factors for "espionage and treason," for "drug
offense[s]," and for "homicide. ' 28 9 As a consequence, the 1994 Act
specifies a total of twenty-six aggravating factors; the 1988 legislation lists only twelve. The number of aggravating factors listed in
the statute can be extremely important, because unless one of the
statutory aggravating factors is unanimously found by the jury, a
death sentence may not be imposed.29 ° It thus follows that the
more aggravating factors that are provided in the statute, presumably the more cases in which death is at least a possibility.
In addition, both statues permit the government to seek to prove
other aggravating factors not listed in the statute itself, so long as
the required advance notice has been given.2 91 Such non-statutory
aggravating factors can add to the final "justification" balance; but
significantly, they may not serve alone as justification for a federal
death penalty. 292 The possibility of non-statutory aggravating factors permits a certain amount of "creativity" in the capital prosecutor's role, and allows prosecutors to address significant factors that
may be present in particular cases but which the legislature did not
foresee. The availability of non-statutory aggravators is a mixed
suggestions made above, see supra notes 257-66, that the 1994 FDPA procedures
should be applied.
288. See supra notes 259, 284.
289. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(b), (c), (d) (1994), with 21 U.S.C. § 848(n) (1994).
See supra notes 229-30, 251, 254 (discussing non-homicide death penalty offenses).
290. The statute makes this point rather obliquely, stating that "[i]f no aggravating
factor set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3592 (the list of aggravating factors)] is found to exist,
the court shall impose a sentence other than death [that is] authorized by law." 18
U.S.C. § 3593(d); accord, 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1994).
291. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(b), (c), (d); 21 U.S.C. at § 848 (n). The Supreme Court
has upheld the practice of relying on non-statutory factors, in mitigation and, if the
statute so authorizes, in aggravation. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987)
(discussing mitigating factors); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 956 (1983) (discussing
aggravating factors).

292. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (stating that a statutory aggravating factor must be "found
to exist" before death can be considered); 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (same).
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blessing for prosecutors, however: it naturally produces some incentive for "overkill," out of fear of losing an opportunity to prove
some fact whose relevance becomes clear later. Yet overinclusion
of hoped-for, non-statutory aggravating factors can yield opportunity for error which would not have been present had the prosecutor simply stuck to proving factors listed in the statute.293 Lacking
specific legislative endoresement, they may more easily be found
improper or duplicative upon appellate review. 94 Because at least
one statutory aggravator must always be proven for a case to be
death-eligible, the utility of non-statutory aggravating factors is debatable in many cases. Non-statutory aggravators have been the
focus of much of the federal capital litigation since 1988, and federal prosecutors should think carefully before deciding they are
necessary to successfully pursue a capital case.
All twelve of the potential aggravating factors specified in the
1988 CCE Act are replicated in the 1994 Act, mostly in identical
language.2 95 Many of these involve prior convictions; for example,
having prior convictions for two felonies involving serious bodily
injury, two controlled substance distribution felonies, or a prior
CCE conviction, can expose a defendant to the death penalty
under both statutes. Other replicated aggravating factors include:
(1) creating a grave risk of death to other persons besides the victim(s); (2) substantial planning and premeditation; (3) a victim
"particularly vulnerable due to old age, youth, or infirmity;" (4)
procuring the offense by payment or promise of payment; (5) committing the offense for pecuniary gain (i.e., "in the expectation of
the receipt of anything of pecuniary value"); or (6) committing the
293. Stephen B. Bright, a well-known death penalty defense lawyer and director of
the Southern Center for Human Rights, has said that any prosecutor who adds nonstatutory aggravating factors "takes a chance" and can lead to the government
"sho[oting] itself in the foot." David E. Rovella, Preparingfor the Penalty Phase:
There are Actually Two Oklahoma Bombing Trials Afoot in Denver, NAT'L L.J., May

12, 1997, at A15.
294. This was the error in the Jones case, which resulted in review by the Supreme
Court, as well as McCullough, in which the death sentence was reversed. See United
States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, reh'g en banc denied, 87 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1699 (1997); see Jones, 132 F.3d at 252. Meanwhile, in both
cases significant statutory aggravating factors were found by the jury and affirmed on
appeal, so that it seems in hindsight that the government may have been better off
simply sticking to the statute.
295. There are some specific language changes, but the substance of all the factors
is largely identical. For example, compare 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(3) (1994), with 18
U.S.C. § 3592(c)(4) (1994); compare 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(10) (1994), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3592(c)(13) (1994).
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The last two aggravating factors, "pecuniary gain" and "serious
physical abuse," are considered at some length below. 2 97 For now I
will simply assert that when the generality of these statutory aggravating factors and their commonality in many murders are considered together with the added authority to invoke non-statutory
aggravators, it is the rare federal defendant that could not, in theory, be sentenced to death simply upon conviction of any killing
offense.
Appeals, Implementation, and Results
Under both statutes, once a federal death penalty is returned, a
defendant is entitled to appellate review "upon appeal by the defendant. '298 It appears, however, that the defendant must properly
request appellate review; unlike some state statutes, the federal
death penalty procedures do not authorize automatic capital sentencing review. 299
Under the 1988 CCE statute, the appellate court may affirm a
death sentence only if, after thorough review, the court concludes
that the evidence supports all the aggravating factors found as well
as the mitigating factors (or their absence), and that "the sentence
was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any
other arbitrary factor. ' 30 0 Courts have consistently rejected the argument that because this last phrase does not expressly authorize
b.

296. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(5)-(9), (11) (1994); 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(n)(5)-(9), (12) (1994).
297. See infra notes 647-688 and accompanying text.
298. 18 U.S.C. § 3595 (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(1) (1994).
299. The Supreme Court has "emphasized repeatedly" that "meaningful appellate
review" is "crucial" to a constitutional capital punishment structure. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991). While some states review all capital verdicts automatically, however, this does not appear to be constitutionally required. See Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990) (sidestepping question of whether appellate
review of a death sentence is constitutionally required despite defendant's decision
not to appeal); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) (allowing capital defendant who waives all appeals to be executed); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687
,however grave the offence [sic] ...is not
(1894) ("review by an appellate court ...
now [ ] a necessary element of due process

. .

."). Whether denial of capital sentenc-

ing review due to a technically improper appeal notice, rather than a competent and
voluntary decision to forego appeal, would survive constitutional muster is a yet-unanswered question under the 1994 FDPA. But cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 756-57 (1991) (holding state collateral review petition filed three days late in
capital case sufficient to foreclose federal review); see also S. REP. No. 99-282, at 24
(1986) (stating that any "[n]otice of appeal must be filed within the time prescribed"
by statute).
300. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(q)(2), (3) (1994).
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appellate review for "legal errors" it is unconstitutional, concluding
instead that the statute implicitly authorizes review for "harmful
errors of law." 30 ' Nevertheless, and presumably in reaction to such
attacks on the CCE statute, the 1994 Act specifies that appellate
remand of a death penalty is also required for "any other legal error requiring reversal ...[if] properly preserved .... "302 The 1994
statute also expressly provides a "harmless error" affirmance rule,
stating that a court of appeals "shall not reverse or vacate a sentence of death" so long as "the Government establishes beyond
'30 3
reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.
The 1994 Act broadly permits government employees to decline
to participate in executions if it contravenes their moral or religious beliefs.30 4 In addition, unlike the CCE statute, the 1994 Act
also addresses "implementation" of federal death sentences. Section 3596 provides that U.S. Marshalls shall "supervise" implementation "in the manner prescribed by the law of the State in which
the sentence is imposed."30 5 That statute also recognizes that the
federal death penalty might be applied anywhere in the nation,
although a quarter of the states do not authorize capital punishment. If the state in which the federal sentence is imposed does
not authorize capital punishment, "the court shall designate
another State, the law of which does provide for the implementation of a sentence of death, and the sentence must be implemented [there]. '3 6 In fact, the federal government has con301. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. at 764 (D.N.J. 1991); United States v. Pitera, 795 F.
Supp. 546, 566-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).

302. 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2)(C) (1994).
303. 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c) (1998). Application of the harmless error standard on appeal is one of the questions before the Supreme Court in the Jones case.
304. See 18 U.S.C. § 3597(b) (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 848(r) (1994). Notably, the
equivalent CCE provision is limited to prison employees and contractors. See 21
U.S.C. § 848(r) (1994).

305. 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a) (1994).
306. Id.; accord 18 U.S.C. § 542 (1940). The 1994 Act also specifies that the death
penalty may not be "carried out" on a woman "while she is pregnant," nor on a "mentally retarded" or person who "lacks the mental capacity to understand the death
penalty and why it was imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3596(b), (c) (1998). This latter provision had been championed by Senator Kennedy (D-Mass.) since at least 1986. See S.
REP. No. 99-282, at 48-49 (1986). Finally, the federal death penalty does not apply to
persons subject to Indian tribal jurisdiction for offenses that occur in Indian Territory
and for which there is no independent federal jurisdiction, unless the tribe elects to
permit the federal death penalty to apply. See 18 U.S.C. § 3598 (1998). Although
there are a number of distinctions, this statutory deference to Indian tribal jurisdiction, but not to state legislative decisions not to authorize capital punishment, pro-

vokes interesting federalism questions. See supra note 36.
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structed a federal execution facility at a prison in Terre Haute,
Indiana. °7
Although thirteen House Republicans predicted in 1994 that the
FDPA's procedures were so pro-defendant that "it is doubtful that
these penalties will ever be implemented, ' 30 8 there are presently
twenty persons currently on federal death row. 30 9 They are all
male, and fifteen of them are not caucasian (thirteen are AfricanAmerican, one is Hispanic and one is Asian-American).31 0 All are
in various stages of appellate review, which presumably will include one - but only one - federal habeas petition. 3 11 Although a
number of persons indicted for federal death-eligible sentences
have avoided that final judgment at trial, only one person actually
sentenced to death under the 1994 Act has prevailed so far, on appeal.3 12 No reviewing court has identified any pervasive statutory
or constitutional flaw in the procedures, and while it is dangerous
business to predict Supreme Court results, it seems unlikely that
Jones will result in any systemic striking down of FDPA provisions.3 13 Although his case presents a serious guilt issue, Ronald
Chandler appears to be the farthest along on the path to federal
execution: his sentence has been finally affirmed on direct appeal
and his appeal of the district court's denial of his federal habeas
petition was argued on October 28, 1998.314 It seems entirely likely
307. See Federal Death Penalty Law Still to be Tested, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14,
1997, at AO.
308. H.R. REP. No. 103-467, at 22 (1994); see supra note 277.
309. See Federal Death Row Prisoners,supra note 6.
310. Id.
311. Amendments in 1996 to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 considerably tightened existing case

law requirements for "successive" federal habeas petitions. See Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 105, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220;
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1998) ("The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a

second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner," and "a
1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section.").
312. John McCullah, a white male sentenced to death for a drug-related kidnap
murder, had his case remanded for resentencing after an appellate panel (affirmed by
an evenly-divided en banc court) accepted his argument that one of the aggravating
factors the jury had relied upon impermissibly duplicated an element of the offense.
See United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied en banc, 87
F.3d 1136 (10th Cir.) (denying rehearing en banc, 6-6), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1699,

137 L. Ed.2d 825 (1997). He is awaiting resentencing as of February 1999.
313. See 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998). Other courts that have upheld the 1994
FDPA provisions include United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1998), reh'g
denied en banc, 161 F.3d 10 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Battle, 979 F. Supp. 1442

(N.D. Ga. 1997); United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525 (D. Kan. 1996).
314. See supra note 199. In Texas, Juan Garza's federal habeas corpus petition has
also been denied, and an appeal is pending before the Fifth Circuit. See United States
v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. 1998). Moreover, it is possible that a federal "volun-
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that sometime near the end of this millennium or the beginning of
the next, the federal death penalty will in fact be implemented by
execution.315
G. DOJ Implementation
In 1992 President Clinton supported capital punishment as a candidate. But when Janet Reno was nominated by the President as
Attorney General, she initially indicated that she opposed capital
punishment.316 Meanwhile, other Democratic congressional leaders remained opposed to a federal death penalty. Janet Reno thus
confronted questions at her March 1993 confirmation hearing from
both sides of the capital punishment debate. 7 She noted that as
the Dade County State's Attorney, she had authorized and obtained the death penalty in a number of cases. But she also acknowledged concern about the troubling data regarding racial
disparities in capital punishment.3 18 Although McCleskey had disposed of this issue as a constitutional matter in 1987, that decision
did not remove the statistical evidence itself nor the deep concern
it created among some congressional leaders. 19 Reno the nominee
responded that the DOJ would fairly and non-arbitrarily administer a federal death penalty system, and indicated that she "looked
forward to" developing the legislation that ultimately became the
teer" could reject further appellate proceedings before execution. See supra note 38
(discussing the Hammer case).
315. It is entirely possible that lower courts will withhold action on pending FDPA
appeals until the Supreme Court issues an opinion in Jones. Nevertheless, assuming
that the Court decides Jones by July 1999, Chandler's or Garza's habeas appeal could
be decided by late 1999. Further assuming that certiorari petitions are rejected, they
could face an execution date sometime in the year 2000. The next millennium, of
course, begins on January 1, 2001.
316. See Search for Attorney General Finally Final (National Public Radio, Feb. 12,
1993) (re-broadcasting Reno's nomination press conference), available in 1993 WL
9570448 ("Ms. Reno: 'I'm personally opposed to the death penalty, as I've told the
[P]resident. But I've probably asked for it as much as many prosecutors in the country, and have secured it. And when the evidence and the law justify the death penalty,
I will ask for it."). See also Attorney General Reno Visits NYU, NYU L. SCH. MAG.
(Autumn 1998) (reporting that Reno "confessed to being personally opposed to the
death penalty").
317. See, e.g., RENb CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 214, at 53 (Senator
Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) notes concerns regarding racial disparities); id. at 75 (Senator
Specter (R-Pa.) seeks assurances that Reno will not oppose capital punishment).

318. Id. at 53.
319. John Conyers in particular, the senior Democratic member of the House Judiciary Committee, is African-American and expressed particular concern regarding the
McCleskey issues. See H.R. REP. No. 458 (1994) ("There is compelling evidence from
certain jurisdictions that the race of the defendant may be a factor governing the
imposition of the death sentence").
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1994 FDPA. 32 ° Once the FDPA became law, the now-confirmed
Attorney General Reno quickly set about implementing its
provisions.
1.

The DOJ Capital Case Protocols

On January 27, 1995, little more than three months after the
FDPA was enacted, the Attorney General issued what is known
within the DOJ as the "Death Penalty Protocol. ' 321 More particularly, a "bluesheet" was issued to all "Holders of the United States
Attorneys' Manual"3 22 which replaced the prior section on "Capital
Crimes. '323 This directive addressed "Federal Prosecutions in
Which the Death Penalty May Be Sought," and set forth "policy
and procedures to be followed in all federal cases in which a defendant is charged with an offense subject to the death penalty, regardless of whether the United States Attorney
intends to request
32 4
authorization to seek the death penalty.
In order to ensure national "consistency" in administration, the
DOJ protocols state that "[t]he death penalty shall not be sought
320. RENO CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 214, at 75 (death penalty should
be "carried out in a fair, reasoned way"); see id. at 101 ("prevent disparate treatment"
and "reinforce procedures to make sure that [race disparities] will not happen"); id. at
100 ("I look forward to working with you in developing death penalty statutes that
will withstand the most vigorous scrutiny"); id. at 158-59 (Let's "walk together in this
next year to see if we can pass a bill . . .
321. See infra note 328. A copy of the memorandum announcing the Protocol is on
file with the author. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 910.000 ("Capital Crimes"), available in the DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12,
and through the Department of Justice website, supra note 12. The author served as
an Associate Deputy Attorney General in the DOJ in 1996-97, and served on the
Attorney General's capital cdse review committee pursuant to the Protocol. He feels
competent, therefore, to report that the protocol provisions are also sometimes referred to in the plural, as "the protocols." See also Walker v. Reno, 925 F. Supp. 124,
128-29 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (describing the "Protocol").
322. The UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, is a collection of
internal policy statements and procedures issued by the DOJ to guide its personnel on
a myriad of issues. Although a prosecutor's violation of a UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL provision may provide a basis for internal discipline, courts consistently have held that the UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL does not create any

enforceable legal rights. See, e.g., Nichols v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 748 (D. Colo. 1996),
affd, 124 F.3d 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (so. holding with regard to the 1995 death penalty
protocols); accord United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1979) ("violation of the internal housekeeping rules of the DOJ" is not ground for reversal).
323. See supra note 321. "Bluesheets" [hereinafter DOJ Bluesheets] are amend-

ments to the

UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL

that are issued with some fre-

quency, and are so called because they are issued on blue-colored paper so as not to
be missed.
324. See infra notes 512-529 (emphasis supplied) for a discussion of the emphasized
language.
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without the prior written authorization of the Attorney General.

'325

The basic requirement of the protocols is that "[in] all

cases in which the United States Attorney intends to charge a defendant with an offense subject to the death penalty, whether or not
the United States Attorney recommends the filing of a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, the U.S. Attorney shall prepare a
'Death Penalty Evaluation' form and a prosecution memorandum," and obtain the Attorney General's personal approval
before
32 6
proceeding with a federal death penalty prosecution.
Requests for authorization are processed through the Criminal
Division.3 27 The on-line version of the United States Attorneys'
Manual "encourage[s]," but does not require, U.S. Attorneys to
"consult" with Main Justice before indicting potential death penalty cases.328 It also cross references a list of "capital eligible statutes" found in something called the Criminal Resource Manual; in
turn, that statutory list is broken down among the various Sections
within the Department's Criminal Division that are assigned to advise and oversee the administration of the particular statutes.32 9
The DOJ protocols state that notice of intent to request approval
to seek the death penalty "should" be given to defense counsel, at
the time of indictment or before the U.S. Attorneys' office decides
to seek DOJ "approval" for the penalty, "whichever comes
first. ' 330 This statement of timing for notice to the defense uncon325. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 9-10.020, 9-10.080.
The Attorney General's personal approval has been a Main Justice requirement since
at least 1988, prior to enactment of the CCE statute.
326. Id. § 9-10.040 (emphasis added). The 17-page Death Penalty Evaluation form
was attached in blank as an Appendix to the original Protocol. It is now available in a
separate publication called the Criminal Resource Manual. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 71 (last visited Jan. 20, 1999) <www.usdoj.gov/usao/

eousa> [hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE

MANUAL]

(listing all federal death eligible

statutes and the Main Justice sections assigned to supervise each and noting that different death penalty evaluation forms are available for different charged offenses).
With the establishment of a Capital Cases Unit in DOI to handle all potential capital
cases, see infra note 343, the need for this section assignment list has been mooted.
327. DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-2.148.
328. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.020.
329. Id.; see supra note 326. This cross-reference was not contained in the original

1995 Protocol, because the

CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL

was not published until

the United States Attorneys' Manual was reorganized in 1997. In that reorganization,
much material was excised from the United States Attorneys' Manual in order to make
that multi-volume source more manageable, and was transferred to the CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL,
330. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL,

supra note 12, § 9-10.030 ("Notice of
Intention to Seek the Death Penalty"). Obviously, the simple fact of indictment
under a death eligible statute gives the defendant notice of the possibility of death.
Thus the Protocol notice provision actually seems intended to encourage some more
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sciously reflects an unfortunate ambivalence that runs throughout
the Capital Case protocols: is the "trigger" for submission to Main
Justice for review simply any case in which the death penalty might
be sought ("regardless of whether the U.S. Attorney intends to"
seek it33 1), or is it only when the U.S. Attorney "decides to request
approval" of a death penalty prosecution? 332 The possibly deleterious effects of this ambiguity, and a suggestion for amendment, are
discussed below.333
The stated purpose of defense notice is to "give counsel for the
defendant a reasonable opportunity to present any facts, including
any mitigating factors," to the U.S. Attorney.334 If, after considering any defense submission, the U.S. Attorney still "decides to request approval to seek the death penalty," the office "should"
inform counsel for the defendant.335 The hortatory nature of the
defense notice provisions is somewhat mystifying, because in fact
the defense receives notice of Main Justice death penalty review in
every case that is submitted.336
For every case submitted for review, the U.S. Attorney is required to provide to Main Justice a completed "Death Penalty
Evaluation" form and a memorandum outlining the facts and relevant law, as well as "whether or not" the office recommends seeking the death penalty. 337 The trigger for submission is again stated
as whether the defendant is "charge[d] ...with an offense subject
specific notice to the defense, when the U.S. Attorney's office actually determines
that death penalty approval should be sought from Main Justice. Interestingly,
although it not infrequently occurs, the possibility that the U.S. Attorney's office
would submit the case for DOJ review with a recommendation againstthe death penalty is not expressly addressed by this notice provision.
331. Id. § 9-10.010; see also DOJ Bluesheet, supra note 321, Jan. 27, 1995 (statement of "Purpose").
332. Id. § 9-10.030.
333. See infra notes 512-529.
334. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.030.
335. Id.
336. According to the UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-10.050, defense
counsel "shall" be provided an opportunity to present their views to the Department's
capital case review committee, so defense counsel necessarily receives notice that the
Department is considering the death penalty. Whether the defense notice provision
should be interpreted to require that U.S. Attorneys inform defense counsel of the
substance of their recommendations, including whether a recommendation is for or
against the death penalty, has been much debated. There are good reasons for not
informing defense counsel of the substance of a U.S. Attorney's recommendation
(which is only preliminary in any case), and in fact defense counsel are not always so
informed. See infra note 401.
337. Id. § 9-10.040. The form "is intended primarily to be used as a guideline and
worksheet for the internal decision making process, and may be hand-written." Id.
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'
to the death penalty."338
The submission to Main Justice must also
provide "any other relevant information," copies of other "significant documents" (such as confessions or investigative reports), and
any written material that defense counsel has provided to the U.S.
Attorney.339
The central innovation of the Attorney General's capital case review protocols is the formal establishment of a high level Capital
Case Review Committee at Main Justice. It is the only capital punishment review committee in existence to have nationwide jurisdiction.34° The Committee is appointed by the Attorney General and
must include designees of the Deputy Attorney General and the
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division.34' With one
exception the identity of the Review Committee's members has
necessarily changed over time, but a consistent virtue of the Committee has been that its members have been high-ranking attorneys
within the DOJ hierarchy who have direct and speedy access to the
highest decision-makers in the Department.342 This ensures responsiveness within Departmental and U.S. Attorneys' offices
when questions arise, and speedy decisions from the Attorney
General when necessary. The Committee also has had excellent
staff assistance from the Criminal Division. In late 1998, in acknowledgment of the importance of federal death penalty review
as well as the increasing workload, a formal Capital Cases Unit was
established within the Criminal Division to staff all death penalty
reviews as well as to advise federal capital prosecutors in the
field.343
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Cf. John A. Horowitz, Note, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the Death Penalty:
Creating a Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2571, 2573, 2580 (1997) (suggesting the creation of a state-wide committee to
address localized differences within state).
341. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.050. Until
1997 the Committee met with three members. In 1997, a fourth member was added to
the Committee, a female African-American prosecutor with substantial trial
experience.
342. Since Attorney General Reno established the Committee, the only continuous
member has been Kevin DiGregory, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
Criminal Division and a career prosecutor who tried death penalty cases when he was
a Deputy in Janet Reno's State's Attorney Office in Dade County, Florida. The other
members have changed over time, but they have all had high level access and "clout"
within the Department. For example, the Deputy Attorney General's first designee
to the Committee was then-Associate Deputy Attorney General Seth P. Waxman,
who is now serving as the Solicitor General of the United States.
343. Robert Schmidt, Death Row's Price Tag, 21 LEGAL TIMES, No. 21 (Oct. 12,
1998), at 1.
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Once a potential death case is submitted to Main Justice for review, defense counsel for each defendant must be granted an opportunity to make a presentation (oral, written, or both) to the
Review Committee.344 The Committee must consider all information provided to it, including any evidence of "racial bias" against
the particular defendant in the case and any more general evidence
of any "pattern or practice of racial discrimination" by the Depart' 345
ment "in the administration of the Federal death penalty."
However, the protocols do not suggest what role any such evidence
should play in a particular authorization decision.346
The express inclusion of this language regarding possible race
bias demonstrates the centrality of this concern in Attorney General Reno's administration of the death penalty; the protocols
plainly were written with the race-bias concerns of McCleskey in
mind. Echoing the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f), the protocols direct
that "bias for or against an individual based upon characteristics
such as race or ethnic origin may play no role in the decision
whether to seek the death penalty. '347 In fact, to guard against
such bias on a possibly unconscious level, the Attorney General
has directed that prosecutorial death penalty review submissions
be "race blind," that is, devoid so far as possible of racial identificaUNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.050.
345. Id.
346. As noted above, of the 20 prisoners currently under a federal sentence of
death, 13, or 65%, are African-American; 75% are non-caucasian. See FederalDeath
Row Prisoners,supra note 6. This is a small sample; but it is the only publicly disseminated data. Attorney Kevin McNally of the Federal Death Penalty Resource Project
has also presented the Department with data asserting that "since 1988 there have
been 133 defendants against whom the Attorney Generals have personally authorized
a capital prosecution, 78 (59%) have been African-American, 32 (24%) have been
Caucasian, 17 (13%) have been Hispanic, and six (4%) have been Asian or Indian."
Affidavit of Kevin McNally (Oct. 4, 1998), filed in United States v. Holloway, No. 3:9600004 (M.D. Tenn.) (on file with the author). Because the Department knows these
facts and still continues to authorize federal death penalty prosecutions, it obviously
does not consider them to present a disabling "pattern or practice" of racial discrimination in the administration of the federal penalty. The Holloway court also rejected
the data as a basis for discovery or dismissal. See Holloway, supra, Mem. Op. Dec. 3,
1998. The author believes that the Department is presently studying this issue and the
protocol language that addresses the topic.
347. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.080. In addition,
in a document that accompanies the blank death penalty evaluation form entitled
"Non-Decisional Case Identifying Information," the Department again advises federal prosecutors that "[a]s is true for all federal prosecutions regarding prosecution,
bias for or against an individual based upon characteristics such as race, color, national origin, or sex of a defendant or a victim may not play any role in the decision
whether to seek or authorize the death penalty, and any influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors must be avoided." Id. at n.1. See infra note 349.

344.
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tion information regarding the defendant or victim(s). 3 48 Yet the
Department as an institution does not ignore race; rather it collects
race-identification information about capital defendants and victims (which obviously might be valuable for future study of federal
death penalty administration) on a separate form, while instructing
U.S. Attorneys that the information "will not be included in the
materials presented to the Attorney General's Review Committee. '349 Main Justice staff also reviews the materials that are submitted to the Committee to ensure that unnecessary racial
information does not slip in. So, unless the defense informs the
Committee, as they sometimes do for strategic reasons, or some
fact necessary to the prosecution suggests ethnicity, the Attorney
General and her review committee remain ignorant of race or
ethnicity. 5 0 This is a further indication of the Department's sensitivity to race issues in administration of the death penalty. While
the Department maintains useful statistical information about race
as it is intertwined with administration of the federal death penalty
(although it has not publicly released this data), it self-consciously
eliminates racial information from the Attorney General's review
process.
After the Review Committee has considered the case, it makes a
written recommendation directly to the Attorney General, who
makes the "final decision" whether to file the statutorily required
'
The protocols
"Notice of Intention to Seek the Death Penalty."351
also provide, however, that the Committee can revisit a capital case
upon request, and will review "any submission defense counsel
348. The author must vouch for this from his personal experience. See supra note
RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 326, at 74 (requiring race of
capital defendant and victim data from U.S. Attorneys, and noting that "[t]his page
will not be included in the materials presented to the Attorney General's Review
Committee, but will be ... retained").
349. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 326, at 74-7, "Non-Decisional
Case Identifying Information" form.
350. For example, a Death Penalty Evaluation memo might say that "Defendant
was indicted under RICO as the leader of the Latin Kings" or "Defendant's name is
[seemingly ethnic]." However, unless ethnicity is stated directly (which it is not), the
Committee knows that "seemingly ethnic" clues can lead to inaccurate inferences.
That is, the Latin Kings may have non-Latino members, and names that supposedly
suggest ethnicity can be completely misleading. Thus the elimination of direct racial
information is a relatively effective measure.
351. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.050; see 18
U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994). The Committee is supposed to give its written recommendation to the Attorney General within 15 days of receiving all necessary documents. Id.
§ 9-10.050. There is no requirement that the Committee be unanimous in its
recommendation.

321. See also CRIMINAL
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chooses to make," even at later stages in the case.352 In that circumstance, the Committee again will make a recommendation to
the Attorney General. 3 There is no requirement, however, that
the Attorney General formally issue a second decision in such a
case.
The protocols require the U.S. Attorney to notify the family of
the victim of all "final decisions" regarding the death penalty.354 In
practice, because family members are often necessary government
witnesses, and also out of concern for victims' families, family
members are often consulted regarding the process as it goes on.
On the other hand, security concerns and concern for deliberative
confidentiality may necessarily limit the information that can be
shared with victims' families in some circumstances.
In one of the protocols' more opaque but important sections, the
Department suggests (but does not mandate) that a federal indictment should be returned in a potential death penalty case only
when the "Federal interest in the prosecution is more substantial
than the interests of the State or local authorities. ' 35 6 This provision implicitly recognizes that murder is a crime in every state, so
that many federally indictable murders are "dual jurisdiction"
crimes, that is, prosecutable by state authorities as well as federal.3 57 The normal presumption is that federal authorities will not
prosecute in addition to a state prosecution 35 8 - but still a decision
must often be made as to which jurisdiction will prosecute in the
first instance.359 In other words, will the U.S. Attorney's office
prosecute a potential capital case over which there is dual jurisdiction, or will it defer to a local prosecution?
This "substantial federal interest" provision also implicitly acknowledges that the federal death penalty applies even in states
352. Id. § 9-10.050.
353. Id.
354. Id. § 9-10.060.
355. See Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 6, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (the Victim and Witness Protection Act"), reprinted in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512, Historical Note (West 1984).
356. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.070 (stating that
"[i]t is anticipated that" this will be so).
357. See Little, Myths and Principlesof Federalization,supra note 68, at 1073 n.212
(noting that even murder of the President could be charged in state courts and in fact
did not become a federal offense until after President Kennedy was assassinated in
1963). Locations over which federal authorities have exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute include federal enclaves such as military bases and federal parklands, and the
high seas.
358. See infra notes 363-64 and accompanying text.
359. See generally Steven D. Clymer; UnequalJustice: The Federalizationof Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643 (1997) (analyzing federal case selection policies).
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that do not authorize the death penalty, and recognizes that some
persons might advocate federal prosecution in a non-capital punishment state simply to obtain a death sentence. The protocols expressly direct that such penalty-driven decisions to file federal
charges are inappropriate: "the fact that the maximum Federal
penalty is death [where the relevant state's maximum penalty is
not] is insufficient, standing alone, to show a more substantial interest in Federal prosecution. '361 The "substantial federal interest"
section then goes on to list three general factors (which are "not...
exhaustive") that "may be considered" in deciding whether the
federal interest in prosecuting a particular case is more substantial
than the state's: (1) the strength of the state's interest in prosecuting the case; (2) the extent that the criminal activity or its impact
extended beyond the state's borders; 361 and (3) the "likelihood of
effective prosecution" in federal versus state courts (which may
well have different procedural or evidentiary rules, jury pools, resources and venues, etc).3 62
The "substantial federal interests" section of the death penalty
protocols plainly envisions that federal authorities will defer to
state authorities in many homicide prosecutions, implicitly relying
on the Department's Petite policy not to duplicate state prosecutions even though dual state-federal jurisdiction is constitutionally
available.363 Named for the Supreme Court case in which it was
first announced, the Department's Petite policy directs that, in dual
jurisdiction cases, "federal prosecutors should, as soon as possible,
consult with their state counterparts to determine the most appropriate single forum in which to proceed. ' 364 The Department's
death penalty protocols are directly responsive to that policy. In
360. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.070.
361. In particular, if evidence to effectively prosecute must be obtained from other
states, the national subpoena authority of a federal grand jury is often a vital consideration in whether to indict at the federal level. See UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.070B. Thus, for example, when a murdering kidnapper like
Victor Feguer crosses state lines in the course of his offense, federal prosecution can
often be more efficient from an evidentiary standpoint. See supra notes 27-38.
362. UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.070A-C. The
Oklahoma City bombing case provides a good example of the overall federal interests
out-weighing the interests of state prosecution. It involved destruction of a federal
building, deaths of federal officials as well as other persons, interstate investigative
and evidentiary needs and leads, a huge commitment of resources, and an available
out-of-state venue (Denver) in which the highly-publicized and emotional case could
be tried.
363. See id. § 9-2.031.
364. Id. § 9-2.031A (emphasis added); see Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529

(1960).
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contrast, there is no requirement that state authorities must defer
to a federal prosecution (although the high cost of capital prosecutions often counsel against a duplication of effort). For instance, in
the Oklahoma City bombing case, state authorities filed a capital
case against the defendants despite the fact that Timothy McVeigh
was already subject to death in the federal case.365
Once a case is properly indicted and before it is submitted to the
Attorney General for personal review, the protocols describe in
general terms how the Committee should perform its analysis.
Here it is necessary to diverge to note an important point about the
federal prosecutor's role under the federal death penalty statutes.
The decision to authorize the filing of a death penalty notice
merely permits the U.S. Attorney to place the issue of the death
penalty before the jury. It is not the same as deciding to impose
the death penalty itself. It properly remains the ultimate province
of the jury, representatives of the community at large, to decide
whether death should be imposed. Nevertheless, federal prosecutors cannot escape the difficult moral judgments necessary in capital prosecutions simply by claiming that they only "authorize," and
do not impose, death.366 Aside from the obvious point that prosecutors are the gatekeepers for capital punishment by virtue of their
charging discretion, the federal death penalty statutes themselves
require federal prosecutors to come to a reasoned moral judgment
367
before they file a death penalty notice.
As explained above, the long battle to enact a general federal
death penalty statute in 1994 yielded a compromise, not a draconian statute.368 Congress did not simply direct that a death penalty
notice shall be filed whenever a death-eligible federal statute is
charged. Rather, Congress wrote a more discretionary provision',
which demands that before a death penalty option is placed before
a federal jury, federal prosecutors must conclude that death is "jus365. See Steven Wilmsen & Kevin Simpson, Death for McVeigh - Twelve Reach
Their Decision in 11 Hours, DENV. POST, June 14, 1997, at Al; Jo Thomas, The
Oklahoma City Bombing: The Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1997, at Al; Robert Suro,
Decision May Become Benchmark in Capital Punishment Debate, WASH. POST, June
14, 1997, at A10.
366. See Noonan, supra note 39, at 1023 (declaring that "the prosecutors' role imposes on them a part in the infliction of death").
367. As Justice O'Connor wrote in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987),
capital sentencing decisions "should reflect a reasoned moral response" to the defendant's background, character and crime.
368. See supra notes 206-225 and accompanying text. Indeed, some Congressional
capital punishment supporters dissented from the FDPA legislation as finally written
because they viewed it as too lenient. See supra note 219.
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tified" as the appropriate penalty under the statute. Section
3593(a) directs that a federal death penalty notice shall be filed
"[i]f... the attorney for the government believes that . . . a sentence of death is justified" under the statute. 369 Thus federal prosecutors must apply all the balancing provisions of the statute and
ultimately "believe" that the death penalty is "justified" before
they proceed to seek it. Any lesser prosecutorial assertion, such as
"death is 'arguably' appropriate under the statute so we should let
the jury decide," is inconsistent with the statute that Congress
wrote.
For this reason, the death penalty protocols direct both the U.S.
Attorney and the Attorney General's review committee to perform
the same statutory exercise that a federal capital jury must ultimately perform: determine what aggravating and mitigating factors
are present and then decide whether the aggravating factors "sufficiently outweigh" any mitigating factors so as to "justify a sentence
of death. ' 370 The Department does not further constrain the discretion of its prosecutors in consideration of relevant factors: the
protocols expressly direct that in making the final determination
regarding whether it is "appropriate to seek the death penalty," all
involved must consider "any legitimate law enforcement or
prosecutorial reason which weighs for or against seeking the death
penalty. "371
Nevertheless, as in the statute itself, the Department's review of
specific aggravating and mitigating factors is tilted somewhat in the
potential capital defendant's favor. The protocols direct reviewers
to consider only aggravating factors that are supported by "sufficient admissible evidence" - sufficient not only to sustain the
death penalty but "to sustain it on appeal" - and only those aggravating factors which they find supported "beyond a reasonable
369. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994) (emphasis added). The statute does not expressly
say "only" if, but the exclusionary intention of the congressional language may reasonably be implied under traditional rules of statutory construction. See infra note
426; see also United States v. Roman, 931 F. Supp. 960, 962-63 (D.R.I. 1996); Nichols
v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 748, 752 (D.Colo. 1996), affd, 124 F.3d 1376, 1378 (10th Cir.
1997). The CCE statute's triggering language is different. See infra notes 425, 469.
370. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.080; accord, 18
U.S.C. § 3593(e) (1994).
371. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.080. Thus, for
example, while general deterrence is not mentioned within the federal statute, and
some dispute it as a sensible rationale for the death penalty, it would not be illegitimate for the Department to consider it in some cases. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184-86
(discussing deterrence rationale).
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doubt."3'72 In contrast, because the prosecutorial death penalty decision must be made at a relatively early stage when the defense
case is likely to be undeveloped (as well as unrevealed), mitigating
factors are (as in the statute) not held to such a high standard.
Rather, the protocols direct that "any mitigating factor reasonably
raised by the evidence should be considered in the light most
favorable to the defendant. '37 3 In light of this process weighted
somewhat in favor of mitigation, one would expect federal death
penalties not to be authorized in all cases where it technically
might be available. And indeed, as discussed below, this appears
to be the case.
In keeping with the concept of centralized control over federal
death penalty administration that the protocols represent, once a
death penalty notice is authorized by the Attorney General, the
protocols direct that any subsequent withdrawals of a death penalty notice that are not part of a plea bargain require explanation
by the U.S. Attorney, review by the Review Committee, and approval by the Attorney General.374 But, in their final section, the
protocols recognize that plea bargaining can occur in capital cases
just as in any other. It is at this point that the complex relationship
between the semi-autonomous Presidentially-appointed U.S. Attorneys and Main Justice produces an odd wrinkle in the otherwise
centralized DOJ death penalty administration process.
Plea bargains that avoid the federal death penalty are treated
differently from other decisions to withdraw death penalty notices
once filed. By virtue of tradition, not law, U.S. Attorneys (who are
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate) have always been granted almost complete autonomy in disposing of cases
within their districts by plea negotiation.375 Thus, U.S. Attorney
autonomy in plea bargaining controls in capital cases. Under the
372. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.080.
373. Id.
374. See id. § 9-10.090.
375. Whether this policy should be so is a complex question bounded by deep historical traditions as well as political realities, and well beyond the scope of this Article. Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court made it clear that U.S.
Attorneys are "placed under [the Attorney General's] immediate direction and control." United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1888). Nevertheless,
U.S. Attorneys have traditionally operated with great independence, due in part to
their political strength as Presidential appointees, nominated by their States' Senators
rather than directly appointed by the Attorney General. See generally JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES 9 (1978); id. at 13, 16, 41-5, 98, 123; Dan M.
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 486-87
(1996) (noting a "strong history and culture of independence" for U.S. Attorneys).
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protocols, United States Attorneys in the field may dispose of federal capital cases, once charged, without advance approval or review by the Attorney General or Main Justice. 376
In discussing capital case plea bargaining, the protocols first direct that "[t]he death penalty may not be sought, and no attorney
for the government may threaten to seek it, for the purpose of obtaining a more desirable negotiating position. ' 377 This is consistent
with the statutory direction that the federal prosecutor must sincerely "believe" that a death penalty is "justified" before seeking
it.378 Thus the protocols direct that U.S. Attorneys must, before
they negotiate any plea in a potential capital case, perform for
themselves the same death penalty evaluation required by the protocols for Departmental approval. 379 But once the U.S. Attorney
has completed this evaluation within his or her own office, he or
she can "approve any plea agreement" so long as it is consistent
with general plea bargain principles found elsewhere in the United
States Attorneys' Manual.380 The protocols could not be more clear
on this point: although pleas in capital cases must be reported and
explained to Main Justice by the U.S.' Attorney after the fact,
"there is no need for the United States Attorney to obtain prior
authority from the Attorney General to approve a plea
381
agreement.
One might imagine that a sensible U.S. Attorney would advise
and consult with Main Justice in advance in any case, if he or she is
considering a plea in a capital case, if for no other reason than to
avoid the personal disfavor of Main Justice officials including the
Attorney General.382 Nevertheless, perhaps because avoiding a
"fight" with Main Justice is more comfortable, many U.S. Attorneys that plead out capital cases do not report in advance. Moreover, consulting is quite different from being required to follow
orders from Main Justice, and the explicit autonomy of U.S. Attorneys to forego the death penalty in a capital case plea bargain with376. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.100.
377. Id. This is consistent with various ethical authorities. See, e.g., MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a) (ABA 1998) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]
(prosecutors "shall refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause"); AMERICAN LAWYERS CODE OF CONDUCT Rule 9.5
(Revised Draft 1982) (prohibiting "unconscionable pressures" by prosecutors).
378. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
379. UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.100.
380. Id. (emphasis supplied); see id. § 9-16.000 (discussing general plea negotiation
principles).
381. Id. § 9-10.100.
382. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 375, at 98.
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out Main Justice approval is an exception to the Department's
otherwise centralized authority in the capital arena. Thus,
although the protocols appear to seek to bring within the purview
of Main Justice all cases from all U.S. Attorneys' offices across the
country "in which the death penalty may be sought, ' 383 even if the
U.S. Attorney does not wish to seek it, they do not prevent the
U.S. Attorney from unilaterally dispensing with the penalty by plea
once the case is filed.
2. A PersonalAccount of How the Death Penalty
Review Committee Works
Appointees to governmental positions can provide a valuable
public service of public education by providing, after they leave
their position, a responsible account of how the institution of which
they were a part functions.384 However, an attorney's ethical obligation of confidentiality to former clients never terminates, 385 and
considerations of institutional and personal loyalty also provide
prudent justification for avoiding "tell all" journalism.386 Confidentiality fosters candidness and wide-ranging debate in government; good government cannot function effectively if all is to be
laid bare by fleeting occupants of institutional positions. Yet
knowledge of how our governmental institutions work is valuable
for informed public debate and in the effort to formulate sensible
policy for the future. Thus principles of governmental confidentiality and public understanding of government can tug in different
directions. Without breaching duties of confidentiality and with
confidentiality and privacy concerns well in mind,387 the following
383. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.010.
384. See, e.g., EDWARD LAZARUS, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS (1998) (providing account of U.S. Supreme Court by former law clerk to Justice Blackmun); J. HARVIE
WILKINSON, III, SERVING JUSTICE (1974) (same by former law clerk to Justice Powell); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GovERNMENT (1955) (providing a personal account by the former Solicitor General and
Supreme Court Justice); Janet Napolitano, Different Legal Worlds, 21 LITIG. 27 (Summer 1995) (providing an account by U.S. Attorney of how that office functions).
385. See e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 377, at Rule 1.9.
386. See Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 835 (1999) (criticizing
CLOSED CHAMBERS, supra note 384, on this basis).
387. Cf. LAZARUS, supra note 384, at xi (referring to the need to be "careful to
avoid disclosing [certain confidential] information"); WILKINSON, supra note 384, at
xiii (stating that "[t]he need for such confidence... [is] important, and I have tried in
every instance to respect it.").
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personal account of how the Attorney General's Capital Case Re-

view Committee has worked is provided. 88
There was no formalized Main Justice review of potential federal
death penalty cases until Attorney General Janet Reno established
the Review Committee in January 1995. But for four years now,
the Committee has theoretically reviewed every potentially deatheligible federal prosecution in the country, in order to advise the

Attorney General about the decision and the reasons for either authorizing or not authorizing pursuit of a death sentence. The Committee creates written, although currently non-public, memoranda
explaining its recommendations. In effect, this Committee has
been acting as a national moderator of capital punishment for four

years. Its written recommendations represent a developing body
of "common law" precedent on the appropriate interpretation of,
and standards for applying, the FDPA.
Due to her historic long tenure, Janet Reno has been the only
Attorney General to utilize the Committee since it was created.3 89
This has allowed the Committee to operate with stability, which
has been very useful in terms of solidifying successful practices.
The Committee's operation is also shaped by Attorney General
Reno's personal style, which, while serious, is also informal, can-

did, and open. Janet Reno's leadership has been essential to creating a centralized death penalty review system that works well
within the bounds of Main Justice.39 °
The Committee's success is also due in part to the leadership of
its only continuous member since 1995, Deputy Assistant Attorney

General (Criminal Division) Kevin DiGregory. A former state
388. The author served on this Committee during 1996 and 1997. See supra notes
321-342 and accompanying text. This account is based on his recollection, which
could be faulty, and his experience, which might have been unrepresentative and may
be out of date. Moreover, some readers will find the account over-detailed. But because an account of how the Committee works has not previously been published, and
because practitioners and judges may find the details useful in particular cases, the
author has opted to include it.
389. As of February 1999, Janet Reno is the second longest-serving Attorney General in history, surpassing Homer Cummings who served five years and 10 months
under Franklin Roosevelt (1933-39). See David Johnson, Reno's Tenure Sets a Record
this Century, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1999, at A14. Only William Wirt, who served under
two different Presidents for 11 years during 1817-1829, has served longer. Wirt, however, did not receive a full-time salary and supplemented his income with outside
legal clients. See Susan Law Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in our
ConstitutionalScheme: In the Beginning There was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561,

619.
390. As discussed below, achieving an effective review that truly encompasses all
potential capital cases in the field has been less successful. See infra Part II.B.
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homicide prosecutor from Janet Reno's State's Attorney office in
Florida, DiGregory brings to the Committee a vital practice perspective which few federal prosecutors have, in light of the absence
of federal capital prosecutions for a quarter century. His experience, steady continuity, informal yet serious manner, and comfortable long-standing relationship with the Attorney General all serve
to further the best interests of the Department in establishing a
smoothly-running centralized capital punishment review system in
an organization famous (or infamous) for the independence of its
field offices. 39 '

The Review Committee operates informally, with no set schedule and with virtually immediate access to the Attorney General
when necessary. The Committee itself may not agree unanimously
in all cases, and the Attorney General often directs further study or
investigation in close cases. Nevertheless, once the Committee has
come to rest, Attorney General Reno generally follows its recommendations. This provides the Committee with confidence that its
work is meaningful, and with a healthy sense of responsibility for
its decisions.
As the process worked in 1996-97, cases were first submitted by
the U.S. Attorney's office with venue over the offense to the Criminal Division, which then assigned each case to the particular "component" of Main Justice that had oversight responsibility for the
particular federal statutes charged.392 Thus, for example, an attorney in the Violent Crimes Section would help review a potential
capital case charged under the car-jacking statute; the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section would handle a case charged
under RICO; and the Civil Rights Division's Criminal Section
would handle a civil rights homicide prosecution.393 The job of the
Main Justice lawyer is to consult with the U.S. Attorney's office on
all aspects of the case, including any perceived evidentiary gaps
and any deadlines a district judge may have imposed for filing a
death penalty notice,394 to ensure that all necessary paperwork and
391. See generally EISENSTEIN, supra note 375; MCGEE & DUFFY, supra note 13, at
14 ("The DOJ is a vast unruly kingdom" with "ninety-four autonomous fiefdoms
lorded over by local U.S. Attorneys.").
392. As noted supra note 343, in late 1998, the Department formally established a
Capital Cases Unit within its Criminal Division to advise in, and handle review of, all
federal death penalty cases, thus eliminating the need to parcel out potential capital
cases among various sections within Main Justice.
393. See CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 326.
394. Although the FDPA does not mention a deadline other than "a reasonable
time before trial," 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a), some district judges have relied on their general supervisory authority to set filing deadlines for death penalty notices. In one case
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exhibits have been provided by the U.S. Attorney's office and to
seek additional information as necessary along the way. From 1996
through 1998, these diverse DOJ Sections and attorneys were coordinated for the Committee by an experienced attorney at Main Justice specifically assigned to the task. Specialized expertise and
dedication to ensuring that submitted capital cases are "ripe" for
the Attorney General's review is essential, and the excellent staff
coordination has been invaluable to the Committee, whose members each have a multitude of other duties that compete for
attention.
Cases are brought to the Review Committee's attention in two
ways: either they are "ripe" for review, meaning that all necessary
documentation has been received and the assigned Departmental
attorneys are satisfied with the package; or there is an immediate
need for attention because a court has set a deadline by which the
Department must either file a death penalty notice under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3593(a) or forego seeking the death penalty.395 In either instance, the case comes with a package of paperwork: a Death Penalty Evaluation form and supporting documents sent by the
submitting U.S. Attorney's office; a memorandum from the assigned Main Justice component; and a brief memo from the Committee's staff attorney summarizing the case and flagging possible
issues or questions to be raised. U.S. Attorneys are required to
provide a recommendation whether to seek the death penalty or
not, and reasons for that recommendation.3 96 They may not remain agnostic on this ultimate question.
The U.S. Attorney's recommendation carries great, although not
dispositive, weight with the Committee. This is particularly so
when the recommendation is against seeking death in a death-eligible case. Such "no death" recommendations are almost always accepted, not just because of the traditional autonomy of the U.S.
Attorneys, but also because U.S. Attorneys generally exercise
great care in submitting their recommendations and are presumed
to know their local communities, jury pools, judges, and the overall
strengths and weaknesses of their particular case far better than
Main Justice personnel. Nevertheless, a U.S. Attorney recommena federal judge actually dismissed the government's death penalty notice as untimely,
thereby barring a capital prosecution authorized by the Attorney General. United
States v. Rosado-Rosario, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 673 (D.P.R. Jan. 15, 1998). There is
no authority in the FDPA for such an action.
395. See supra note 394.
396. See CRIMINAL RESOURCE

MANUAL, supra note 326, § VII (Death Penalty
Evaluation Forms, "Recommendation of the United States Attorney").
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dation against seeking the death penalty can be overridden by the
Attorney General, and in at least one case a U.S. Attorney has
been directed to file a death penalty notice despite the U.S. Attorney's recommendation against it.397
On the other hand, a recommendation from a U.S. Attorney in
favor of seeking a death penalty receives somewhat less deference
at Main Justice. Here is where the goal of national uniformity in
administering the federal death penalty often outweighs the localized perspective of field offices. As the chart below indicates, the
Attorney General has approved the death penalty in only a third of
the cases submitted for Main Justice review. 398 While the Department has not yet publicly released the substance of U.S. Attorney
recommendations in individual cases, it was the author's experience that. more cases submitted for review recommended seeking
the penalty than against it. The Committee's job is to review such
cases on at least two levels: (1) does the case itself present facts and
circumstances that "justify" a death penalty, and (2) how does the
case compare to other cases in which the death penalty previously
has been recommended but not authorized? Some cases fall out of
the approval range after the first inquiry while others, technically
"death-eligible," nevertheless fall out when compared to other,
non-approved cases.
When the Committee members have received all necessary
paperwork, preliminary discussion may occur among the members
informally, sometimes with less than the entire Committee, and
397. That case, however, was resolved after the Attorney General directed the U.S.
Attorney to file a death penalty notice, by a plea bargain that waived the potential
death penalty. This is the one stage of a federal capital case in which the U.S. Attorney may act without the approval of the Attorney General. See supra notes 374-383.
Plea negotiations and the rationales of the parties involved are generally strictly confidential. But many prosecutors believe that resolution of a potential capital case by
plea, so that risk of acquittal as well as expensive years of appeals are avoided, is
almost always in the public interest, at least where there is any plausible mitigating
factor in play. This is exemplified by the "UnaBomer" case, where a guilty plea to life
imprisonment was accepted. See United States v. Kaczyinski, No. CR-S-96-259-GEB
(E.D.Cal. 1998); see also The Kaczyinski Plea, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1998, at A24
(editorial praising the plea bargain, noting that trial would have "set up sticky appellate questions," and noting defendant's diagnosis of mental illness); Tamala M. Edwards, Crazy Is as Crazy Does: Why the Unabomer Agreed to Trade a Guilty Plea for
a Life Sentence?, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998 at 66 (same). On the other hand, in United States

v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming death sentence in the bombing
of federal building taking 168 lives), no guilty plea likely would have been accepted by
the DOJ despite the high costs of pursuing a trial and other possible mitigating factors. See supra notes 41-44.
398. See infra chart at p. 429.
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often more than once. Also, by this time, the staff attorney has
scheduled the defense attorney presentation to the Committee.
By the time a case comes before the Review Committee, the defense position is often known, because the protocols encourage
U.S. Attorneys to consult with defense counsel prior to submitting
the case to Main Justice and U.S. Attorneys know that the defense
will be given an opportunity to make a presentation to the Main
Justice review committee. 99 Anticipating this, the U.S. Attorney's
memo will often explain the defense position and include some rebuttal. However, neither the U.S. Attorney nor Main Justice is required to tell defense counsel what the U.S. Attorney has
recommended. Only the Attorney General can make a final decision regarding the federal death penalty, and all recommendations
before her decision are necessarily tentative. Moreover, a U.S. Attorney's recommendation, in either direction, can be used adversely to the government's interests if disclosed.40 0 Consequently,
although it may be obvious in some cases which way the U.S. Attorney or the Committee is "leaning," and in some cases U.S. Attorneys have already told defense counsel which way they have
recommended, it can also be true that defense counsel are in the
dark when they make a presentation to the Review Committee.4° '
In the author's experience, virtually every case submitted for review was accompanied by an in-person presentation by defense
counsel. Usually more than one lawyer appeared for the defendant, and often a "specialist" in the emerging field of federal capital

399. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.030 (noting
that U.S. Attorney "should" give defense counsel opportunity to present mitigating
factors). The protocols direct that defense counsel "shall" be provided an opportunity
to present to the Review Committee, orally or in writing, reasons for not seeking the
death penalty. See id. § 9-10.050.
400. If a U.S. Attorney reveals that she or he has recommended death but then that
recommendation is not approved by the Attorney General, adverse publicity can be
generated in the U.S. Attorney's home district. Conversely, if a U.S. Attorney's nodeath penalty recommendation were revealed but then not accepted by the Attorney
General, there could be adverse consequences in the subsequent prosecution. Thus it
can be in the U.S. Attorney's interest to remain silent regarding the substance of any
recommendation.
401. If this is so, then an awkward, somewhat ritualistic meeting can sometimes
occur in a case where the Committee members are already predisposed to recommend against the death penalty. If the defense counsel lacks this knowledge, she or
he must seriously accept the possibility of a death recommendation and thus must
make a full-blown presentation against death. In such instances, defense counsel
must be somewhat disconcerted by the Committee's seemingly blank reception of
their arguments.
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defense was present.4 °2 In addition to defense counsel, the meeting
is usually attended by all members of the Review Committee, the
Committee's staff attorney, and representatives of the relevant
U.S. Attorney's office, including on occasion the U.S. Attorney
him or herself, as well as one or two attorneys from the assigned
Main Justice component and possibly even a federal law enforcement investigator. As such, there could be up to a dozen people
seated around the Criminal Division's conference table for the defense presentation.
Capital defense counsel are ambivalent about the utility of making presentations to the Review Committee, and they understandably tend to view the opportunity largely in strategic terms. In a
case where a death penalty authorization seems overwhelmingly
likely, for example in the UnaBomer or Oklahoma City cases, it
makes little sense to "tip one's hand" regarding potential defense
arguments (on guilt or in mitigation of sentence) in advance of
trial. In such cases, the meeting might instead be used by the defense to gauge the Department's own approach and possibly gain
some "free" discovery about the government's case. Departmental
personnel are aware of this possible use, however, so that in such
clear-cut cases they are likely to be extremely guarded as well.
On the other hand, where there seems to be a genuine possibility
of avoiding a death penalty authorization, defense counsel seem to
feel that a serious Main Justice presentation is worth the effort as
well as the possible sacrifice of some strategic advantage.40 3 This
becomes increasingly true as the Review Committee's independence (i.e., willingness to reject a U.S. Attorney recommendation
of the death penalty) becomes known within the small federal
death penalty-defense bar. Finally, even in cases in which a deatheligible offense is charged but the filing of a death penalty notice
seems unlikely, defense counsel generally choose to err on the side
of making a serious presentation. Thus, in the large majority of

402. See 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1998) (federal capital defendants entitled to at least two
appointed attorneys). Lawyers who have developed expertise from handling a
number of federal cases in this area include: David Bruck of South Carolina; Kevin
McNally of Kentucky; Richard Burr of Texas; and David Ruhnke of New Jersey.
403. The effort required of defense counsel can be considerable. It requires preparing an evidentiary package of some kind, an explanatory memorandum, and a one or
two-day trip to Washington D.C. Not only does preparation of the documents require
defense attorney time and energy, but some case-specific investigation must be done
as well. Moreover, disclosing this investigation to the prosecution always comes at
some strategic risk.
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cases presented for review, a defense presentation lasting from
forty-five to ninety minutes generally occurs at Main Justice.
No formal record is kept of those meetings: no court reporter,
tape recording, or even minutes. They are "driven" by defense
counsel who, after brief introductions and welcome, are asked to
make whatever presentation they like. Members of the Committee
generally ask some questions, sometimes specifically factual, sometimes more generally legal or even philosophical (for example,
when is one defendant "equally culpable" to another?; what really
makes a homicide "especially heinous"? 4"4 ). Like judges' questions at appellate argument, these questions may or may not reveal
the Committee members' actual predilections about the case.40 5
However, in the author's experience, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General DiGregory, who usually chaired the defense presentation
meetings, routinely and candidly informed the parties (both government and defense) about strengths and weaknesses that the
Committee perceived as relevant to the death penalty
determination.
Arguments made to the Committee are generally a mix of fact
and law. Some cases are intensely factual, and it emerges that the
defense has a very different vision of the facts from the U.S. Attorney's office, both as to the offense and as to the defendant's background. Occasionally, the defense will reveal new facts, such as a
psychological examination or records of the defendant showing
mental illness. 4°6 Such fact-based arguments often create the need

for more fact investigation prior to Committee decision. Other defense presentations may be largely legal; for example, arguing that
a statutory factor should be interpreted as to not encompass the
defendant's case. Again, such presentations may cause the Committee to do more work and research before deciding. Both sorts
of presentations were, in the author's experience, effective. ,
The Review Committee does not formally "vote" after a defense
presentation. More likely, the members will informally discuss the
404. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4), (c)(6) (1998).
405. See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, Effective Appellate Advocacy, 24 L1TG. 19, 22 (1998).
For example, where the Committee is already inclined to recommend against the
death penalty, but defense counsel attempts to "oversell" the defendant's case, questions might be asked to correct any misimpressions. In other instances, questions
might be asked to flesh out proffered mitigating factors, despite the committee member's leaning toward recommending the death penalty.
406. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (1998) (providing that a significantly impaired "capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of... conduct or to conform conduct to the
requirements of law" is a statutorily-recognized mitigating factor "regardless of
whether the capacity was so impaired as to constitute a defense").
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case, determine whether some further information would be helpful, and ask the staff attorney to follow up before preparing a draft
recommendation memo for the Attorney General. In most cases, a
consensus regarding the appropriate recommendation quickly
emerges. In others, more study and deliberation are necessary.
The Committee's recommendation to the Attorney General
need not be unanimous, neither in result nor in rationale. That is,
although all members might agree that the death penalty should
not be recommended in a particular case, they might reach that
conclusion for different reasons. For example, one member may
find no aggravators proven at all, while others do find aggravators
present yet believe they do not substantially outweigh strong mitigating factors. Articulation of rationale is important, as the recommendation to the Attorney General is made in writing and she
needs to understand her Committee's reasoning. Significant differences in viewpoints among Committee members, while not frequent, are usually specified in the memo for the Attorney General.
When the memo is satisfactory to all members, it is delivered to
the Attorney General and an in-person meeting is scheduled with
her save in those rare cases where an immediate deadline exists.
These meetings, while generally brief, are candid and unrushed.
Difficulties in the case and any significant viewpoint differences are
often discussed. On occasion, the Attorney General directs the
Committee to seek more information or perform further legal analysis. More often, however, she briefly explains her decision and
signs a form that authorizes the U.S. Attorney to file a death penalty notice, or not.
Serving on or in connection with the DOJ's death penalty review
committee is a sobering experience, and one that is entirely new
for most federal prosecutors.40 7 Approving the filing of a death
penalty notice is as close as a prosecutor comes to actually imposing the penalty without personally trying the case or serving as juror. 40 1 The role is, of course, different from a capital juror's, in that
the federal prosecutor merely places the penalty before the jury,
and in this sense allows the community finally to decide whether
death is appropriate. Nevertheless, the Committee members must
407. Few federal prosecutors have relevant homicide trial experience, although
since the federal death penalty became a general possibility in 1994, experienced
homicide attorneys from state prosecution offices have increasingly been sought out

to join U.S. Attorneys' offices. Most recently, experienced state homicide prosecutors
have been hired to staff the Department's new Capital Cases Unit.

408. Even the judge has less discretion under the federal scheme. See generally 18
U.S.C. § 3594 (1994).
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perform the same ultimate weighing exercise that the jury must
perform, generally with less information and yet possibly with the
same result.4 °9 In contrast, a decision not to authorize a death penalty notice will entirely end that possibility.
Thus the Committee, and the Attorney General, take quite seriously the responsibility of administering a national system of capital punishment fairly and without bias, and with some degree of
uniformity among similar cases coming from different regions of
the country. The sense of moral responsibility for the defendant's
life is palpable - but so too is the moral responsibility for victims
and the unavoidable obligation to "faithfully execute" the statutory
federal death penalty provisions that Congress enacted and the
President signed. 10 Personal beliefs regarding capital punishment
have no place in this balance, although there is no doubt that Attorney General Reno (as well as the statute) would permit a federal prosecutor opposed to capital punishment to "opt out" of a
death penalty case. 11 In my opinion, the DOJ's Capital Case Review Committee conducts its business responsibly, thoroughly, expeditiously and fairly.
3.

Results of the DOJ Death Penalty Review Process

The DOJ has not publicly released much of the data it possesses
regarding its administration of the federal death penalty over the
past decade.41 z Conclusions drawn about the process from the limited data provided are, therefore, necessarily hypothetical and
likely imperfect. The Department could add useful knowledge to
the continuing debate about capital punishment if it were to permit
a more complete study of the data it possesses.

409. See supra notes 366-370 and accompanying text.
410. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (the Executive "shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed"); See Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal
Prosecutors?,65 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 380, n. 129 (1996) (suggesting that the consti-

tutional duty to faithfully execute the laws carries with it ethical obligations).
411. See 18 U.S.C. § 3597 (b) (1994) ("No employee of... the United States Department of Justice ...shall be required ... to participate in any prosecution" of a
federal capital case.").
412. For example, while we know how many cases have been submitted for Main
Justice review during that time, see chart infra p. 429, the Department has not yet
released racial or ethnic data regarding this group, nor have they released the initial
U.S. Attorney recommendations in the cases or the facts of the specific cases not
authorized compared to those that have been authorized.
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Nevertheless, the Department has released general data regarding the results of its centralized authorization process.4 13 Below is
a chart revealing the authorization results for all the potential federal capital defendants reviewed by the Attorneys General from
1990 through 1998. It therefore includes some pre-protocol cases,
pre-FDPA cases, and twenty-one pre-Janet Reno defendants.
Fiscal Year of
Decision
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Total

Number of
defendants
reviewed
2
6
10
19
7
28
56
124
166

Not Authorized
0
0
1
10
0
10
40
100
122

Authorized
2
6
9
9
7
18
16
24
44

418

283

135

The first point to note is the continuing increase in the number
of cases being reviewed over the last four years. This probably represents the U.S. Attorneys' and the DOJ's increasing familiarity
with the new federal death penalty statutes and the Attorney General's capital case review system. The related increase in death
penalty authorizations also suggests that the number of federal defendants actually receiving death penalties is likely to increase significantly in the coming years.
The figures also demonstrate that a little more than two-thirds of
the time (283 out of 418), the Attorney General has not authorized
pursuing the death penalty in cases submitted by U.S. Attorneys
for review. If one assumes that U.S. Attorneys recommend death
more often than not in the cases they submit for review, 14 and that
the Attorney General usually follows her Review Committee's recommendations, then it can fairly be said that the Main Justice Re413. This information was provided for this Article by the Department in writing
(copy on file with the author).
414. See discussion infra notes 512-529 (discussing U.S. Attorneys' discretion in
whether to submit cases for review). Not only is this an assumption, but it may be less
accurate over time, as U.S. Attorneys develop a "feel" for the sorts of aggravated
cases likely to be authorized. See infra Part II.D.

430
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view Committee acts relatively independently when deciding
whether to recommend death penalty prosecutions. That is, the
Committee rejects U.S. Attorney death penalty recommendations
with some frequency.
Moreover, if one assumes that U.S. Attorneys typically submit
for review cases that they sincerely believe merit the death penalty,
and that the Review Committee just as sincerely attempts to
"rank" submitted cases and authorize the death penalty (or not)
with rough consistency across geographic boundaries, then it might
fairly be suggested that, as a general matter, the Review Committee's approval recommendations are made in the most aggravated
murder cases that are submitted. In other words, of all the federal
murder cases submitted for possible death penalty prosecution, the
DOJ's Review Committee is approving pursuit of capital punishment in the relatively "high end" homicides that plainly merit consideration of death as a potential sentence under the statutory
scheme.415 Of course, without more specific public information regarding the 418 cases that have been reviewed since 1990, the foregoing suggestions could be characterized as largely unsupported
speculation. However, they are not inconsistent with the author's
seven-month experience as a member of the Review Committee.
Another aspect of the data provided by the Department relates
to the final disposition of defendants authorized by the Attorney
General for death penalty prosecution. As of December 31, 1998,
135 defendants had been authorized for pursuit of the death penalty since 1990. As the chart below indicates, only twenty of the
135 have actually been sentenced to death (although another
thirty-two authorized defendants were awaiting trial and one is
awaiting resentencing).
Thus, only 15% of the 135 federal defendants approved for capital prosecution by January 1999 (and less than 5% of the 418 defendants submitted to the Department for review by that date)
have actually received a death sentence. The percentage of deatheligible federal defendants actually sentenced to death is even
smaller if one assumes that not all potential death cases are being
sent to

415. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 325, n. 2 (1987) (stating Baldus' study divided
homicides into eight categories of seriousness, the eighth of which involved cases
with aggravating factors "so extreme" that only one outcome is appropriate).
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Disposition of AG-Authorized Federal Capital Defendants
(as of December 31, 1998)
20
Received Death Penalty
33416
Awaiting disposition
43
Guilty Plea with no death sentence
29
Convicted but no death recommendation
4
Acquitted of capital charges
3
Death penalty notice dismissed by court as untimely
1
Capital charge dismissed by court
1
Murdered before trial
1
Committed suicide before trial
135

Total

the Department for review.417 These relatively small numbers
compel that the question be asked: is the federal death penalty imposed on so few defendants out of the available death-eligible universe that Justice Stewart's "struck by lightning" constitutional
analogy from Furmancan be applied? 418 Federal courts so far have
said no.419
Also significant is that over one-third of the authorized defendants avoided death by pleading guilty-the one disposition for
which Main Justice review is not required. °
4.

The Department's Discretion and Its Choice to Pursue
National Uniformity

It is important to note two points regarding the DOJ's new role
as administrator of the federal death penalty. First, Departmental
lawyers rightfully exercise discretion in determining which cases
deserve pursuit of federal capital punishment, because the statute
that Congress enacted demands an initial exercise of prosecutorial
discretion before the statute's capital procedures may be invoked.
Second, although the new federal statutes do not demand national
uniformity in administration of the federal death penalty, such a
416. One of the defendants is McCullah, who received a death sentence but had it
vacated on appeal and is awaiting re-sentencing. See supra notes 205, 312 (describing
the McCullah case).

417. See infra chart at note 558.
418. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These death sentences are
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."). Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 275, at 375 (noting that, two decades after
Gregg, "thousands of murderers are death eligible, yet few receive death sentences
and fewer still are executed," and asking whether this meets constitutional standards).
419. While the question is raised, answering it is well beyond the scope of this
Article.
420. See supra notes 374-83.
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legislative policy is strongly implied and the Department has ex-

pressly chosen to pursue at least a rough form of national, interDistrict uniformity among similar death-eligible federal cases. The
choice to pursue centralized uniformity is by no means compelled
by the FDPA. Indeed, a contrary decision, to allow regionalized
discretion to control all federal death penalty filings, is defensible
on a number of grounds. The issue of "uniformity" raises complex
and intriguing questions which, for purposes of this critique of the
regime actually in force, have been put aside. 421 However, the Department's choice for uniformity is entirely consistent with the stat-

ute and with other expressions of congressional intent.
First, some more detail as to discretion.4 z2 Strong advocates of
capital punishment might contend that a prosecutorial Capital

Case Review Committee has no place in the federal statutory
scheme; rather, a death penalty notice should simply be filed in
every case in which a death-eligible federal offense is charged and a
death has occurred.42 3 Of course, such a practice would be inconsistent with the long-standing experience of state prosecutors' of421. See supra note 21.
422. See also supra notes 366-370 and accompanying text.
423. It is important to note here a significant difference in charging requirements
between most state and federal capital cases. Virtually all state statutes that authorize
a death penalty are predicated on conviction for some common-law homicide offense.
This has two consequences: first, in a pro-death penalty state, all crimes meeting the
offense definition of a capital offense are death-eligible - whether a death sentence is
actually imposed will turn on the exercise of discretion by various actors (prosecutor,
jury, and judge); and second, when a state death penalty case is charged, an intentional or reckless killing is almost always an element of the crime charged. As such,
the killing is treated as a fact that the jury must find at trial, and it must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
The same is not necessarily true regarding most federal death-eligible crimes. Except for straight federal homicide cases, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994), federal
death penalty charges need not necessarily include a "death" element. That is, because the death penalty has been engrafted onto pre-existing federal offense statutes
as part of the punishment sections, the additional necessary fact that can make a federal offense death-eligible - "if death results" - appears as a matter of literal language to be in the nature of a sentencing enhancement, rather than a statutory
"element" of the crime. Thus, for example, a federal prosecutor theoretically can
simply charge "car-jacking," and if the jury convicts on that charge, it is only later, at
the sentencing stage, that the "death resulted" and accompanying mens rea factors
that can result in the death penalty would become relevant. Thus, in stark contrast to
common-law death penalty charging, (1) not every crime meeting the offense definition in a death-eligible federal statute is, in fact, death eligible; and (2) the "death
resulted" allegation that is generally treated as an element in state capital proceedings
need not, at least theoretically, be so treated in most federal capital proceedings. Instead, the fact of a killing might be treated as the ultimate "sentencing factor" in the
federal system, found only after guilt is determined and by some lower standard of
proof.
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fices, where discretion among which cases to seek the death
penalty is normally exercised.4 24 But the rationale for exercising
prosecutorial discretion at the federal level is more than just "good
practice." Such discretion is, in fact, statutorily required under the
1994 FDDA.
The federal statute does not direct that a death penalty prosecution be commenced in "every eligible case." Rather, the statute, a
product of compromise between supporters and opponents of capital punishment, provides that a death penalty notice "shall" be
filed by federal prosecutors "[i]f, in a [statutorily eligible] case...
the attorney for the government believes that . . . a sentence of

death is justified under this chapter .
"425 This manifestly directs
that federal prosecutors engage in the evaluative process that Attorney General Reno's protocols require - a sincere prosecutorial
belief that death is "justified," after applying the weighing structure of aggravating and mitigating factors enacted by Congress, is
statutorily required before a federal death penalty prosecution can
42 6
proceed.

In fact, it is the DOJ's policy to allege that "death resulted" in all federal death
penalty indictments, and to treat the allegation as an element at trial. But while the
arguments for such treatment appear strong, whether this is constitutionally required
remains to be seen. As noted above, supra note 229, the Supreme Court has recently
struggled with the constitutionality of what facts may properly be treated merely as
"sentencing factors" rather than elements, and it has the issue before it again this
Term. So far the Court has, by a 5-4 margin, rejected the view that all statutory sentencing enhancements must be treated as elements of the offense, although there may
be a "fundamental fairness" exception. See Monge v. California, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 2250
(1998). Justice Stevens' and Scalia's dissenting concerns take on particular force when
considered in the context of federal death penalty liability that might turn on significant findings not treated as "elements" of the federal crimes charged. See id. at 2253,
2255.
424. See, e.g., Melanie Shaw, Race Statistics and the Death Penalty, 34 How. L.J. 503
(1991) (discussing state prosecutor office's death penalty review committee).
425. 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (a) (1994) (emphasis added). The CCE statute's language is
different. See infra note 467. I would argue, however, that DOJ should not have
separate standards for its death penalty decisions.
426. This reading of the statute assumes that the legislative "if" means "only if." It
is possible, though implausible, that one could read the statute differently. Although
the statute mandates filing a death penalty notice if the prosecutor believes a death
penalty is justified under the statute, one might argue that this does not literally prohibit the filing of a notice in other cases, but rather leaves federal prosecutors with
discretion to file in every possible death-eligible case. Such a reading, however, does
violence to the everyday meaning of the word "if," which normally implies a condition of limitation that must be fulfilled before further activity can occur. See, e.g.,
Northcutt v. McAllister, 249 S.W. 398, 401 (Mo. 1923) (this meaning of "if" is "so well

settled" that extrinsic evidence on the issue is prohibited); 20

WORDS AND PHRASES

35-43 (1959) (collecting cases). Moreover, the strained alternative reading leads to
the absurd and unethical result that a federal prosecutor would be authorized to pur-

434
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Second, as to the choice for national uniformity among federal
districts. The statutory requirement for a sincere prosecutorial belief in "justification" does not further require centralized Main Justice review. That is, while an atomized administration of the
federal death penalty statutes might seem unlikely to some, leaving
U.S. Attorneys in charge of regionalized discretion within their
Districts sounds like a reasonably arguable position. The terms of
the statute do not forbid leaving to every individual "attorney for
the government 4 27 the unreviewed discretion to determine
whether seeking a death penalty in any particular case is "justified." This statute could be read, therefore, to permit leaving U.S.
Attorneys with such discretion, dispensing with any centralized
Main Justice review. Thus the requirement of Main Justice review
for all potential federal death penalty cases in order to ensure
''consistency" is undoubtedly a policy choice which (some might
contend) needs to be defended.
This Article, however, seeks to present and critique the process
currently in place. The Attorney General has chosen to pursue
centralized uniformity, at least in rough degree, and this Article
seeks to analyze that system and suggest ways to improve it. Thus
this Article does not defend at length the Department's decision to
pursue a goal of rough national uniformity, but rather accepts it as
consistent with the statute and congressional intent, and not unreasonable. While one might possibly argue in favor of a federal
death penalty regime that lacks national uniformity - one that
would permit similar federal crimes and defendants to receive life
or death dependant on the district and regionalized, cultural differences - that does not appear to be the statute Congress has enacted nor is it the stated policy of the Attorney General. After
briefly discussing what "uniformity" might mean, and then noting
sue the death penalty in a case where she or he did not believe it to be justified. Such
absurd results are to be avoided when construing seemingly clear statutory language.
See generally United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931). Suffice it to say that no
case authority or legislative history of which the author is aware supports the more
discretionary alternative reading.
427. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994). The phrase "attorney for the government" is a
term of art, defined in Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
encompass all attorneys who might be authorized to prosecute a case in federal court.
The term has also been broadly defined by the Attorney General in 28 C.F.R.
§ 77.2(a) (1998). In October 1998 (in the course of effectively overruling the bulk of
28 C.F.R. part 77), Congress endorsed the Attorney General's definition and added
independent counsels and their staff to it. See Section 801 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 530B (1998)).

1999]

FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

four arguments that might support the Attorney General's choice,
the remainder of this Article proceeds to critique the DOJ's existing capital punishment regime within the framework of its stated
uniformity goal.
This Article can only begin to sketch the meaning of national
capital sentencing uniformity.428 For present purposes, the term
"uniformity" encompasses substantive consistency in results, as well
as procedural uniformity. Moreover, only "rough" uniformity is
possible.429 Thus "uniformity" has three components. First, it
must, at a minimum, be administered according to nationally consistent procedures. The process of selecting, evaluating and prosecuting federal capital cases should be roughly the same in all
districts. Second, it should not produce too many "aberrational"
results: defendants with "similar histories, convicted of similar
crimes, committed under similar circumstances, 43 ° should receive
similar sentences. Death should not result for simple robbery
murders in some Districts but never in others. Third, results need
be only "roughly" consistent. Reasonable people and courts inevitably will disagree about the equivalency of homicide facts and
criminals' backgrounds. Thus capital sentencing uniformity necessarily partakes a bit of the "I know it when I see it" school of
evaluation.431
With these general definitional principles in mind, this Article
contends that reasonable arguments can be made that a non-uniform system federal capital punishment administration would be
inconsistent with (1) Congressional intent; (2) prior DOJ practice;
(3) sound management principles; and (4) the constitutional rationale of Furman itself.
First, the Federal Death Penalty Act contains no language to
suggest that it should not be applied uniformly around the country.
Rather, it appears to be written as a statute of nationwide, uniform
application. It applies to every federal "defendant" without distinction, and governs the actions of all federal prosecutors - every
"attorney for the government" - alike.432
428. See supra note 21.
429. See Pully v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984) ("Any capital sentencing scheme
may occasionally produce aberrational outcomes.").
430. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (quoting the Senate Report proposing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
431. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart; J. concurring). See Paul
Gewirtz, On "I know it when I see it", 105 YALE L.J. 1023 (1996).
432. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591(a), 3593(a) (1994).
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This reading is consistent with Congress's general expression of
federal criminal sentencing policy. In 1984, Congress enacted the
Sentencing Reform Act which endorsed a wholesale alteration of
federal sentencing policies, from a system granting virtually unreviewed discretion to each federal judge around the country to a
centralized system of sentencing rules promulgated by a Sentenc-

ing Commission located in Washington, D.C. 433 In creating this

centralized sentencing system, Congress stressed that one goal was
to eliminate "unwarranted sentencing disparities" among similar
cases and defendants across the country.434 Regional disparity in
federal sentencing had been decried for years.435 In the Sentencing
Reform Act, Congress embraced that criticism and directed that
uniform federal sentencing guidelines be promulgated without regard to geography. Nothing in the more recent congressional
death penalty legislation suggests that Congress has changed its intention to have federal criminal punishment administered uniformly for similar violations and violators of identical federal
statutes.
In addition, during the six years prior to the 1994 enactment of
the Federal Death Penalty Act, the United States Attorneys' Manual directed that all federal death penalty prosecutions had to be
approved centrally by the Attorney General.436 In an area as controversial as the federal death penalty, Congress likely was aware
of this requirement when it enacted the FDPA, and might therefore be presumed to have expected and intended uniform Main
Justice administration.437 In fact, influential members of the Con433. Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). See Koon, 518
U.S. at 92 (referring to the "far-reaching changes in federal sentencing"); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366-69 (1989) (describing "sweeping reforms"); Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L.REV. 1, 4-5 (1988).
434. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). See Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 (noting Senate Report
criticizing "an unjustifiablly wide range of sentences" in "similar" cases); Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 366 (noting "[flundamental and widespread dissatisfaction with... disparities"); Breyer, supra note 433, at 4 (stating that "Congress's second purpose was to
reduce 'unjustifiably wide' sentencing disparity").
435. See, e.g., MARVIN R. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
10-11, 16-25 (1972) (discussing "the tragic state of disorder in our sentencing
practices").
436. See UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.020.

437. Cf. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1981) (stating in a federal
criminal case that "Congress is 'predominently a lawyer's body,' and it is appropriate
for us 'to assume that our elected representatives ...know the law.'.. .[]f anything is
to be assumed ... it is that Congress was aware of the ... rule and legislated with it in
mind") (discussing Supreme Court caselaw; citations omitted); see also Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979).

1999]

FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

gress that enacted the FDPA expressed misgivings about race and
other biases exhibited in various States' administration of the death
penalty. In response, Janet Reno assured Senatorial questioners in
her confirmation hearings that she would seek to have "procedures" in place that would "prevent disparate treatment.

'4 38

A

promise of uniform DOJ treatment of death penalty cases thus
could be said to be implicit in Janet Reno's confirmation. It might
even have been crucial to some moderate members of Congress
who voted to approve the FDPA later in that same Congress.439
Sound management principles also support the Attorney General's decision to enforce centralized Main Justice review of potential capital cases. A decentralized federal capital punishment
system permitting over 4,000 federal prosecutors 44 0 - or even just
ninety-four separate U. S. Attorneys - to determine individually
whether or not to invoke federal death penalty procedures, would
seem extremely likely to produce different and conflicting interpretations of identical statutory language. Although courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, could seek to settle such conflicts over
time, in an area as important and sensitive as capital punishment,
such a process is not the most efficient management decision.44 '
Moreover, because much of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
is judicially unreviewed, courts would likely be unable to correct
some conflicting prosecutorial interpretations of the federal statutes, or even know of them. As the executive officer charged with
"faithfully executing" the federal death penalty laws, it is surely not
irrational for the Attorney General to seek to regularize their exe438. RENO CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 214, at 102 (responding to Senator Cohen).
439. For example, Senator Cohen, who sought assurances from Ms. Reno on this
matter at her confirmation, was a key Republican moderate in support of the federal
death penalty. See id. at 106. Similarly, one can imagine that Senator Kennedy, long
an opponent of capital punishment, might have had more trouble supporting the
FDPA if he had believed that individual prosecutors in every state were going to have
unreviewed discretion to seek the death penalty.
440. See Clymer, supra note 359, at 676 n.177 (noting that as of 1994 there were
4,099 federal prosecutors).
441. It must be noted, however, that the Attorney General does not require centralized review of many U.S. Attorney decisions, despite the likelihood of generating
conflicting decisions. Yet increasingly, Main Justice review of important decisions,
such as RICO or money-laundering indictments, is required. See, e.g., UNITED
STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, at §§ 9-105.100, 9-110.101. Given the
constitutional view that "death is different" and significantly more important, the decision to isolate capital punishment for particularly intense Main Justice review does
not seem unreasonable.
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cution by opting for a centralized review system rather than one of
442
disparate autonomy.
Finally, a decentralized and regionally disparate system of federal capital punishment could run the risk of violating Furman's
prohibition of indiscriminate randomness in imposing the death
penalty. Of course, one cannot know the result of such a system
without trying it: perhaps all federal prosecutors would evaluate all
potential death penalty cases in roughly the same way and reach
roughly the same results across the country, so as to avoid the constitutional accusation that there is "no meaningful basis for distinguishing" death from non-death cases. 4 3 Moreover, one can
debate whether Furman and Gregg require substantive, or only
procedural consistency.444 But the issue is not whether a decentralized process would necessarily be open to constitutional attack.
Rather, it is that the Attorney General is empowered to avoid the
experiment by continuing the pre-existing practice of centralized
DOJ review for all potential federal death penalty cases. This
choice is a reasonable one; it is neither insensible nor inconsistent
with the statute's language and likely intent.445
Regardless of the merits of the choice, it seems clear that some
form of rough national uniformity is a goal of the Attorney General and her capital punishment regulations. When confirmed, Janet Reno responded to questions about race and the death penalty
by saying the Department "should do everything [it] can to prevent
442. Of course, courts can still arrive at conflicting interpretations and decisions
even after the Attorney General has exercised some centralized review. Moreover, it
is doubtful that more than "rough" uniformity can ever be achieved; lawyers and
judges will always argue about what cases and results are truly "similar." The Attorney General is permitted to try, however, even if perfect uniformity is unattainable.
443. Furman, 408 U.S. at 238 (White, J. concurring)
444. A substantive uniformity argument based on Furman and Gregg ,is
complex
and would require far more development than is possible here. But those cases, as
well as later ones, do contain suggestions that some rough substantive uniformity is
required. Of course, they also contain contrary suggestions. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at
198 (Op. of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (finding it significant that Georgia's
Supreme Court "compares each death sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is
not disproportionate . . . . [t]hese procedures seem to satisfy the concerns of
Furman."); cf Pulley, 465 U.S. at 54 (occasional "aberrational outcomes" are inevitable and appellate proportionality review not invariably constitutionally required, yet
"major systematic defects [as] identified in Furman" might invalidate system). Further pursuit of these hints simply must await another day. See supra note 21.
445. See generally Kahan, supra note 375, at 489-90 (arguing that Chevron deference should apply to the DOJ, so that when a statute is silent or ambiguous, courts
should defer to the Department's pre-existing, reasonable interpretations).
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disparate treatment.

'44 6

439

Ten months later, when the Attorney

General issued the capital punishment review protocols, they expressly applied to "all Federal [capital] cases" without distinction,44 7 and they stated that "consistency" was a primary goal.4 48
Indeed, what other purpose could a national, centralized review of
potential capital cases have, if not to produce at least rough uniformity among the Districts? And in fact, that was the ethic of the
Review Committee when I served: Although every case is unique,
to the extent possible we attempted to ensure that like cases were
treated similarly, both procedurally and substantively, wherever
they originated. In sum, it appears to be current DOJ policy that,
as best as humanly possible, the federal death penalty be administered uniformly across the nation.
This Article does not argue that national uniformity in federal
death penalty administration necessarily should be the goal of the
DOJ. Rather, it accepts the Department's and Congress's statements that uniformity is their goal, and suggests some attention to
DOJ policies in pursuit of their uniformity objective. It is a separate question, not further addressed here, whether Congress could
enact a regionally disparate federal death penalty system - for example, authorizing that the death penalty be available for federal
crimes only in those federal districts whose States permit capital
punishment. Congress has not enacted such a statute and the wideranging policy and constitutional issues provoked by the question
can be left to another day.449 From this point on, this Article pro446. RENO CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, supra note 214, at 101; accord at 102.
447. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.010; accord, id.
§ 9-10.040 (referring to "all cases").
448. Id. § 9-10.080 (stating that "[t]he authorization process is designed to promote
consistency and fairness").
449. See supra note 21. The Supreme Court has held that the principles of the
Fourteenth, Amendment's equal protection clause also run against the federal government, via the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same
as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446
(1973) (rejecting equal protection challenge to federal bankruptcy statute); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The literal command of the Fifth Amendment - "nor
shall any person be ... deprived of life ... without due process of law" - seems to
encompass the imposition of the death penalty. If Congress were to enact a regionally
"unequal" capital punishment scheme, questions such as what level of scrutiny applies, what governmental purposes are served, and whether the purposes are "rationally" (at a minimum) served by the statute would all have to be answered. See
generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1436-55 (2d ed. 1988).
If equal protection analysis of federal statutes really is "the same as that under the
Fourteenth Amendment," then the language of the Fourteenth Amendment requiring
equality within the jurisdiction of the sovereign entity might arguably require federal
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ceeds within the framework of a goal of rough national uniformity
as presently found in the statute, congressional intent, and the Attorney General's stated policy.
II. Administration of the Federal Death Penalty Roles and Some Remaining Challenges

Changing

The realistic availability of death penalty prosecutions on the
federal level undoubtedly has changed the roles of some federal
prosecutors. For many serious federal offenses, case-acceptance
and charging policies must now take the penalty into account. Federal trial attorneys are now obliged to include consideration of
strategic aspects unique to death penalty cases, and also to add the
moral weight of possible death sentences to the responsibilities of
prosecution in general. Responsibly administered, the role of a
death penalty prosecutor should be one of the most difficult known
to our profession.
On an institutional level, the DOJ has assumed a new and unprecedented policy-making role as a national death penalty administrator. The tasks of assembling and reviewing potential death
penalty cases from around the country, interpreting and developing
application standards for the Federal Death Penalty Act, and formulating consistent national prosecution policies for death penalty
cases are new and challenging. The Attorney General has responded progressively to these challenges by requiring centralized
review of potential federal death penalty cases, creating a highlevel race-blind Capital Case Review Committee, and publishing
some guidelines to ensure "consistency and fairness" in Main Justice review.45 °
Nonetheless, challenges remain. The discretion of federal prosecutors in the field is virtually unchecked regarding the selection,
charging, and plea disposition of potential capital cases. Moreover,
the unconscious influence of racial factors still has the potential to
significantly affect federal death penalty administration. 451 Finally,
uniformity in the administration of capital punishment. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93;
see also supra note 444 (discussing Furman, Gregg, and uniformity). As for Congressional policies, see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1994) (stating the "purposes" of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission include "avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants"). But see 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994) (assimilating, for purpose of undefined
crimes committed on federal enclaves, not just state substantive criminal law but also
state "punishment[s]" which may well differ nationally).
450. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 9-10.010 - 10.080.
451. See infra Part II.B.2. (developing the concept of "unconscious racial empathy"). Stephen Bright, an experienced death penalty critic, has accusatorily opined
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indefinite statutory language requires self-conscious Main Justice
interpretation and specification if semantic ambiguities are not to
produce disuniformity. If fairness and consistency are seriously to
be attempted on a national level, not just at Main Justice but also
among ninety-four federal districts across the country, then it is
time for the Department to take its new role as federal death penalty administrator to the next level and address these more difficult, discretionary issues.452
A. The Role of the Individual Federal Death Penalty
Prosecutor
Before addressing Main Justice's role, the new role of individual
federal prosecutors and their offices "in the field" in confronting
potential capital cases should briefly be considered. Just as "death
is different," so too is the role of an individual federal death penalty prosecutor different from the prosecutorial role in other types
of criminal cases.
1. Declining, Selecting, and Charging Cases
Decisions to "decline" cases referred to U.S. Attorneys' offices,
in favor of state and local prosecution, are made daily by federal
that "[t]he United States DOJ ... is now one of the worst offenders in the discriminatory use of the death penalty." Stephen Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial:
The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 433, 466 (1995). This critique was based on early information regarding federal capital prosecutions under 21 U.S.C. § 848, and Bright may not fully appreciate the inevitably slow pace of change within an Executive Department as large
and sprawling as the U.S. DOJ. See Bright, supra at 464. Moreover, he has come
forward with no direct evidence of discriminatory purpose or intent; in light of various
State-side issues, his accusation is at the very least overstated. Nevertheless, his critique and the statistical facts upon which it is based cannot be ignored.
452. This Article generally suggests measures that would provide Main Justice with
greater review and control over federal death penalty administration. It should be
noted that others have decried the trend toward "usurpation of the U.S. Attorneys'
power by the DOJ and the Office of the Attorney General." Tom Rickhoff, The U.S.
Attorney: Fateful Powers Limited, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 499, 503 (1997); see also 1998
JUDICIAL CONF. REPORT ON COSTS, supra note 246, at A-3, Recommendation 5 (stating that DOJ should "streamline" the Main Justice review process and adopt a "fast
track" review for "cases ... where there is a high-probability that the death penalty
will not be sought"). It should be noted that the Judicial Conference's recommendation is not at all inconsistent with this Article's proposed system of a broader and
nationally uniform federal capital review system. While more cases would come to
Main Justice for review, "easy" cases could, and should, still be fast-tracked. Indeed,
the more cases that Main Justice must review, the greater the need for an intelligent
fast-track system.
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prosecutors in the field.453 Now that the FDPA is in place, the realistic availability of capital punishment is a new factor that can affect the initial job of selecting which cases and what charges to file.
Because many federal killings might also be charged as state murder, federal prosecutors initially have to decide which cases should
be pursued federally, as opposed to deferring to a state prosecution. Prosecutors should be attuned to the effect that death penalty
availability might have on their cases selection decisions.
The DOJ protocols state that the desire to obtain the death penalty cannot alone support accepting a case that otherwise would be
deferred to the State.454 But they do not further address whether
desire for a death penalty may play a role in the decision and, if so,
what that role legitimately might be. The Department must be
careful not to allow regional differences regarding the appropriateness of capital punishment substantively to distort its pursuit of
roughly consistent results across the country. Yet regional differences may claim some legitimate role. 55 Further detail is needed
on this topic in the protocols.
In addition, the converse question should also be confronted:
should a desire to avoid death penalty prosecutions lead a federal
prosecutor to decline cases over which federal jurisdiction would
otherwise be asserted? In real-world terms, for example, should a
major narcotics prosecution be declined in an anti-death penalty
state even if the prosecutor learns that the lead defendant has also
killed a witness? The protocols do not provide an answer to this
mirror-image question, although they may be read to suggest one.
The protocols state that a federal death penalty case should not be
filed unless the "Federal interest in the prosecution" clearly outweigh the State's interests. 5 6 This suggests that the federal prosecutor's focus in selecting and declining cases should be on the
interests in the "prosecution," not the penalty. One can of course
debate whether a separate concept of "federal interest in the death
penalty" can be intelligibly separated from the federal interests in
453. See Clymer, supra note 359, at 693-95 (describing the role and policies of federal case selection). Potential cases are "referred" to U.S. Attorneys by federal and
state law enforcement agencies, and a case cannot be prosecuted unless and until it is
accepted for federal prosecution by an attorney within the office. If a referral is "declined" for federal prosecution, it does not enter the official court statistics for that
federal District. The efforts of law enforcement agencies to "sell" cases to federal
prosecutors is a common and well-known event within all U.S. Attorney's offices.
454. See UNITED STATES ArrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.070.
455. See Sifton, supra note 21.
456. Id. § 9-10.070 (emphasis added).
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prosecution. But if such a distinction can be made, then the DOJ
protocols suggest that availability of the death penalty ought not
play a role (or, at least, never a dispositive role) in the selection of
cases in either direction.
On the other hand, one might read "interest in the prosecution"
as encompassing factors related to the penalty, since in practice the
availability of the death penalty is difficult to separate from the
prosecution. The presence of a death penalty can have an impact
on the chances for a successful presentation.457 If this reading is
adopted, then federal prosecutors should attempt to develop a philosophy regarding what factors are appropriate in defining the
"federal interest in seeking the death penalty," and how that interest should influence case acceptance policies. One might ask
whether there are some types of potential federal cases where
seeking the death penalty serves specific, articulable federal interests that would not be served, or not served as well, by deferring to
state authorities.458 At present, development of such an overarching theory of federal death penalty administration is, at best, at a
nascent stage within the DOJ. Until some national guidelines on
such substantive issues are forthcoming from Main Justice, 4

9

indi-

vidual federal prosecutors should, at the very least, discuss the impact that an available death penalty should (or should not) have on
their initial case-intake decisions, and attempt to develop unbiased
and uniform standards within their individual offices for capital
case referrals.46 °
The same is true, it would seem, regarding charging decisions.
Once a U.S. Attorney's office has decided to accept a case, how to
charge it can sometimes, although not always, present a choice between death-eligible and other felony charges. In other words,
death-eligible federal offenses often reach conduct that might also
457. See infra notes 464-70.
458. My colleague, Professor William K.S. Wang, has stimulated me to consider
whether one possibility might be the murder of federal officials. It can be argued that
a specifically "federal" interest in deterring similar attacks on other federal officials is

better served by seeking the death penalty federally, rather than consigning it to the
discretionary protection of state prosecutors. This discussion of articulable and severable federal interests in capital prosecutions seems worthy of further concentration.

459. In general, the DOJ capital case protocols address only procedural administration of the federal death penalty and do not provide any substantive standards.
460. In other words, the choice regarding whether to accept or decline potential

death penalty cases ought not be left to the absolute discretion of each individual
prosecutor within a U.S. Attorney's Office. Instead, when an office receives a potential federal case that involves a killing, each office, at least, should apply some uniform standards and require supervisory oversight.
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be charged under federal statutes that do not include a possible
death penalty. 461 Although the United States Attorneys' Manual

does contain a general "most serious offense" charging policy, that
policy is somewhat vague and, more significantly, its implementation is normally not exposed to Main Justice review.462 While the
decision whether to file a death penalty notice when a death-eligi-

ble statute is charged does require Attorney General review under
the protocols, the earlier decision of what statutes to charge in the
first instance is analytically separate, and not reviewed. The issue
of how to make charging choices in cases involving killings should
be acknowledged and self-consciously confronted. Rather than
leave penalty-dispositive charging choices to the unreviewed dis-

cretion of individual federal prosecutors, U.S. Attorneys' offices
(as well as Main Justice) should seek to develop unbiased and uniform charging standards for all potentially death-eligible cases.4 63
Finally, experienced prosecutors candidly admit that media focus

can influence prosecutorial decision-making, and that such pressures are often greatest in the capital context. 464 Accordingly, federal prosecutors must anticipate the influence that intense media
focus in capital cases can have on their behavior and the behavior
461. For example, in the witness tampering, fraud, or narcotics distribution contexts, some statutes encompassing the criminal conduct have not been amended to
include a possible death penalty even "if death results." Compare 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A) (death penalty is not available for large-scale distribution) with 21
U.S.C. § 848(e)(1) (declaring that the death penalty is available for large-scale distribution) and 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b) (same); compare, 18 U.S.C § 1510 (1994) (death penalty is not available for "obstruction of criminal investigations") with 18 U.S.C.
§H 1503, 1512 (the death penalty is available for obstruction of justice and witness
tampering). In contrast, in a case involving the murder of a federal officer, for example, a death-eligible statute would almost certainly have to be charged. See generally
Clymer, supra note 359, at 697-705 (noting difference between federal case "selection" and "charging" policies).
462. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-27.300 ("Charging Most Serious Offenses"); see also DOJ Bluesheet 9.022 (Oct. 12, 1993) to "clarify"
the most serious offense charging policy, reprinted in DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL,
supra note 12, § 9-27.750B (stressing prosecutorial discretion but requiring that
"charging and plea agreement decisions must be made at an appropriate level of responsibility and documented with an appropriate record of the factors applied"). The
"appropriate level of responsibility" is not defined; while it would seem to require
some supervisory review within a U.S. Attorney's office, it does not extend back to
Main Justice except in rare cases.
463. Cf Clymer, supra note 359, at 716 (suggesting that federal cases in general
should not be charged solely to "take advantage of" harsher federal sentencing
policies).
464. See, e.g., E. Michael McCann, Opposing Capital Punishment: A Prosecutor's
Perspective, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 649, 669 (1996); Thomas Johnson, When Prosecutors
Seek the Death Penalty, 22 Am. J. CRIM. L. 280, 280 (1994).
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of others (witnesses, law enforcement officers, staff, etc.). In addition, they should attempt to guard against such external pressures
influencing their selection, charging, strategic and case disposition
decisions.
2. Litigating Federal Death Penalty Cases
Once a federal case has been charged as a death penalty case,
strategic litigation issues arise for the individual federal prosecutor
to consider. For example, in a case where the question of guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the substantive offense is evaluated to
be close, adding a death penalty can increase the difficulty of persuading twelve jurors to convict. Even though capital jurors are
told not to consider the possible penalty until the guilt phase has
concluded, 465 many prosecutors believe that the specter of a death
penalty can increase the chances of a "hung" jury or acquittal on
the issue of guilt in close cases. Media presence and scrutiny can
also effect lawyers, jurors, witnesses and judges. A careful calculus
must be performed, on evidentiary and strategic levels, to determine how best to absorb this potentially disturbing influence.
In contrast to the sympathetic effect that a death penalty might
cause during the guilt/innocence stage of a close case is a concern
about the effect that "death qualified" juries can create at the sentencing stage. The Supreme Court has approved excluding for
cause in a capital trial all jurors who admit that their personal beliefs regarding the death penalty "would prevent or substantially
impair" them from following the law regarding capital punishment.466 Many critics have argued that such "death qualified" juries are also more prone to convict.4 67 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the by-product of producing a "conviction
465. See, e.g., 1 EDWARD J. DEVITr, CHARLES B. BLACKMAR ET AL., FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 10.01, (4th ed. 1992); 1 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTR., CRIMINAL, No. 8.83.2 (6th ed. 1996) ("Jury Must Not Consider Penalty").
466. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968). Capital defendants also have the right to exclude jurors who say they
would always impose the death penalty, regardless of mitigating factors - a "lifequalified" jury. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). But whether this has a significant impact on prosecutorial strategy in potential capital cases (as does a "death qualified" jury) has not been the object of study. One imagines that jurors who say they
would impose a death sentence regardless of the circumstances are much more rarely
found.
467. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 169-70 nn.4-6 (1986) (collecting
authorities); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital
Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1114 n.19 (1997) (collecting authorities); Welsh S. White, The ConstitutionalInvalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death-QualifiedJuries, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1176, 1177 (1973).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI

prone" jury poses no constitutional bar to excluding jurors who
cannot follow the law.468
Critics contend that some strategic prosecutors may charge a
case as death-eligible merely to obtain a conviction-prone jury, not
truly believing the case to deserve, or to be likely to receive, a
death sentence.469 While such prosecutorial manipulation seems
manifestly unethical, it is also violative of the federal death penalty
statute itself. The FDPA provides that only a prosecutor who "believes that ...a sentence of death is justified" may file a death
penalty notice invoking the FDPA's special procedures.4 7 ° Responsible federal prosecutors must take pains to ensure that their
deep desire to "win" does not, even subconsciously, lead them to
strategically manipulate death penalty charges. 471 Federal prosecutors are expressly prohibited under the FDPA from manipulating
death penalty notice filings merely to obtain "death qualified"
juries.
Once a notice is filed, federal prosecutors also should be attuned
to the possibility of seeking Main Justice release from a previouslyauthorized death penalty in some cases. Although the protocols do
not explicitly address the possibility, it is well accepted that prosecutors, just as defense counsel, may return to the Attorney General

468. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168-73 (assuming the "conviction prone" contention to
be true although also criticizing the empirical data). Neither does this phenomena
require that two separate juries be selected, one not death-qualified for the guilt
phase, and another death-qualified for the sentencing phase, despite the fact that
death qualification relates only to the second stage of capital trials. See id. at 180-82.
A "unitary jury" system with bifurcated conviction and sentencing stages was upheld
in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 160. The "conviction prone" argument had been noted, but not
decided prior to Gregg, in Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968), and the "two
jury" solution was advanced at length by Justice Marshall in dissent in Lockhart, 476
U.S. at 203-06, and again in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 426-31 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
469. White, supra note 467, at 1177; see Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest DA, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., July 16, 1995, at B1.
470. 18 U.S.C § 3593(a) (1994). See supra notes 366-68, 425-426. Interestingly, the
CCE statute does not contain this language, but rather appears to permits the prosecutor to file a death penalty notice "[w]henever the Government intends to seek the
death penalty." 21 U.S.C. § 848(h) (1994). Nevertheless, federal prosecutors are still
governed by ethical rules that forbid them from pursuing charges not supported by at
least probable cause. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 377, Rule 3.8(a). See also
supra note 425.
471. Of course, prosecutors actually "win" whenever justice is done, regardless of
whether a conviction results. This can be difficult for any lawyer to remember in the
heat of battle, however, and budgetary and political pressures to convict can be
strong. The statutory prohibition, therefore, is important.
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to revisit a death penalty authorization decision at any time.472 The
government's evidence can change, and get weaker, after an initial
charging decision has been made, and trial attorneys should not
feel disabled from revisiting the death penalty authorization
decision.
Similarly, as with case declination and charging decisions,473 federal prosecutors should develop policies to regulate individualized
plea bargaining in capital cases. While Attorney General approval
is not required for plea dispositions in the death penalty context,474
neither should such dispositions be left to the individual, unreviewed discretion of line prosecutors. Particularly since the Attorney General has ceded this stage to the U.S. Attorneys, the U.S.
Attorneys' offices should undertake to develop a philosophy of
plea dispositions regarding capital cases. 475' Office-wide policies

should be openly discussed and circulated within an office, and supervisory review and approval should be required before any plea
is offered, let alone agreed to. Aside from the beneficial local effect, if U.S. Attorneys undertake to self-consciously develop such
guidelines and then show them to Main Justice, useful information
and stimulus for development of DOJ policies will be generated.
This in and of itself will be a benefit. Main Justice policy is generally best developed through individual field office initiatives, rather
than by centralized thinking divorced from field concerns.
3.

Costs, Careful Attention, and Moral Implications

Federal prosecutors must consider that death penalty cases usually take longer to get to trial, to try, and to finalize on appeal.
Most estimates agree that the cost of carrying a capital case from
indictment to. execution far exceeds the total cost of a non-capital
472. The protocols implicitly recognize that a U.S. Attorney may sometimes seek to
withdraw a death penalty after it has been filed, because the protocols expressly require Main Justice approval for any such withdrawal (unless it is part of a plea bargain). See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.090. The
protocols also provide that the U.S. Attorney, as well as Main Justice, may consider
"any legitimate law enforcement or prosecutorial reason" in evaluating the death penalty option. Id. § 9-10.080. Changes in the evidentiary mix before, or even during,
trial would surely be legitimate reasons for reconsidering a death penalty.
473. See supra notes 451-462.
474. See supra notes 374-81.
475. See Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1121, 1126-27 (1998) ("[P]rosecution offices, in their internal guidelines or procedures, should set forth the[ir] plea-bargaining theory or theories.").

448

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI

prosecution.4 7 6 In addition, the average capital defendant may sit

on death row for years before the sentence is implemented.477 Federal prosecutors now have a responsibility to consider the impact
of such costs and delays before engaging the process that invites
them. While, on balance, a case like the Oklahoma City bombing

case (with 168 persons killed) may obviously demand placing the
death penalty option before the jury regardless of cost, other cases
that still have egregious facts, like the UnaBomer case, may nevertheless warrant a non-death disposition.4 7 8
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court's death penalty

jurisprudence prohibits certain prosecutorial arguments, such as an
argument that misleads the capital jury to believe its verdict is not
"final. '479 The more general point is that appellate courts generally subject capital verdicts to particularly close scrutiny. With this
fact in mind, federal capital prosecutors should be cautious in strategy and rhetoric. Any federal prosecutor about to try a capital

476. The Federal Judicial Center has reported that federal death penalty prosecutions cost an average of $580,000 per case (prosecution and appointed defense costs),
as opposed to an average of $55,772 for death-eligible cases for which the death penalty is not sought. See 1998 JUDICIAL CONF. REPORT ON COSTS, supra note 246, at iiiiv; see generally RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 187216 (1991). Unbiased cost studies are hard to find. For "high end" figures from abolitionist advocacy groups, see Richard C. Dieter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians
Don't Say About the High Costs of the Death Penalty, reprinted in BEDAU 1997, supra
note 14, at 405-06 (stating that "capital cases cost at least an extra $2.16 million per
execution, compared to... life in prison"); see also Death Penalty Focus of California,
The Cost of the Death Penalty in California (visited Oct. 15, 1998) <http://members.aol.com/Dpfocus/cost.htm> (opining that slightly over $2 million is spent for capital cases compared to roughly $1.5 million for cases seeking life without parole).
Meanwhile, the internet has yielded one web page contending that life without parole
("LWOP") costs twice as much as a death sentence case. See Wesley Lowe's Pro
Death Penalty Webpage (visited Oct. 4, 1998) <http://www.rit.edu/-ww12461/cp.html>
(comparing 50 years of LWOP to six years on death row).
477. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1997, supra note 45, at 1 (the average time on death
row for the 74 state prisoners executed in 1997 was 11 years and one month). The
length of time between conviction and execution and the higher cost of capital cases
are not unrelated. The time that federal prisoners linger on death row should be
shorter, because they do not have a separate "state habeas" review process available.
478. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 397 (discussing factors in accepting the
Unabomer plea). As for the Oklahoma City case, which one hopes is sui generis, the
costs of prosecution (which have not yet ended) have been announced as over $80
million. Oklahoma City Bomb Probe Cost $80 million, MARIN INDEP. J.,Nov. 3, 1998,
at Al.
479. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 347 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring to
provide fifth vote); see Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994) (stating that argument must be misleading to be improper).
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case should make a special review of ethical constraints on
prosecutorial trial tactics and closing arguments.48 °
Similarly, federal prosecutors wishing to prosecute a death penalty case must also now consult with, and suffer intense review by,
Main Justice at the highest levels. Having one's investigative and
prosecutorial decisions personally reviewed by the Attorney General will be a new experience for most Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
One hopes that federal prosecutors are circumspect and careful in
every case they handle. But charging a federal capital case invokes
a new level of scrutiny that must be anticipated by line federal
prosecutors.
Finally, individual federal prosecutors must now add to their
roles the moral implications of implementing the death penalty.
Even if one supports capital punishment, prosecuting a death penalty case - operating as "an instrument of death" in the eyes of
some - is surely a morally challenging responsibility.4 81 Although
federal prosecutors have for years had responsibility for prosecuting lengthy mandatory minimum imprisonment cases,48 2 for many
federal prosecutors a death penalty case will nevertheless "feel"
different in its weight. Of course, the statute permits those with
sincere "moral or religious convictions" against the death penalty
to decline participation.483 Moreover, federal prosecutors whose
moral misgivings regarding capital punishment would interfere
with their effective prosecution of capital cases are ethically obligated to withdraw from that role.484 Federal prosecutors must
therefore search their consciences to determine whether their participation will provide the United States with the committed attorney advocate to which it is entitled. 485 Even when federal
prosecutors can proceed in good conscience, they must gird themselves for a morally difficult, albeit necessary, institutional role.
480. See Thompson v. California, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring to provide fifth vote) ("Among the most important and consistent themes in this
Court's death penalty jurisprudence is the need for special care and deliberation in
decisions that may lead to the imposition of that sanction.").
481. See Noonan, supra note 39, at 1011.
482. See, e.g., United States v. McKines, 917 F.2d 1077, 1081 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming mandatory life sentence without parole).
483. See 18 U.S.C. § 3597(b) (1994); George Kannar, FederalizingDeath, 44 BUFF.
L. REV. 325, 331-37 (1996) (discussing the "conscientious objector" provision of the
FDPA). The equivalent CCE provision does not appear to encompass prosecutors,
see 21 U.S.C. § 848 (r), but it makes no strategic sense for DOJ to compel a prosecutor with moral objections to remain on a capital case.
484. See MODEL RULES, supra note 377, Rule 1.7(b).
485. See id. Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.7(b).
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DOJ Administration of the Federal Death Penalty - A
Good Start But There are Large Opportunities for
Improvement
The foregoing account of how the DOJ's Capital Case Review
B.

Committee works486 no doubt reveals the author's overall positive

evaluation of the DOJ's procedures for centralized review of proposed federal death penalty cases. The procedures that the Attorney General has put in place at Main Justice are thorough, open to
defense input, and race-blind.
However, the Main Justice review procedures do little to regulate many discretionary federal death penalty decisions made by
over 4,000 federal prosecutors "in the field." A serious flaw in the
DOJ procedures is their lack of attention to significant
prosecutorial decisions that are made earlier in the potential death
penalty process by federal prosecutors in ninety-four separate U.S.
Attorney offices. Whether to accept a case for federal prosecution,
what and who to charge once the case is accepted, and whether to
submit the case to Main Justice for review at all, are preliminary
decisions that can be immensely influential when the death penalty
is potentially in play. These field decisions are the ones that most
dramatically affect the "pool" of death-eligible cases upon which
Main Justice later imposes its review procedures. In addition, the
later decision to accept or decline death-avoiding plea bargains is
unregulated by Main Justice. Now that a centralized review process is in place in Washington, the DOJ should turn its attention to
developing effective review strategies for influential death penalty
decisions made in the field.
The remainder of this Article will discuss three problems that
remain to be confronted by the DOJ in its administration of the
federal death penalty: (1) regional disparity in a national system;
(2) persistent racial disparities; and (3) semantic manipulability.
These problems relate to the Department's internal protocols, the
federal death penalty statute, and the nature of the criminal justice
system as a whole.
1. Achieving National Uniformity in the Face of Regional
Diversity
There is no doubt that capital punishment is disparately administered in the United States today. Regional diversity of views regarding the death penalty skews its imposition geographically.
486. See supra notes 383-410 and accompanying text.
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First, twelve states - almost a quarter of the fifty - do not authorize capital punishment.487 No matter how egregious the conduct may be, murderers in these twelve States cannot receive the
death penalty - at least not in their state criminal justice systems.
All of these twelve "anti" death penalty states lie outside the historically-defined southern or border states.488
As for the thirty-eight states that do authorize capital punishment, there is a clear dichotomy between those that actively implement the death penalty and others that have carried out no, or very
few, executions since Gregg reauthorized the death penalty in 1976.
As of January 1999, of the thirty-eight states that authorize capital
punishment, nine had carried out no executions since 1972,489 and
in seven others there have been only one or two executions.49 °
Thus the death penalty is concentrated in only twenty-two states,
less than half of the Union. 49 1 Finally, executions are clearly concentrated in the southern United States. As of October 1998,
seven southern and border states account for almost three-fourths
(73%) of all executions carried out in this country since Furman:
Texas (167), Virginia (60), Florida (43), Missouri (33), Louisiana
(25), and Georgia (23), and South Carolina (22).492 The next closest states are Alabama (17) and Arkansas (17). 493 Thus it is a fact
487. The 12 states that do not authorize capital punishment are Alaska, Hawaii,
Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. In addition, the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico do not authorize capital punishment. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1997, supra
note 45, at 1.

488. The "southern states" are generally considered to be the 11 states that formed
the Confederacy in the Civil War (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia). Similarly, "border states" describes the four states just above the southern states that also
had slavery but remained in the Union during the Civil War (Delaware, Kentucky,
Maryland and Missouri). See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM:
CIVIL WAR ERA 51, 101, 284 (1988).
489. The nine non-executing states are Connecticut, Kansas, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Dakota and Tennessee. See Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions By State Since 1976 (visited Jan. 30,
1999) <http://www.essential.rog/dpic/dpicreg.html> [hereinafter Number of Executions By State Since 1976].
490. See id. Only one execution has been performed in Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky,
and Wyoming, and only two in Montana, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.
491. The 12 states with no capital punishment, plus nine with no executions and
seven more with only one or two executions in at least 27 years, total 28 states with
little or no capital punishment since Furman was decided.
492. See Number of Executions By State Since 1976, supra. note 489. The total
number of executions since Furman is 510; the seven leading states account for 373 of
them. Texas alone is responsible for over 30% of all executions in that time.
THE

493. Id.
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that the southern and border states implement the bulk of capital
punishment in this country.494
Such regional diversity is not necessarily surprising or improper.
One genius of our federalist system is that States may enact widely
varying policy decisions, so long as they do not run afoul of our
national Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause forbids states
to discriminate within their own borders; however, it does not prohibit lack of uniformity among States with regard to criminal punishment.495 With specific regard to the death penalty, Gregg v.
Georgia496 and its companions made it clear that States may enact
differing capital punishment structures so long as general constitutional principles of "guided discretion" are observed.
This calculus, however, changes when one considers Congress's
and the Attorney General's stated goals for a national, federal, capital sentencing scheme.497 As noted above, the FDPA, the underlying congressional intent regarding federal sentencing, and the
Attorney General's capital case protocols, all indicate a policy of at
least rough uniformity in the administration of the federal death
penalty.498 Yet, if uniform national administration of the federal
death penalty is the object of the Department's authorization policies, it has been achieved only in a narrow, almost meaningless,
sense. I have no doubt that once potential death penalty cases are
submitted to Main Justice for review, the Attorney General and
her Review Committee succeed as well as is humanly possible in
achieving unbiased uniformity among the cases before them. Thus,
for example, violent car-jacking death penalty cases are treated the
same, and the death penalty is authorized or not, without regard to
what district the case came from, and without knowledge of race or
ethnicity. In this sense, uniformity in the handling of federal capital cases is achieved within the Department.4 99
494. Of course, like any generalization this one is of limited inferential value. For
example, the southern state of Tennessee has executed no one since Furman, while
the "northern" state of Illinois has executed 11 people. See Number of Executions By
State Since 1976, supra note 489.
495. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" (emphasis added). Id. Of course, to the extent
that the theory of Furman is still valid, it places an outer constitutional limit on disuniformity in capital punishment.
496. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
497. It might also change under a constitutional analysis of a federal system, but
this Article does not undertake that separate examination. See supra note 449.
498. See supra notes 425-447 and accompanying text.
499. Because similar cases can always be distinguished at some level, perfect uniformity is impossible not only to achieve but even to evaluate. The reality of human
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However, achieving procedural and substantive uniformity
"within the Department" is only a partial triumph, and one that is
severely limited if it produces complacency and serves to mask serious non-uniform results among potential federal capital cases
across the country. This is because unless there is uniformity in
federal charging and case-selection decisions, in submissions to
Main Justice, and in post-authorization plea dispositions, then uniformity "within the Department" fails to address significant potential sources of disparity: disparate death penalty charging,
submission, and plea-bargain decisions made in the field.
In fact, new data released by the DOJ suggests that the geographic disuniformity seen in state administration of the death penalty is reflected, though not nearly as extremely, in U.S. Attorney
submissions of potential capital cases to Main Justice for review.500
Geographic disparity is also reflected to some extent in
authorizations.
Specifically, since the Attorney General's protocols were issued
in 1995, sixty-three Districts have submitted 471 possible capital
defendants for DOJ review; of the 374 actually reviewed,50 1 102
defendants were authorized for death penalty prosecutions.50 2
Most immediately, it is apparent that thirty-one of the ninety-four
federal districts, encompassing eleven complete states, have not
submitted any potential capital cases in four years.5 3 It is difficult
to believe that not a single murder in those eleven states since 1994
was a possible candidate for federal prosecution.50 4 Crimes resultconsiderations may, in close cases, come into play. Thus, to continue the car-jacking
example in the text, two cases in which victims were killed with similar aggravating
and mitigating factors might still yield different results within the Department's review system, if the U.S. Attorneys issued opposing recommendations and both argued
strongly for their position. But if an explanation were called for, the difference in
result would likely be formally justified by pointing to specific fact differences in the
cases, rather than to the differing U.S. Attorneys' recommendations, which in theory
should not matter.
500. This data was transmitted to the author on January 25, 1999. It is reprinted in
full in this Article. See infra note 558.
501. Cases submitted may not be finally reviewed for a variety of reasons. See id.
502. See id.

503. The 11 states in which U.S. Attorneys have submitted no cases for capital review from 1995-1998 are Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Many states are divided into a number of separate federal districts, so that there are more non-submitting Districts than there are states. Thus, for example, while North Carolina has three
federal districts, only two of those districts' U.S. Attorneys have submitted cases for
Main Justice review.
504. For example, despite having no data for three of the states, the FBI reports
that in 1995 there were 713 adult arrests for murder or non-negligent homicide in the
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ing in death are distributed approximately evenly throughout the
United States.5 ° 5 There are, sadly, gang-related killings in every
urban center in America, and drug related killings occur not only
in Miami, but also in urban centers such as New York, San Francisco, Chicago, and Seattle.
Furthermore, of the 471 total potential capital defendants sub-

mitted to DOJ for review, 177 (37% of the total) have come from
the fifteen Southern or border states, while only thirty-nine have
come from the twelve states that do not authorize the death penalty. 6 When one looks at authorizations, the picture is slightly
more stark. Fifty-one of the 102 defendants authorized for federal
capital prosecutions have come from the fifteen Southern and border states, while only twenty-two have come from the twenty-one
non-execution states.50 7 Finally, of the twenty federal defendants
actually on death row, sixteen have come from prosecutions in

Southern or border state Districts.

8

Thus there does appear to be geographic disuniformity in admin-

istration of the federal death penalty, which to some extent reflects
the regional maldistribution of State death penalty executions. To

be sure, the federal situation is far less disparate than the States'.
11 states that made no capital review submissions to Main Justice. See FEDERAL BuREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 266-72 & n.6, Table 69 (1995).
While jurisdictional reasons might prevent federally charging many of these murders,
that such jurisdictional bars existed in all 713 cases seems highly unlikely.
505. That is, instances of non-negligent killing cases are not non-randomly distributed, such that they do not occur in anti-capital punishment states. For example, in
1995, there were 16,701 arrests around the country for "murder and non-negligent
manslaughter." Id. at 209, Table 30. In the 12 states that do not authorize capital
punishment there were still 2,453 arrests for such killings, or roughly 15% of the national total. See id. at 266-72, Table 69.
506. When submissions from the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands are excluded (because these jurisdictions have considerations operating that
are uniquely separate from the States'), this regional contribution rises to 45% of the
total.
507. The "non-execution" states are the 12 that do not authorize capital punishment at all plus the nine that, while technically authorizing capital punishment, have
not executed anyone since 1972. See supra notes 476-477.
508. The 20 federal death row occupants were prosecuted in federal districts in
Texas (four), Virginia (three), Louisiana (two), Missouri (two), Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Illinois, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania.
The Colorado and Pennsylvania cases addressed highly aggravated killings: the
Oklahoma City bombing case, involving the death of 168 persons, was prosecuted in
Colorado on a change of venue; and the Pennsylvania case involved a defendant who
murdered another federal inmate while serving a 1,200-year Oklahoma state sentence. See Federal Death Row Prisoners,supra note 6. It should be noted, however,
that the Department cannot control cultural or regional biases regarding capital punishment that can enter cases at the jury deliberation stage.
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For example, U.S. Attorneys in seventeen of the twenty-one nonexecuting states have submitted cases for DOJ review, and two of
the top five submitting states are New York and California. °9 In
addition, the distribution of submissions appears to be improving
over time, perhaps as federal officials become more familiar with
the federal death penalty statutes and DOJ procedures. 510 Nevertheless, the DOJ has reason to inquire whether the federal death
penalty statutes are being applied even-handedly across the
country.
Disuniformity has the potential to enter the federal death penalty system in at least three different prosecutive stages not controlled by Main Justice: the initial discretionary case-acceptance
and charging stage, the discretionary decision to submit the case to
DOJ for review, and the discretionary plea disposition stage. 1 '
Lack of uniformity in submissions for Main Justice review is easiest
to address, because it might be corrected simply by an amendment
(and Main Justice enforcement) of the capital case protocols in the
United States Attorneys' Manual. The other two sources of lack of
uniformity (case-acceptance and plea bargaining) are more deeply
embedded and are likely more difficult, if not impossible, to solve.
Nevertheless, the Department could attempt to address these areas
more self-consciously as well.
a. Lack of Uniformity in Submissions to Main Justice - Amend
the Protocols
The Attorney General's capital case protocols require field prosecutors to submit for review at Main Justice all cases where a defendant is "charged with an offense subject to the death
penalty. ' 512 The quoted phrase is the "trigger" for submission to
Main Justice. Obviously this language makes the exercise of
prosecutorial charging discretion of paramount importance. But
even putting the charging concern aside for the moment, the meaning of the trigger phrase "offense subject to the death penalty" is
ambiguous. It leaves too much room for discretion to avoid Main
Justice death penalty review. Although reasonable persons might
509. Combined federal districts in New York have submitted 78 defendants for review, and in California, 20 defendants. The other top submitting states are Virginia
(57), Texas (29), and Maryland (24).
510. See supra note 412.
511. Of course, the DOJ can do nothing to control judge or jury discretion and
biases, which can produce non-uniform death penalty results no matter what the Department does.
512. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.010.
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agree that the review protocols were intended to bring into Main
Justice all cases in which a federal death penalty might possibly be
sought, 13 that is not precisely what the protocols say. Instead, two
other, quite different, readings of the phrase "charged with an offense subject to the death penalty" are possible.
First, a "strong" reading of the trigger phrase might be that the
Attorney General requires submission of all federal cases in which
a statute that has been charged lists death as possible penalty.
However, over forty federal statutes now provide death as a possible penalty, and all but a few prohibit the penalty unless "death
results." For this reason, the strong reading of the "offense subject
to the death penalty" as providing a statutory "trigger" for submission would produce a dramatically over-broad result. Most cases in
which death-eligible statutes are charged do not actually involve
deaths. Therefore, the simple "statutory trigger" reading would unnecessarily sweep into Main Justice hundreds of cases in which,
while the statute charged might authorize a death penalty, the facts
of the case plainly render a death sentence unavailable. For instance, the majority of cases charging car-jacking, narcotics distribution, or witness intimidation are not truly death-eligible, because
the defendant has killed no one. If the goal is to achieve uniform
treatment and the absence of bias in death penalty administration,
there is no need for Main Justice to review thousands of non-killing
federal cases charged under death-eligible statutes, because the
death penalty is not available (with rare exception) unless a "death
results.

'51 4

Accordingly, "offense subject to the death penalty" ought not be
defined solely by reference to the statute charged. This would result in submission of far too many cases in which the death penalty

513. In fact, in the 1997 reorganization of the UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANsupra note 12, a caption to § 9-10.010 was added that describes the section as
governing "federal prosecutions in which the death penalty may be sought" (emphasis
added). But the text of that section does not repeat this language, and this caption
was absent from Attorney General Reno's original promulgation of the protocols in
1995. Compare DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.000 ("purpose"
section, now codified at UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 910.010). While the caption arguably helps to dispel the ambiguity of "offense subject
to the death penalty," it does not eliminate it. Moreover, its anonymous pedigree
renders it somewhat suspect.
514. 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (a)(2) (1998). The statutory exceptions to the "death results"
rule are treason, espionage, and the new "super drug kingpin" death penalty provisions, and the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty for non-killing crimes
has been left in some doubt after Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). See supra notes 229-232.
UAL,
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is not actually available. 515 It would also represent an unprecedented expansion of DOJ review authority to non-capital criminal
cases, which historically have been handled with autonomy by individual U.S. Attorneys' office.5 16
But elimination of a "statutory trigger" for DOJ capital case submission also removes the easiest bright-line method of ensuring national uniformity in the pool of cases submitted. For how is a U.S.
Attorney otherwise going to determine that a charged offense is
"subject to the death penalty" so that submission is necessary?
This is the point at which the protocols' ambiguity can yield less
than uniform submissions.
A second reading of the protocols' "trigger" phrase, in the opposite direction, can be that no offense is "subject to the death penalty" unless its facts show all the necessary preconditions for the
death penalty: a mens rea qualifier, sufficient aggravating factors,
and insufficient mitigating factors. This reading would posit that a
charged federal offense is not "subject to the death penalty" until a
U.S. Attorney has determined that the death penalty is justified
under the FDPA. Yet these judgments are the very ones that the
protocols seek to bring to Main Justice for national, uniform interpretation and review. Unless each U.S. Attorney's resolution of
these issues is to become, de facto, the final one, the ultimate death
penalty criteria cannot serve as the initial trigger for Main Justice
submission. Otherwise, U.S. Attorneys who have higher standards
for seeking the death penalty than others will simply not submit for
review many cases in which the death penalty plausibly might be
sought.
The Attorney General's protocols plainly seem designed to prevent such a predetermining of the federal death penalty review
process. Rather, the protocols recognize that U.S. Attorneys are
515. It would also resemble a system of automatic death penalty charging that the
Supreme Court has described as "totally alien to our notions of criminal justice."
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50.
516. Prior to the advent of the federal sentencing guidelines in 1987 (see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3551), individual districts had authority to seek differing sentences even for like
offenses and offenders. The resulting disparity in federal sentencing was a chief stimulus for the new federal sentencing guidelines legislation. See generally Breyer, supra
note 433. But even the new sentencing guidelines seek to regularize federal sentencing largely through judicial oversight, not through Main Justice review. See Koon, 518
U.S. 81. Although prudence may sometimes counsel getting Main Justice advice, U.S.
Attorneys are not required to submit guidelines sentencing issues for DOJ review
before taking positions on them in district courts around the country. The death penalty protocols thus already represent an unprecedented attempt to achieve national
sentencing uniformity, in a discrete area, through pretrial (even pre-indictment) Main
Justice review.
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subject to human differences regarding capital punishment. They
will evaluate similar capital punishment cases differently, both consciously and unconsciously.5 1 7 The review protocols are intended
to even out such inevitable differences, by bringing all possible
death penalty cases to one place and permitting a centralized, rela-

tively small group of experienced prosecutors to compare all deatheligible cases, from all ninety-four different districts across the nation, and arrive at roughly consistent dispositions.
The Department thus does not want U.S. Attorneys in the field

to use, as their "trigger" for submission, their own ultimate determination of whether the charged offense should subject the defendant to the death penalty. Such a high standard would pretermit

determinations for which national uniformity is a stated goal. It
would effectively substitute the initial determination not to submit
the case for review for the Attorney General's ultimate decision on
the matter, for all such cases originating in a particular district. 18
Instead, if national "consistency" is the goal, the Department
should review all cases in which a death penalty might possibly be

sought, particularly those in which some U.S. Attorneys might not
wish to actually seek the death penalty, in order to make nation-

wide comparisons between cases similar on their facts. Only by
such a broad review can the Department develop and apply na-

tional standards for application of the FDPA and ensure, so far as
humanly possible, regularity and the absence of inappropriate bias

in all federal death penalty charging decisions. The conception underlying the protocols is that a case should receive the death penalty, or not, irrespective of its geographic location. Similar cases
should be treated similarly, whether in liberal, anti-death penalty
San Francisco or more conservative, pro-death penalty districts.51 9
This concept of rough national uniformity underlies the FDPA and
517. Cf. United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556, 565 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (Trott, J., dissenting) (noting the "different perspectives of those judges making
[sentencing] decisions"). "Judges in New York City may believe that a $20 sale of
heroin is small potatoes, but in Pocatello [Idaho], those potatoes may be considerably
more significant." Id.
518. Note that if the system were to function in this manner, then the Attorney
General would largely become simply one more "screen" against the death penalty.
That is, potential death penalty cases would fall out all along the system, with only the
most egregious even making it to Main Justice for review. Opponents of capital punishment might well be satisfied with such a "one-way" system, but it would not reflect
the "consistent" administration of the FDPA that the DOJ says it wants.
519. Districts in states that have relatively frequent executions might be compared.
For example, Texas alone has carried out over 32% (166 of 510) of the executions in
the United States since 1977. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1997, supra note 45, at 3.
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federal criminal sentencing in general, and is central to the Attorney General's vision of the capital case review system.52°
Thus, under its protocols, what the Attorney General presumably desires is for all U.S. Attorneys to submit for Main Justice review all cases in which a defendant is charged with an offense
which, on its facts, is possibly subject to the death penalty. One
simple way to ensure that all such cases are "captured" by the DOJ
review system would be to require submission of all federal cases in
which a killing has occurred. (Special provisions could be written
to capture the rare treason, espionage, or "super drug kingpin"
cases that do not involve killings, and such cases likely are too rare
and significant to escape Main Justice attention in any case.)
Moreover, to ensure that results are not skewed by case declination
decisions made by U.S. Attorneys in the field, cases in which a killing occurs that are referred to a U.S. Attorney, but declined, should
also be submitted for at least a cursory Main Justice review.521
While the preferred reading of the current submission trigger
may be clear to most, its literal language needlessly permits ambiguous interpretation. Such ambiguity has the potential to distort the
"pool" of cases that the Department reviews. U.S. Attorneys who
are less eager than others to seek capital punishment might rely on
the trigger ambiguity to not submit cases which are, in fact, quite
similar to cases being submitted by other U.S. Attorneys more eager to seek the death penalty. One result is likely to be geographic
disuniformity in cases submitted for review, between districts with
pro-capital punishment U.S. Attorneys. This, in turn, could lead to
reflective disuniformity in the cases actually authorized for federal
death penalty prosecution.
The potential problem, however, is more serious than simply geographic disuniformity. Uneven review submission standards can
520. See supra notes 434-446 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1994) (attempting to
"avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities") and UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.080 (striving for "consistency and fairness"). As explained
above, this Article takes Congress and the Attorney General at their word and premises its proposals on an underlying goal of national uniformity in death penalty administration. There are reasonable arguments to the contrary. For example, in an area as
controversial as capital punishment, U.S. Attorneys with largely anti-death penalty
jury pools might reasonably contend that this cultural bias will adversely affect a
death penalty prosecution such that the penalty should be foregone in order to ensure
conviction. However, while this-argument is not unreasonable, at bottom it is in deep
tension with a goal of national uniformity.
521. See supra notes 472-520 and accompanying text (discussing declination decisions and review in greater detail). Of course, this would still not capture cases that
are never referred to a U.S. Attorney's office but which still might be changed federally. There are necessary limits, however, to intrusive DOJ review policies.
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also lead to substantive disuniformity - that is, a lack of equal death
penalty charging results in factually similar cases. 522 Because the

trigger phrase provides U.S. Attorneys with broad submission discretion, it is likely that potential capital cases are not being submitted for review from districts where the federal prosecutors are
uneasy about pursuing capital punishment. If most cases submitted
to Main Justice for review come from districts in which U.S. Attorneys are eager to pursue a death penalty, the resulting "pool" of
cases examined at Main Justice is substantively skewed toward less
aggravated cases - cases in which other U.S. Attorneys, if forced
to take a position, would oppose seeking a death penalty. However, the latter group of less eager U.S. Attorneys is currently able
to be silent in the DOJ capital punishment debate, because they
can simply not submit such less-aggravated cases for review.
Meanwhile, the Capital Case Review Committee at Main Justice
is effectively developing national death penalty statutory interpretations and application standards, but based on a pool of cases
which is substantively skewed toward more aggressive capital prosecutions and with more aggressive U.S. Attorneys as the vocal advocates. Missing from the pool, and thus from the advocacy of
debate and the Review Committee's interpretive analysis, are similar cases arising in Districts that do not submit them for review
because they do not seem, to those U.S. Attorneys, to be "subject
to the death penalty." In other words, if the pool of death penalty
case submissions is substantively skewed, it distorts the Death Penalty Review Committee's interpretive process, because the Committee does not have available as a basis for national comparison
similar potential death penalty cases that would not be recommended for the penalty (if submitted for review) by other Districts.
A skewed pool of submissions - skewed substantively as well as
geographically -seems inconsistent with the Attorney General's
stated goals of "consistency and fairness. "523
The ambiguity in the submission trigger is needless, and should
be eliminated. The protocols should be amended to ensure that all
potential federal death penalty cases are captured for Main Justice
review. 24 The new language should encompass not just all charged
522. See supra notes 428-431 (discussing substantive uniformity concept).
523. UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.080
524. The content of the protocols is not a trivial matter. Rather, it can deeply influence federal prosecutor behavior. Although the provisions of the United States Attorneys' Manual are not well-publicized, Professor (and former federal prosecutor)
Steven Clymer has similarly suggested that they are sufficiently influential on the be-
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cases where a death has resulted, but also all potential capital cases
that might have been charged federally but, instead, were declined
by a U.S. Attorney's office. Such a broader and clearer submission
trigger need not be complex; rather the protocols could be
amended simply to require submission to Main Justice for "all
cases, charged or declined, in which a killing has occurred.' 525 This
would make crystal clear their purpose and could truly nationalize
the Department's death penalty review system. 526 Otherwise, a
lack of geographic and substantive uniformity is the likely result.
The group of cases actually presented for review is likely skewed
toward cases in which U.S. Attorneys, as a national group, would
not agree that a death penalty is justified, and truly representative
national evaluation standards cannot be developed.
Only by ensuring that the pool of cases submitted for review is
truly a national one, and that arguments presented by U.S. Attorneys for or against death penalty authorizations are truly representative of the national body of U.S. Attorneys, can the Attorney
General's Review Committee develop truly representative national
standards for uniform administration of the federal death penalty.
Otherwise the pool of cases is skewed toward less-aggravated capital cases, and the debate at Main Justice is driven largely by those
U.S. Attorneys who are eager to prosecute seeking the death penalty. Enforcing a truly national, and all-encompassing, review submission policy would compel U.S. Attorneys who are presently
silent in the death penalty debate to participate.527
If one hypothesizes that the standards of these currently nonparticipating U.S. Attorneys for seeking the death penalty are
"higher" or more rigorous than some others, then the addition of
havior of federal prosecutors to warrant amendment (in his Article, to help guide case
selection and charging decisions in general). See Clymer, supra note 359, at 708-17.
525. Of course, what constitutes a "declination" would also have to be defined and
regulated, so that "informal" referrals and declinations do not become a surrogate for
the present disuniformity. One definition might be simply any case discussed between
any federal prosecutor and a law enforcement official for possible federal charging.
Regulating declination decisions is not an entirely new concept; the UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, already requires prosecutors to put their "reasons" for declinations in their "office files." Id. § 9-27.270.
526. Thus various sections in the capital case protocols, e.g. id. §§ 9-10.010, 10.020,
10.030, would need amendment of their "offense subject to the death penalty"
language.
527. Of course, it currently is not politically popular to express misgivings about
capital punishment, generally or in particular cases. To foster full and candid U.S.
Attorney participation, the DOJ debate regarding substantive federal death penalty
prosecution standards should be entirely internal and confidential, until the Department is prepared to publish its views as an institution.
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their voices to the debate might well raise the federal standards for
pursuing the death penalty.528 Thus the result of compelling
broader case submissions for Main Justice review would not necessarily be an increase in the number of federal capital prosecutions.
Instead, the result could be a raising of federal capital charging
standards, to appropriately reflect the range of views within the
entire DOJ, such that less aggravated cases that are currently being
authorized for the death penalty might not be.529 While the net
result - more or less federal death penalty prosecutions - is impossible to predict, the gain in national consistency, as well as in
open and broad-ranging debate within the Department, seems
worth the attempt.
b.

Disuniformity in Chargingand Plea-BargainingIntractable Problem?

an

Even putting aside, for the moment, the disturbing specter of
persistent racial disparities in capital prosecutions and sentencing, 530 lack of uniformity caused by good-faith but uneven exercise
of prosecutorial discretion is likely to persist in the administration
of the federal death penalty. An amendment to the Attorney General's submission criteria cannot, by itself, make federal death penalty prosecutions uniform, because discretion over other aspects of
potential capital cases - case selection, charging, and plea dispositions - still resides almost entirely with individual federal prosecutors in the field. Such decisions are largely unregulated and
unreviewed with any specificity at Main Justice, even in capital
prosecutions. So long as unreviewed discretion can significantly influence the selection and disposition of federal capital cases, internal guidelines to assure that every possible death-eligible federal
case is submitted to Main Justice for review might improve, but not
entirely eliminate, disparity concerns.
As Professor Randall Kennedy has noted, "the institutional actors who have the most to do with the prevalence and incidence of
528. U.S. Attorneys do not participate in Main Justice debates only, or even primarily, through individual capital case reviews. Rather, the primary mechanism for
U.S. Attorney input is via the Attorney General's Advisory Committee ("AGAC") of
U.S. Attorneys. The AGAC is, in effect, a lobbying group of U.S. Attorneys within
Main Justice. If the capital case submission trigger for U.S. Attorneys is broadened,
the AGAC is sure to focus on the issue.
529. See infra note 574 and accompanying text (addressing the "level up" concern).
530. See infra notes 590-598.
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'
This is obviously true in light
capital sentences are prosecutors."531
of the basic fact that many criminal homicides are not charged as
death-eligible crimes, and most death-eligible crimes do not go to
verdict before a jury. Parsing notoriously vague national statistical
sources, Professor Hugo Bedau has estimated that only 13-25% of
people arrested for criminal homicide are even at risk for a death
sentence, and that over half of all persons convicted for criminal
homicide offenses plead guilty.53 2 It appears that less than 1% of
all persons arrested, and only about 2% of those convicted, on
criminal homicide charges actually receive a death penalty. 33 Federally, we know that of 418 cases reviewed by the DOJ since 1990
for potential death penalty filing, only 135 or about one-third were
authorized for such filing - clearly reflecting the exercise of some
prosecutorial discretion.534 Moreover, of the 135 federal death
penalty cases authorized between 1990 and January 1999, at least
forty-three (32%) were resolved by guilty pleas that avoided the

531. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 343
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW]. See also BEDAU 1997,

(1997) [hereinafter

4.1 (1993) (displaying the "estimated number of arrests, 1992");

BUREAU OF JUSTICE

supra note 14, at 32
(stating that "the prosecutor's decision" is responsible for a large portion of the
"enormous attrition" between criminal homicide arrests and death sentences actually
imposed); Bright, supra note 451, at 450 ("The most important decisions that may
determine whether the accused is sentenced to die are those made by the prosecutor."); Jordan, supra note 10, at 1111 (opining that "plea bargaining in capital cases is
a powerful factor in deciding who is ultimately put to death").
532. Professor Bedau estimates that of an average 15,000 annual arrests for "criminal homicide" - what the FBI labels "murder and non-negligent manslaughter" from 1984-1993, only 36% of the 10,000 persons annually convicted (and only about
20% of those arrested) were convicted by jury trial, and only between 2,000-4,000 are
"at risk for a death sentence in capital jurisdictions." BEDAU 1997, supra note 14, at
31-2.
533. BEDAU 1997 supra note 14, at 31-2. Professor Bedau notes that 250 "actual
death sentences" is the annual average for the period 1984-93, less than two-tenths of
1% of the roughly 15,000 persons annually arrested for criminal homicide offenses.
Id: Similarly, U.S. DOJ data for 1992 indicates that 22,100 persons were arrested
nationally for "murder and non-negligent homicide," 13,926 persons were prosecuted
for those offenses and 12,672 (90%)were convicted. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 418, Table
1995, Tables 5.18 & 5.63 (displaying the number of defendants prosecuted
in federal and state courts) and Tables 5.44 & 5.45 (displaying the number of defendants convicted in state and federal courts). Of the 12,672 persons convicted of homicide offenses in 1992, 265 or just over 2% received the death penalty. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1.992 1 (1993). It
is also notable that only 288 of these 12,672 criminal homicide prosecutions occurred
in federal courts, and that a far lesser percentage - 124 federal defendants, or less
than 50% - were convicted. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1995, supra, at
Tables 5.18 & 5.45.
534. See supra chart at p. 429.
STATISTICS,
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death penalty. 35 Clearly it is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that has the largest single impact on capital punishment in this

country.
The DOJ's internal regulations, including the capital case protocols, currently permit virtually all prosecutorial discretion over federal death penalty charging and plea-bargaining to be exercised in
the field, without prior Main Justice approval. There is no general
requirement that a U.S. Attorney obtain approval before "seeking
an indictment for an offense subject to the death penalty,"

although Main Justice consultation "is encouraged. 5 36 Similarly, a
"United States Attorney may approve any plea agreement" in a
federal death penalty case even after the Attorney General has authorized the death penalty, without "prior authority" from the Attorney General (however, an explanation must be provided later to
Main Justice).537 Such unapproved plea dispositions in capital
cases always avoid the death penalty. This independence at the
plea stage exists despite the anomalous fact that the Attorney General's approval for filing the death penalty notice in the first place
is required. 38
Finally, prosecutorial discretion exists in the federal system in a
way not precisely identical to state prosecutors' discretion: the discretion to decline accepting a case in favor of state prosecution.
Because many crimes are "dual jurisdiction," that is, chargeable
under some provision of state as well as federal criminal law, federal prosecutors frequently have the option of allowing a deatheligible murder case to "go stateside," meaning, forego a federal
prosecution in deference to state or local authorities who can prosecute the case as murder.539 In fact, the DOJ's death penalty protocols seem to suggest a preference for state prosecution in
535. See supra chart at p. 431. This percentage likely will increase, as 33 authorized
federal capital prosecutions were still awaiting disposition as of the date of that chart.
See id.
536. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.020. Some preindictment approval requirements do exist in other parts of the Manual, but they are
offense-specific and not restricted to capital prosecutions. See id. (18 U.S.C. § 1959
(indictments)); see also DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-2.400 (listing in
chart form the general "prior approval" requirements, not specific to capital cases).
537. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.100
538. See id. at § 9-10.020 (stating that "[t]he death penalty shall not be sought without the prior written authorization of the Attorney General"); see supra notes 374382.
539. See Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization,supra note 68, at 1034-35
(discussing exclusive and "dual" jurisdiction offenses). Exceptions would include
murders committed on federal enclaves, or on the high seas, or in a foreign country.
See id.
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potential federal capital cases: "Where concurrent jurisdiction exists with a State or local government, it is anticipated that a Federal
indictment for an offense subject to the death penalty will be obtained only when the Federal interest in the prosecution is more
540
substantial than the interests of the State or local authorities.
The United States Attorneys' Manual is explicit regarding the fact
that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to charge will normally go unreviewed: "[i]t is left to the judgment of the attorney
for the government ...
541
There are good and strong reasons to allow prosecutors broad
discretion in their case selection and charging decisions.5 42 Nevertheless, the ability to avoid accepting a potential death penalty case
based upon an unreviewed evaluation that the "interests" of state
officials in prosecuting are "more substantial" provides federal
prosecutors with a significant discretionary tool for avoiding capital
cases. So far as I know however, there is currently no Main Justice
review of decisions made by federal prosecutors not to charge at all
in a murder case.543
There is some general guidance in the United States Attorneys'
Manual about when federal prosecutors should, and should not,
exercise their federal charging power. First, the death penalty protocols provide some discussion of three factors ("not... an exhaustive list") relevant to determining which jurisdiction's interest in
540. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.070 (emphasis
added). This provision assumes that there is probable cause, as well as jurisdiction, to
bring the case in federal court. It builds upon the prosecutorial ethical proposition
that "[m]erely because [probable cause] can be met ... [it] does not automatically
warrant prosecution." Id. § 9-27.210(8); see also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
- Prosecution Function, § 3-3.9(b) ("The prosecutor is not obliged to present all
charges which the evidence might support.").
541. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-27.220B.
542. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) ("They have
this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President's delegates to
help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed'."); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("Such factors
as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall
enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake.").
543. Again, while a lack of federal jurisdiction may explain many U.S. Attorney
declination decisions, it does not explain them all. The Department of Justice Manual
does direct that when a federal prosecutor declines to prosecute, "the reasons therefore" should be "reflected in the office files," DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note
12, § 9-27.270A. However, in the author's experience, this direction is rarely observed. In any case, I am aware of no systematic process in the DOJ to gather and
systematically review such individual declination records, if they do in fact exist.
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prosecution, state or federal, is "more substantial." These factors,

however (and perhaps necessarily), are vague and manipulable in
the prosecutor's discretion.544 A somewhat more detailed discussion of "substantial federal interest" appears in the general "Principles of Federal Prosecution" section of the United States Attorneys'
Manual, which is applicable generally to the decision to indict in

any federal case. 545 This section discusses seven non-exhaustive
factors to consider, while three following sections discuss two other
possible reasons to decline to file federal charges and three flatly
"impermissible considerations. ' 546 Finally, the death penalty protocols make it clear that the fact that the death sentence might be
available if the case were charged federally, where the conduct occurs in a state that does not authorize capital punishment, is not
"alone" sufficient to establish a "more substantial" federal
interest.547

The DOJ deserves commendation for being willing to commit its
views regarding the exercise of prosecutorial charging discretion to
writing.548 The United States Attorneys' Manual provisions are
thoughtful and provide helpful guidance to new and experienced
federal prosecutors alike.549 Moreover, and perhaps contrary to
544. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.070 (subtitled "Substantial Federal Interest"), Section A (subtitled "The relative strength of the
state's interest in prosecution"), Section B (subtitled "The extent to which the criminal activity reached beyond the local jurisdiction") and Section C (subtitled "The relative ability and willingness of the State to prosecute effectively"). Only Section B
seems to provide relatively concrete and objective factors to consider.
545. DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-27.230.
546. Id. § 9-27.240 ("Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction"); id. § 9-27.250 ("NonCriminal Alternatives to Prosecution," which is plainly not relevant to most criminal
homicidal conduct); id. § 9-27.260 ("Impermissible Considerations": "(1) The person's
race, religion, sex, national origin, or political association, activities, or beliefs; (2) The
attorney's own personal feelings concerning the person, the person's associates, or the
victim; or (3) The possible effect of the decision on the attorney's own professional or
personal circumstances"). Id.
547. UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 10.070.
548. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 225 (1969) (recommending that prosecutors "make and ... announce rules. that will guide their choices,
stating as far as practicable what will and what will not be prosecuted, and they should
be required otherwise to structure their discretion."); see also Zacharias, supra note
475.
549. New prosecutors are hungry for guidance on the exercise of their new-found
powers, which is not taught in most law schools or civil practice settings, and perhaps
cannot be taught other than in the crucible of real prosecutorial decision-making. Experienced federal prosecutors can also benefit from reading (or re-reading) the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual,lest they become "lazy" or forgetful about the Manual's well-considered and surprisingly candid discussions. Indeed, I have often thought that a
"United States Attorneys' Manual Refresher Course" ought to be mandatory for all
federal prosecutors after three to five years of federal prosecutorial experience.
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the belief of some Department critics, most federal prosecutors do
read and try to implement in good faith the Manual's provisions. °
Criticisms offered here are intended not as condemnation but in a
constructive spirit.
i. Why Disuniformity and Skewed Samples Result in Federal
Death Penalty Administration
It must be recognized that the unreviewed ability of "field" federal prosecutors not to charge a homicide case federally unless the
State's interest in prosecuting can be said to be "less substantial,"
results not only in unreviewed lack of uniformity but also in a
skewed sample of potential capital cases that Main Justice reviews.
One need not assert prosecutorial "bad faith" to demonstrate this.
In a federal charging system that encompasses the entire country,
the decentralized good-faith exercise of discretion regarding capital
cases almost certainly yields skewed, non-uniform results.
The reason for this is simple: the federal prosecutorial system is
historically and self-consciously decentralized, and prosecutorial
attitudes around the country about capital cases vary as much as,
and to some extent in conjunction with, public attitudes regarding
the death penalty generally. As noted above, our nation's states
can be roughly divided into three groups regarding the death penalty: (1) those that support the death penalty and implement it vigorously; (2) those which authorize capital punishment but are
queasy regarding its implementation; and (3) those which do not
550. I have no empirical studies or systemic evidence to back up this assertion.
However, as a federal prosecutor for some eight years, I personally observed many
office discussions about how to exercise prosecutorial discretion that invoked, and
often centered on, provisions of the Manual. In addition, since October 1994, within
the DOJ, there has been a internal nationwide ethics training effort called the Professional Responsibility Officers ("PRO") program, initiated by Attorney General Janet
Reno and Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division) Jo Ann Harris, which has
produced an Ethics Manual containing discussion on dozens of difficult prosecutorial
discretion issues. The PRO Ethics Manual has been distributed to every Main Justice
Section and U.S. Attorney's office in the country (on file with the author). The PRO
program also provides a two-day intensive training session in Washington D.C. for
one or two attorneys from every office in the country on a semi-annual basis. The
PRO Ethics Manual and training program (in which I have been an instructor) is full
of references to the United States Attorneys' Manual. It is ill-informed and cynical to
assert that most federal prosecutors do not read the United States Attorneys' Manual.
Although, while it may be true that they do not read it often enough, this criticism can
be made of most lawyers and their governing codes of ethics. As a legal ethics instructor to many non-governmental Bar groups, I can report that most practicing lawyers admit that they have not read their jurisdiction's ethical rules within the last year.
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authorize capital punishment. 51 While one might argue about
which particular states that authorize the death penalty fall into
category one or two, a rough division of states - and of public
attitudes generally - into those "pro," "undecided," and "con" on
the death penalty seems clear.
Noting this diversity of public views, it may then reasonably be
hypothesized that lawyers selected by a state's Senators or Congresspersons to be a U.S. Attorney 52 will, by and large, reflect the
prevailing views of their state on capital punishment. This, of
course, will not be true in every case, and the political party affiliation of the appointing President may produce "swings" in U.S. Attorneys' views. 3 But, to hypothesize at the extremes of our
national capital punishment spectrum, one might expect U.S. Attorneys in Texas, where capital punishment is most often implemented, to more eagerly favor prosecution of capital cases than
would the U.S. Attorneys in some New England states.
If this hypothesis is true, then it is also likely true that the good
faith prosecutorial evaluation of what constitutes a proper and deserving federal death penalty case will vary between "pro" and
"con" districts. Of course, Congress has directed that the federal
death penalty be applied nationally, and the Attorney General has
required that all federal offenses "subject to the death penalty" be
submitted to Main Justice for a national "consistency" review.
Nevertheless, the federal death penalty statute requires a
'
prosecutorial belief that the federal death penalty is "justified,"554
and the DOJ protocols require a prosecutorial assertion that the
federal interest in prosecuting is "more substantial" than the

551. See supra note 491 (noting that 12 states do not authorize capital punishment
and another 16 seldom execute anyone). The other 22 states have carried out over
98% of the 510 executions since Furman.
552. It is true that U.S. Attorneys are nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate. However, with rare exception, candidates for the office are normally first
recommended by a U.S. Senator of their home State if the Senator is of the same
party as the President, or by the local congressional delegation of the President's
party if no such Senator is in office. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 375, at 36; Rickhoff,
supra note 452, at 513-14.
553. That is, in a state that favors the death penalty, a Democratic President might

be inclined to appoint an U.S. Attorney less in favor of the death penalty than the
general public, and the reverse might be true for a Republican President making appointments in an anti-death penalty state. Moreover, the entire issue must be kept in
perspective: a U.S. Attorney candidate's views on capital punishment will generally
not be the only, or even a primary, concern of the appointing parties.
554. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(1) (1994).
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state's. 55 If the cultural and community milieu and the prior legal

experiences of a U.S. Attorney and his or her assistants consists of
general support for capital punishment, these "trigger" assertions
may be more easily and frequently made, naturally and in good
faith. Conversely, when the local cultural milieu opposes capital
punishment and has undergone no (or little) local implementation
of the death penalty in a U.S. Attorney's professional lifetime, then
decisions not to charge potential death cases federally, or to prosecute them without death penalty exposure, may more easily and
frequently be made, in complete good faith.5 56
Current federal experience with administering a nationally applicable death penalty supports this hypothesis. The thirteen states
that most vigorously implement capital punishment 55 7 have submitted 154 potential capital cases to DOJ for review since 1995; the
twelve States that do not authorize capital punishment have submitted only thirty-nine review cases.55 8 Moreover, in forty-three of
555. UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.070. Some have
argued, in the capital context, that the assertion should be that the federal interest in
seeking the death penalty be "more substantial" than the state's. This is an intriguing
idea that could have significant impact on federal death penalty filings. However, it is
beyond the scope of this Article.
556. The hypothesized correlation between the State position on capital punishment and a U.S. Attorney's capital case decisions is by no means exact. For example,
it is entirely possible that a pro-death penalty U.S. Attorney in a pro-death penalty
State might still decline potential death penalty cases for resource reasons, comfortable that his or her state counterparts will seek death. My thanks to Professor Steven
Clymer for noting this point.
557. These are the 13 states that have executed 11 or more defendants since
Furman. See Executions of FederalPrisoners 1927-1998, supra note 111.
558. It must be noted, however, that 39 submissions from U.S. Attorneys in states
that do not even authorize capital punishment could be viewed as a remarkably high
and independent number. Of course, the data does not reveal what the U.S. Attorneys recommended - death or no death - in the cases submitted.
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the 154 cases submitted from the executing states, the death penalty was authorized (27%). But only four, or 10%, of the submissions from no-death-penalty states were authorized. This is
significant because the force with which a U.S. Attorney argues for,
or against, authorization of the death penalty can have a large effect on the Review Committee. 9 If U.S. Attorneys who are uneasy about capital punishment submit cases for review but then
argue forcefully against authorization, they can produce results in
mid-range cases 560 that are disparate from similar cases that are
forcefully advocated by other, more pro-capital punishment U.S.
Attorneys.
Even if the protocols were amended to require submission of
every federal case involving a killing, the lack of geographic and
substantive uniformity in federal death penalty administration
likely would not end, because federal prosecutors have discretion
to defer to state prosecution before a federal offense is ever
charged.561 Such declinations are unreviewed, as a general matter,
by Main Justice. If the foregoing hypothetical assumptions are accurate, federal prosecutors' discretionary power to decline potential death cases sometimes will be exercised, in a natural, goodfaith way, so as to skew federal declination decisions on a national
level. That is, more "death" cases are likely to be declined by federal prosecutors in anti-death penalty states than in pro-death
states. Thus, even .if all charged "federal offenses subject to the
death penalty" were reviewed at Main Justice, unreviewed federal
prosecutorial decisions not to charge in some death cases would
still likely reflect regional disparity.

"The 98 (sic) defendant difference between the number of cases submitted and the
number reviewed reflects cases that are currently pending review (39), cases in which
the defendant is a fugitive and review has been deferred (5), cases in which review has
been deferred pending the completion of state prosecution (3), cases handled under
pre-protocol procedure (11), a case in which the capital charge was withdrawn (1),
and cases in which the defendant plead guilty before the completion of review (39)."
Id.
559. See supra notes 397-398 and accompanying text.
560. See McClesky, 481 U.S., at 287 (1987) (noting that in the Baldus study,
"midrange" cases are those whose facts are neither extremely aggravated nor extremely benign). BALDUS ET AL., supra note 180, at 47-59 (describing development of
culpability categories), 399 ("racial effects occurred primarily in moderately aggravated, midrange cases in which the defendant's culpability was neither very high nor
very low.")
561. See supra notes 534-542 and accompanying text.
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ii. A Possible Study of Potential Federal Capital Cases
While recognizing disparity in the administration of the federal
death penalty and acknowledging the role that prosecutorial discretion plays in the phenomenon is an important step, it is not a
solution. And two preliminary objections can be raised. First, it
can be argued that de facto regional disparity in administration of
the death penalty should not be criticized normatively. Second,
even if greater national uniformity is desirable, few observers of
the criminal justice system believe that elimination of prosecutorial
discretion is a possible, let alone desirable, objective. Before proposing a modest program for the DOJ to assemble and study its
own capital case data, both these thoughts are briefly addressed.
As to the first contention, this Article rejects the "regional disparity is good" position as simply not within the current stated intentions of Congress or the DOJ for present purposes.562 Congress
has written a federal death penalty statute which is applicable nationally and contains no express suggestion or endorsement of regional disparities in its implementation. In addition, Congress has
set general federal sentencing policy to attempt to eliminate "unwarranted sentencing disparities" among similarly-situated federal
defendants.163 This supports the conclusion that regional disparity
in capital sentencing is not intended by Congress. Meanwhile, the
Attorney General's capital case protocols specify requirements for
"all Federal cases" without distinction and explicitly state one purpose of Main Justice review as "consistency.

'564

The very existence

of a centralized, national review system for federal capital cases
belies any conscious desire to foster or accept regional disparity.
Yet even if regional and substantive disparity in administering
the federal death penalty is to be condemned, there is little likelihood that all prosecutorial discretion can be eliminated, and good
reason to argue that it should not be. In McCleskey v. Kemp, the
Supreme Court described the role of prosecutorial discretion in the
criminal justice system as "fundamental," and Justice Blackmun,
even while dissenting, acknowledged that "prosecutors undoubtedly need discretion.

'565

Professors La Fave and Israel have noted

562. See supra notes 21, 425-447 and accompanying text.
563. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1994).
564. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 9-10.010, 9-10-080.
The other stated purpose is to promote "fairness," a term that is generally understood
to encompass (but not to be limited to) racial bias concerns. See id. § 9-10.080 ("fairness" goal is immediately followed by a direction that "bias ... based upon ...race or
ethnic origin may play no role" in the death penalty authorization decision).
565. 481 U.S. 279, 311, 363 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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that the idea that prosecutorial discretion can produce valued indi'5 66
vidualized justice is "firmly entrenched in American law.
Courts have defended the basic unreviewability of prosecutorial
discretion as "an incident of the constitutional separation of powers. ' ' 567 Even Professor Davis, while powerfully demonstrating the
point that "the power to be lenient is the power to discriminate,"
notes that "practicable" limitations on his suggested regime of'56ar8
ticulated standards for prosecutorial discretion "are essential.
But one need not propose elimination of prosecutorial discretion
in order to improve the current situation of regional disparity in
federal death penalty administration. I agree that elimination of all
prosecutorial discretion, even if possible, would likely create more
problems than it could solve. More modestly, I propose only a limited "tweek" of the present departmental system. That is, with regard only to potential capital cases, the Attorney General should
require reporting of all U.S. Attorney declinations of cases in which
a non-negligent killing has occurred, for the limited purpose of
studying national administration of the federal death penalty.
"Declination" should be construed broadly, to encompass all matters in which a member of a U.S. Attorney's office has discussion
with law enforcement officials (state, local, or federal) about such a
case. 569 The Department could then review such declination reports for consistency among the various U.S. Attorneys' capital
case declination standards. To reduce resistance, such a program
could be expressly temporary, say a two-year "experimental" study
program that would end once concerns about non-uniform capital
declination policies were resolved.
The goal of such a reporting requirement would be, at least initially, an experimental one. The hope would be to generate a truly
national universe of representative data on "like" potential federal
murder cases, and then to stimulate discussion at Main Justice and
among all U.S. Attorneys about appropriate standards for determining when to charge murder cases federally. Rather than silently submerging regional differences regarding charging
566. 2 WAYNE R. LA FAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a)
(1984).
567. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
935 (1965). In its most recent opinion on prosecutorial discretion, a majority of the
Supreme Court echoed this view when it described the prosecutorial charging power
as "a 'special province' of the Executive." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,
464 (1996) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
568. DAVIs, supra note 548, at 170, 225 n.28.
569. See supra notes 521-526 and accompanying text.

474

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI

standards in the unreviewed depths of declination decisions, the
initial goal of a broad DOJ study would be simply to determine if
such differences in fact exist and, if they do, to self-consciously expose them to the light of considered comparison and analysis. If,
after study and discussion, the DOJ remained committed to its currently policy of national capital case "consistency, 5 7° then specific,
national charging standards - for capital cases only - could be

developed and implemented with a broad system of Main Justice
review.5 7 1 On the other hand, the Department might decide to accept some degree of regional disuniformity - but it would do so
consciously, expressly, and after national (if internal) debate,
rather than silently as is presently the case.
Such a program of Main Justice study and review could be entirely internal, at least initially. Professor Zacharias has noted that
there are "good arguments" for allowing internal standards for the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to remain non-public. 7 2 An initial DOJ program to examine and discuss national standards for
the exercise of federal prosecutorial discretion in potential capital
cases could profit from the freedom in debate that confidentiality
can inspire. The Department should be permitted to alter its internal standards and study these difficult issues without public criticism fueled by the high emotions of the capital punishment debate.
If, after study, the Department decided to implement formal
changes in its United States Attorneys' Manual capital case policies,
it could then decide whether to seek some public comment before
acting in this sensitive area.
Even if no specific standards for federal charging of capital cases
were ultimately adopted, an explicit national dialogue within the
Department regarding the exercise of charging discretion for uniformly written federal criminal statutes would be beneficial. It
570. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.080.
571. Professor Kennedy has expressed skepticism about prosecutorial standards
that realistically "would compel, or even facilitate ... consistency." KENNEDY, RACE,
CRIME AND THE LAW supra note 531, at 343. More bleakly (but perhaps with tonguein-cheek), Professor William Wang has written that "criminal law is hopelessly arbitrary" and that "there is no way of learning how to improve the system." William K.S.
Wang, The Metaphysics of Punishment:An Exercise in Futility, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REV.
306, 330 (1976). The author is less skeptical, although he does recognize the inevitable indeterminacy and manipulability of language. See infra Part II.B.3. But in any
case, the more modest proposal suggested here is only that an experimental DOJ
study is worth the effort, even if it does not ultimately end inconsistent results, as
opposed to the inarticulate silence and consequent silent disparity that un-reviewed
discretion currently produces.
572. See Zacharias, supra note 475, at 1184-85.
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would enable U.S. Attorneys to consciously consider their role as
participants in a federal system, and to confront what differences
may, or may not, exist between that role and the role of a State
prosecutor. It is not at all a given that the proper role of a federal
U.S. Attorney in the federal criminal justice system is to act purely
as an autonomous representative of regional views.573 Indeed, the
past courageous role of some U.S. Attorneys in enforcing federal
civil rights laws in the face of local antipathy suggests a different,
nationalized conception of the federal prosecutor's role. Internal,
self-conscious analysis of the federal prosecutor's role in charging
potential capital cases, as opposed to the silence of declination discretion, could be a helpful step in considering more broadly what
unique elements comprise the role of a federal attorney "for the
United States."
Finally, some have argued that one response to review of
prosecutorial charging decisions in the capital context could be a
"leveling up" that results in more executions.574 In other words, if
regional uniformity were required in federal capital prosecutions,
one possible response could be to boost the number of capital cases
coming out of currently low-number Districts. For opponents of
capital punishment who might otherwise relish an opportunity to
articulate limits on prosecutorial discretion, this would be an unsettling result, and one that could engender an uncharacteristic timidity in advocacy. However, I join with Professor Kennedy in
believing that explicit recognition of the "obvious but repressed
fact" of disuniformity in capital sentencing is "an essential step toward creating a more decent and equitable administration of criminal law. ' 575 Fear of one possible, but not at all an inevitable,
response ought not deter conscientious federal scholars from confronting legal issues that otherwise plainly would be troublesome.
Moreover, if federal charging standards were to be formulated
and adopted on a basis of truly "national consensus," it is far from
obvious that the "level up" solution would result. Currently, it is
likely that the DOJ's standards for whether to authorize the filing
of a federal death penalty notice are being developed (in a com573. Cf. Richoff, supra note 452, at 504 (noting that a U.S. Attorney's "efforts to
respond to the needs of the local communities" can conflict with Main Justice efforts
"to execute a cohesive national policy").
574. See KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW, supra note 531, at 341, 344, 347
(noting the argument, not endorsing it); see also Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v.
Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388,
1433-34, 1436-38 (1988) (same) [hereinafter, Kennedy, Capital Punishment].
575. See KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW, supra note 531, at 348.

476

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI

mon-law way via decisions of the Capital Case Review Committee)
based on a skewed sample of cases submitted largely from "pro"
death penalty states.57 6 If U.S. Attorneys from "undecided" and
"con" states were compelled to participate in this ongoing conversation, rather than silently "opting out" as some of them may now
be doing by declining potential capital cases or not submitting
them for review, it seems likely that the overall standards for when
to charge federal cases as death penalty cases would rise. Higher,
more stringent standards would result because anti-death penalty
prosecutors, who are currently all but silent in the debate, would be
forced instead to actively participate in the development and implementation of national death penalty standards, because they
would know that their potential capital cases would actually be subjected to the resulting Main Justice standards. At the very least,
some compromise standards between the "pro" and "con" U.S. Attorneys would result, which presumably would be more stringent
that the standards being set de facto today by the skewed pool of
submissions. Indeed, if "lowest common denominator" capital
case standards were adopted - that is, standards that every U.S.
Attorney could accept - they would likely represent an even
higher standard for charging federal death penalty cases. The
likely result would be that while some federal capital cases not currently being charged might emerge from the "con" districts, an opposite number of currently charged capital cases from "pro"
districts would disappear, because they would fall below the newly
minted national charging standards. One can hardly predict
whether the final total number of federal capital prosecutions
would be lower or higher. But one can at least anticipate, with
approval, the prospect of a more nationally uniform federal death
penalty administration, with its basic prosecutorial premises expressly articulated rather than silently derived by default.
2.

The Disturbing Persistence of Racial Disparity

When the available statistics regarding the race of federal capital
defendants are added to general concerns of disparity in administration of the federal death penalty, a need for greater Main Justice
attention to the issues of prosecutorial discretion is evident.
The persistent presence of statistical racial disparity - if not outright race bias-in capital punishment administration almost cer576. See supra notes 485-493 and accompanying text.
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tainly produced Witherspoon577 and Coker,578 played a strong role
in Furman,579 was optimistically part of Gregg,58 0 and yet was recognized as unremitted a decade later in McCleskey.5 ' The set of
compromises that evolved over a decade to produce the 1994
FDPA was, at least in part, the product of a quarter-century of concern regarding race in capital punishment. Although opponents of
capital punishment still decry the new federal legislation,58 2 the
1994 FDPA was probably the best that could be accomplished,
within the prevailing constitutional limitations and political realities, to guide discretion unbiasedly and attempt to eliminate race as
a factor in federal capital cases. A strong congressional policy
against racial bias in capital sentencing was enacted into federal
law, and the new federal statute incorporated a number of protections not found in various state capital punishment laws, such as
express instructions to the jury not to consider race and mandatory
sworn jury declarations to that effect.583 Indeed, it was the supporters of capital punishment who criticized the 1994 federal legislation as too "pro-defendant" to be effective.584
577. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
578. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
579. See Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
580. See Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
581. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (noting that the NAACP filed a supportive brief
in Witherspoon); Coker, 433 U.S. at 585 (case briefed and argued by NAACP attorneys); see also JEFFRIES, supra note 128, at 437 (noting that the "explosive issue" of
race discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty was "lurking behind" Coker
and other death penalty challenges). In Furman, a number of Justices expressed their
concern about racial disparity. See 408 U.S. at 249-53 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring). In Gregg, the controlling Justices expressed optimism that the new, approved system would "escape the
infirmities which invalidated its previous system under Furman." See Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 222 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 206-07 (concluding that a system of
guided discretion and appellate review provides "assurance that the concerns that
prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any significant degree").
Yet, over a decade later in McCleskey, the Court assumed as "valid" the statistical
evidence of the Baldus study that race played a disparate role in the imposition of
capital punishment in Georgia, see 481 U.S. at 286-87, 291 n.7, and also that the Georgia State Legislature was aware of the racially discriminatory effect of the state's capital punishment system. Id. at 297-98. Cf. Furman, 408 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (contending that "standards of criminal justice have 'evolved'," and that
"[t]he possiblity of racial bias in the trial and sentencing process has diminished in
recent years"). Professor Jeffries reports that after Justice Powell retired, he changed
his mind regarding capital punishment and came "to think that capital punishment
should be abolished." JEFFRIES, supra note 128, at 451.
582. See generally Bright, supra note 451; Chemerinsky, supra note 218.
583. See Special Precaution To Ensure Against Discrimination, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f)
(Supp. 1998). See supra notes 214-218 and accompanying text.
584. See supra note 219.
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Subsequently, an Attorney General who is opposed to capital
punishment as a personal matter 585 and is the first in the postFurman generation to administer a general array of federal death
penalty statutes, has established a high-level death penalty review
system at Main Justice that is consciously race-blind. An express
goal of this review system is to ensure that "bias ... based on characteristics such as race or ethnic origin ...

play[s] no role in the

'586
decision whether to seek the death penalty.
Critics, however, are unimpressed. The fact that the Racial Justice Act was ultimately dropped from the three-bill package that
the House passed in 1994587 was a large defeat for advocates of
greater protections against racial bias. The Racial Justice Act
would have legislatively "overruled" McCleskey and made raciallydisparate capital punishment statistics actionable, although not dispositive.5 88 In contrast, critics find the anti-discrimination provi'
sions in the FDPA to be ineffective and "almost laughable."589
Meanwhile, despite the avowed goal of race-blind capital punishment administration, statistical race disparity persists in federal
death penalty prosecutions. The public statistics consist of a very
small sample, and they include pre-1995 cases filed under the 1988
CCE statute without race-blind DOJ review. Nevertheless, they
are disappointing to say the least.5 90 In terms of the end result,
thirteen of the twenty people currently on federal death row are
black, two others are non-Caucasian, and five are white. 591 This
65% African-American (75% minority) distribution is far worse
than the states' ethnic distribution for death row prisoners, which

585. See supra note 316 and accompanying text. In this sense Attorney General
Reno echoes Justice Powell, who wrote that while he would personally oppose capital
punishment legislation if he were a legislator, he could not vote to condemn it in his
role as a federal judge. JEFFRIES, supra note 128, at 451.
586. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.080.
587. See supra note 223 and accompanying text; Chemerinsky, supra note 218, at
529-30 (noting that although the Racial Justice Act had passed the House as part of
the larger crime bill, it would have caused a filibuster in the Senate and the Democratic administration ultimately agreed to its removal in order to secure passage of the
overall bill).
588. Chemerinsky, supra note 218, at 520, 530-31.
589. Bright, supra note 451, at 464 (describing the anti-discrimination provisions in

the federal death penalty statutes as "almost laughable").
590. Cf. id, at 434 (stating that despite "[niew capital punishment laws, supposedly
designed to prevent arbitrariness and discrimination,..., race and poverty continue
to determine who dies").
591. See Federal Death Row Prisoners,supra note 6.
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nationally as of December 31, 1997, was over 56% white (1,871 of
3,315).592

With regard to Main Justice authorizations for death penalty
prosecutions, the early data was not promising. In 1994 (prior to
Attorney General Reno's protocol and only a year into her tenure), the House Judiciary Committee reported that "of 36 defendants against whom a Federal death penalty has been sought since
1988, 4 defendants were white, 4 were Hispanic, and 28 were black.
All 9 of the defendants approved for capital prosecution in the past
year [presumably by Attorney General Reno but prior to establish593
ment of the review system] have been black.
More recently, filings in two federal court cases have revealed
similarly unbalanced DOJ authorization figures (although neither
court ultimately found impermissible race discrimination). 94 In
United States v. Heatley in the Southern District of New York, in
response to a court order, the Department revealed that of 296 defendants submitted for capital case review between January 27,
1995, and August 10, 1998, 55% were African-American and 80%
were non-white.595 Similar percentages resulted among the eightyone defendants actually authorized for death penalty prosecution:
57% were African-American and 72% were non-white.596 Since
the authorization process at Main Justice is race-blind, 97 it is not
surprising that the authorization figures roughly reflect the ethnicity percentages in submissions. This indicates, however, how vital
592. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1997, supra note 494, at 1.
593. H.R. REP. No. 103-458, at 3, 103rd Cong. 2d Sess. (March 24, 1994). With
regard to imposition of the death penalty nationally, both by state and federal courts,
the House Report concluded that "disturbing patterns [of racial disparity] are clearly
established." Id. at 2. It is important to note that while the Baldus study did not find
that race-of-defendant discrimination was statistically significant in Georgia, see
BALDUS ET AL:, supra note 180, at 185, other studies have reported that discrimination occurs along racial lines with regard to defendants as well as victims. See H.R.
REP. 103-458, at 3; 1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 180, at 6 (of the 28 studies it
reviewed, "more than half... found that the race of the defendant influenced the
likelihood of being charged with a capital crime or receiving the death penalty"); see
also SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 53 (1989).
594. See United States v. Holloway, No 3:96-00004 (M.D. Tenn.), Memorandum
Op., Dec. 3, 1998, in reported in 64 CRIM. L. RPTR. 231 (BNA, Dec. 23, 1998); Letter
from Joseph S. Uberman, DOJ Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Section, to Assistant
U.S. Attorney Andrew S. Dember (Aug. 13, 1998) filed in United States v. Heatley,
No. 511-96-CR-515 (ss) (transmitting data).
595. See Letter from Joseph S. Uberman, supra note 594.
596. Id.
597. See infra notes 344-347.
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it is to examine the submission standards for DOJ capital case
review.
In United States v. Holloway, a federal death penalty prosecution
in Nashvillle, Tennessee, an attorney for the Federal Death Penalty
Resource Center filed an affidavit reciting similar figures for Main
Justice authorizations over a longer period, spanning at least three
Attorneys General. Of the 133 defendants authorized for federal
death penalty prosecution over the decade from 1988 (when the
CCE procedures were enacted) to October 1998, 59% were African-American and 76% were non-white.598
Of course, after McClesky such statistical data, by itself, cannot
prove intentional race discrimination in the capital context.599
Moreover, because the authorizing officials at Main Justice are unaware of race when they decide, intentional race discrimination in
that process would seem impossible. Finally, much additional data,
including race of victims and the specific facts of each submitted
case, would have to be examined before even tentative conclusions
regarding the selection of federal capital defendants could be
made.
Nevertheless, the bare statistics are disturbing. Far more black
than white defendants are being submitted for DOJ capital case
review and are being authorized for capital prosecution. Over
three-quarters of the residents on federal death row are non-white.
Statistics like these have led Stephen Bright to opine that "[t]he
United States DOJ, which might be expected to be concerned

598. Affidavit of Kevin McNally (Oct. 14, 1998) filed in Holloway. The numbers
recited by McNally (which are not official DOJ figures but which the government did
not dispute in Holloway) were 78 African-American defendants, 32 Caucasian, 17
Hispanic and six Asian or Indian. Id. Gender is also identified in this affidavit, and
there appears to have been only one woman authorized for federal death penalty
prosecution since 1988, Tamara Llamas in the Eastern District of North Carolina, in
1997. Interestingly, the white defendant in Holloway was arguing that because the
Department of Justice has been publically criticized for the high percentage of African-American capital authorizations, "the government is selecting whites for death
penalty prosecution" at higher rates than blacks "in order to appease congressional
concerns ...[,] eliminate the clearly skewed racial pattern ...[and] even the numbers." Holloway, Supplemental Submission of Defendant, at 4 (Nov. 5, 1998). As
noted, the district judge in Holloway rejected this claim, finding that no "similarly
situated" federal capital cases had been shown and that no evidence of discriminatory
intent had been proffered. See 64 CRIM. L. RVTR. 231 (BNA, 1998).
599. See 481 U.S. at 243-47, 308, 312-13.
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about racial discrimination in the courts... is now one of the worst
offenders in the discriminatory use of the death penalty."6 0
Tangentially, it is interesting to note that it was not always this
way. Of the thirty-four federal prisoners actually executed from
1927 through the last federal execution in 1963, twenty-seven, or
79%, were white.60 1 This cannot be entirely explained by the
"white collar" character of federal crimes; while eight of the thirtyfour federal executions were for acts of wartime sabotage or espionage, the others were largely for murder, rape or kidnapping, all
violent and normally "dual jurisdiction" state crimes.60 2 Further
study of the history of the federal death penalty administration
before Furman might prove interesting.
The post-1988 federal statistics surely constitute far too small a
sample, not to mention one that is unanalyzed for myriad variables,
to support anything other than an anecdotal "feel" for how the federal penalty is being administered. Nevertheless, two assertions
about the federal statistics can be made with confidence: (1) because the centralized review process is "race blind," we know that
the Main Justice death penalty authorizationdecisions are not motivated by race bias,60 3 and (2) the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp renders the statistics virtually irrelevant at the
constitutional level. 60 4 Although the emerging federal statistics are
600. Bright, supra note 451, at 466. This charge is extreme and, to the extent it
suggests the DOJ is not concerned, inaccurate. But the public perception, like the
data itself, cannot be ignored.
601. Executions of FederalPrisoners1927-1998, supra note 111. Three of the federally executed were black, two were American Indian, and one was of unknown race.
Two (Ethyl Rosenberg and Bonnie Heady, both executed in 1953) were female. See
id.
602. Some of these crimes were committed in exclusively federal jurisdiction locations (high seas, Indian reservations) and some were murders of federal officials,
often viewed as appropriate for federal prosecution. Id. See also supra note 458 (noting arguably stronger federal interest in prosecuting murderers of federal officials).
But while these facts may explain why the cases were charged federally, they bear no
obvious relation to racial identity.
603. Although I can personally report confronting an odd, unconscious race concern of my own while serving on the Committee. In one particular case, I experienced
a sense of relief upon learning, after authorizing a death penalty prosecution, that the
defendant was white. It was then that I realized that some portion of my own uneasiness about authorizing the penalty in that particular case (from a border state) arose
out of a fear that the defendant was black and possibly the victim of some racial bias.
This is race-consciousness, however benign. (I should note, however, that the bulk of
my uneasiness in this particular case was a factual concern that the aggravating factors
being proposed were not firmly made out on the facts.).
604. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297 (holding that an "inference from the [statistical] disparities" is "clearly insufficient"); id. at 299 (holding that an "inference from
the [statistical] disparities" does not prove "discriminatory purpose"); id. at 313 (stat-
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not inconsistent with Baldus' and others' data, °5 after McCleskey a
purely statistical demonstration of racial disparity in the imposition
of capital punishment is relegated to the realm of "disturbing but
60 6
not unconstitutional.
Others have eloquently presented critiques of McCleskey,
although not always criticizing its result. For instance, Professor
Kennedy has described the Court's decision as a "failure of will"
and noted that the Court "could have decided differently" based
on available precedents.60 7 Critical of all the opinions in the case,
he describes the majority's as "the worst of the lot. ' 608 Stephen
Bright has more vehemently described McCleskey as a "badge of
shame upon America's system of justice," deserving "universal and
scathing criticism. "609 More recently, Professors Evan Lee and
Ash Bhagwat have written that McCleskey's "reasoning reflects a
profound misunderstanding of the nature of statistical evidence
ing that "the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of
racial bias .... ). Accord BALDUS ET AL., supra note 180, at 408 (stating that McCleskey "limit[s] the usefulness of statistical evidence").
605. See generally BALDUS ET AL., supra note 180.
606. This description is my own; cf. GRoss & MAURO, supra note 593, at 212 ("The
central message of the McCleskey case is all too plain: de facto racial discrimination in
capital sentencing is legal in the United States ... [and] even the most conservative
reading [of the decision] ... is extremely disturbing."). "Disturbing but not unconstitutional" is not an uncommon legal position. Rather, it reflects descriptions that some
would offer of many of the aspects of the criminal justice system that are bounded
only by the "floor" of indeterminate constitutional phrases such as "due process" or
"equal protection." See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)
(holding that police car chases that are reckless and ultimately fatal do not "shock the
conscience" so as to violate due process); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (limiting right to counsel to post-charge proceedings); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966) (permitting compelled drawing of blood). Legislatures are free to raise the
constitutional floor in such areas - the Racial Justice Act would constitute such a
floor-raising - but courts may not independently enact more restrictive policy views.
As the Court noted in McCleskey, "there is no limiting principle to the type of
challenge brought by McCleskey," and his "claim, taken to its logical conclusion,
throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice
system." 481 U.S. at 318, 314-15. Rather than open the door (some would say floodgates) to such disturbing issues, the Court simply noted that the death penalty has
been accepted by the Court and the political majority, and ruled that "the Constitution does not 'plac[e] totally unrealistic conditions on its use'." Id. at 319 (brackets in
original) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50). But this is simply ipse dixit reasoning,
no matter how sensible it may seem to many. Concluding that "McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies" simply states, rather than explains,
the decision. Id. at 319. The McCleskey Court simply seemed unwilling to interfere
with the administration of a popular, persistent, and historically well-accepted punishment, no matter how disturbing the equally persistent racial disparities may be.
607. KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW, supra note 531, at 339-40.
608. Id. at 335.
609. Bright, supra note 451, at 480.
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and of discretion.

'6 10

Rather than repeat existing critiques, I seek

here to contribute only two modest thoughts: first, to endorse and
enlarge upon Professor Kennedy's insight that unconscious "empathy" may underlie much of the statistical racial disparities, 611 and
second, to suggest again that wider review and more explicit, probing discussion of potential capital cases at Main Justice might yield
a more racially-neutral federal death penalty process.
In grappling with what he describes as "the McCleskey problem"
in his book, Race, Crime and the Law,612 Professor Kennedy does
not accuse the criminal justice system of overt or conscious racial
discrimination. Rather, in a brief discussion at the end of his death
penalty chapter, Professor Kennedy uses the phrase "willful blindness" to describe the unintentional, unconscious, empathetic reaction of white prosecutors (among others) to perpetrators and
victims of crime.613 Noting that many jurisdictions are "dominated
by whites" in criminal justice decision-making positions,614 he asserts that "in a substantial (albeit hard to specify) number of instances, individuals in America - police and prosecutors, judges
and jurors, editors and readers - react more to the murder of
white than black persons. "615 He invokes the concept of "empa610. Ashutosh Bhagwat & Evan Tsen Lee, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying
ProsecutorialDiscriminationAgainst Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 S. CT.
REV. 111, 122. See also Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination:The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997); Theordore Eisenberg & Sheri
Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989); Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be
Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420 (1988).
611. See KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW, supra note 531, at 347, 349.
612. Id.
613. Id. at 348. In his earlier work, from which this chapter is derived, Professor
Kennedy expressly noted Paul Brest's influential Article, infra note 620, as the foundation for his own thought. Id. at 147. See also Kennedy, Capital Punishment,supra
note 574, at 1420.
614. KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW, supra note 531, at 349; accord, Bright,
supra note 451, at 449-50.
615. KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW, supra note 531, at 348. This observation has roots in, among other sources, an Article published by Kennedy's former
Harvard colleague, Professor Derrick Bell, over 20 years earlier. See Derrick A. Bell,
Jr., Racism in American Courts: Cause for Black Disruption or Despair? 61 CAL. L.
REV. 165 (1973). Ten years later, two psychologists credited Bell with the observation
that "the lack of similarity between the attitudes of [criminal] defendants and those of
other participants in the criminal justice system may be the most influential factor in
the treatment of black defendants." Francis C. Dane & Lawrence S. Wrightsman,
Effects of Defendants' and Victims' Characteristicson Jurors' Verdicts, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM

1982).

83, 107 (Norbert L. Kerr and Robert M. Bray eds.,

484

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI

thy" twice and notes that the phenomenon is not confined to race
relations.616 Rather, says Professor Kennedy, all humans evaluate
"human life according to clannish criteria:" people we know, people from our local community, people from "our side" or our team
or our state are, without reason other than their relative familiarity
to us, valued over strangers.617
Unconscious racial identification with white defendants and/or
victims by white prosecutors, judges and jurors, and a concomitant
failure to identify or empathize with strangers from other racial
groups, is not purposeful, immoral, or bad faith race discrimination. Rather it is, in Kennedy's words, "a universal dilemma in
'
human relations."618
Professor Kennedy appears to seek to diffuse
the accusatory rhetoric of labeling unconscious race empathy as
"bias," discrimination, or racism, all of which bear connotations of
bad faith. Explicit recognition of a more benign and unconscious,
if just as insidious, phenomenon would, Professor Kennedy concludes, "facilitate a more candid discussion" of the influence of
race in administration of the death penalty and help us "change the
'619
realities of racial sentiment in American life.
I propose to call this phenomenon "unconscious racial empathy." Professor Kennedy is not the first to note this phenomenon
or to rely on it to explain persistent race disparities in capital punishment. Professor Charles Lawrence seminally advanced the concept in a 1986 article, 620 and others have followed his insights
(whether consciously or not).621 In fact, the Baldus study clearly
616. KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW, supra note 531, at 347-48 (noting that
"authorities do respond with less vigor and empathy to black-victim homicides"); see
also id. at 349 ("It should come as no surprise .. .that ... officials respond more
empathetically to white than black victims of crime.").
617. Id. at 349-50.
618. Id. at 350.
619. Id.
620. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). Professor Lawrence credits
Richard Wasserstrom for explicating a similar concept a decade earlier. See id. at 34243 (citing Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 599 (1977)). See also Paul Brest,
Foreword: In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8
(1976) (defining "racially selective sympathy and indifference" as an "unconscious
failure to extend to a minority the same.., sympathy and care given ... to one's own
group"). See generally Martha Minow, Forward:Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 10 (1987) (examining conscious and unconscious uses of "differences" in much
constitutional analysis).
621. See, e.g., Bhagwat & Lee, supra note 610, at 120-21, 155 ("Most prosecutorial
discrimination ...is probably unconscious"); David Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and
Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (1995) (asserting an "unconscious ra-
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adverts to the phenomenon of unconscious
racial empathy among
622
prosecutors, although only in passing.
I want to echo and underscore two aspects of Professor Kennedy's discussion. First, explicit, purposeful race discrimination is
seldom, if ever, seen in the federal prosecutorial ranks, even behind closed doors and even in those states where it might stereotypically be expected. I have never seen it during eight years as a
federal prosecutor, including during intensive litigation instruction
of federal prosecutors from virtually every state in the Union.62 3
Because it is more accurate and also because it decreases the accusatory tone of the debate, an explicit recognition that race bias can
be subtle and entirely unconscious would be an extremely useful
step forward in addressing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
in the criminal justice system.624
Second, and in some contrast, I think Professor Kennedy is entirely correct that the psychological phenomena of "empathy" unconscious racial identification - can explain much of the race
disparity in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that he and the
cism on the part of Congress" in setting crack cocaine penalties) and 1307 ("The danger of unconscious racism"); Bright, supra note 451, at 436-38, 451-52; Carter, supra
note 610, at 442-44 (noting the "unconscious racialism that pervades the criminal justice system.").
622. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 179, at 66, 79 n.59 ("prosecutors and jurors...
influenced by race . . . are in most cases probably quite unaware of the
connection ..... )
623. Accord Sklansky, supra note 621, at 1289 n.29 ("I saw no evidence of race
affecting charging decisions during my tenure as a federal prosecutor."). Of course,
not seeing it does not mean it doesn't exist; but it supports the idea that racial bias is
either hidden or unconscious (or both). My experience as an instructor of federal
prosecutors has occurred through the DOJ's "Attorney General's Advocacy Institute," which draws federal prosecutors from every district in the country to Washington for programs taught by knowledgeable federal prosecutors. It has included
instruction in advocacy techniques, where race bias might be thought likely to be exhibited; and the instruction programs are closed to non-Departmental employees, so
that prosecutors might feel "safe" exhibiting bias. It is also a reality that most of the
Assistant U.S. Attorneys I have instructed have been white, and that the AGAI
courses include a certain amount of relaxed nighttime socializing - again, facts that
might lead race bias if present to manifest itself. I repeat: I have not seen it.
624. Professors Bhagwat and Lee "concede it may be controversial to use the word
'racism' to describe such unconscious racially influenced behavior," but they pass the
issue, saying that "[t]erminology... is beside the point." Bhagwat & Lee, supra note
610, at 120 n.34. Terminology may well have been beside the point of their article, but
I think it very much to the point in the debate regarding how to address persistent
race disparities in the administration of capital punishment. We must be thoughtful in
our use of language if we seek actually to influence courts, prosecutors, and other
criminal justice decisionmakers who may take umbrage at more accusatory labels
(particularly when they are also inaccurate descriptors).
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Baldus studies believe to exist. 625 "Empathy" has its origins in the
Greek "en pathos," meaning "in suffering," and is a well recognized psychological phenomenon of "imaginative projection of
one's own consciousness into another being.

' 62 6

It is similar to

other familiar phenomena, such as personal "identification" with
other people who are similar to oneself, or "sympathy" for other
people by "imagin[ing] oneself in the sufferer's predicament. '627
Psychological literature is rich with accepted demonstrations of the
intuitive knowledge that persons identify with and empathize with
other persons "like" them or from their community.62 8 Identification and empathy with one's own racial group - and concomitant
difficulty in empathizing or identifying with racial groups or cultures not one's own - are concepts so well established they might
be described as basic premises of human nature. 62 9 Indeed, one
body of legal literature is broadly premised on acceptance of the
concept of empathy: jury selection and the bedrock belief that jurors will identify and sympathize with persons like them, so that
63 °
advocates should consciously try to pick jurors "like" their client.
625. See KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW, supra note 531, at 343, 331, 349.
626. WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. unabridged 1954). Rather than
further burden this Article with massive citations to literature discussing empathy,
reference to the wealth of material found in Professor Lynne N. Henderson's comprehensive article should be made by the interested reader. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1578-87 (1987). Also relevant here is
Professor Henderson's statement that she "cannot empathize totally with the pain of
blacks ... because I am white." Id. at 1585. She also describes "'unreflective' empathy" a concept similar to that described in the text. Id. at 1584.
627. Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment. A PsychologicalAnalysis,
65 TENN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997); Douglas 0. Linder, Juror.Empathy and Race, 63 TENN.
L. REV. 887, 890 (1996) (noting that empathy is distinguisfi'ed from sympathy although
it is a "necessary precondition").
628. Professor Lawrence provides a wealth of psychological as well as intuitive discussion to support the concept of unconscious racism. See Lawrence, supra note 620,
at 328-44; accord Henderson, supra note 626.
629. This is not to say, however, that persons are unable to empathize with members of other races or cultures. In fact, cross-cultural and cross-racial empathy is well
recognized. See Linder, supra note 627, at 890. The weaker, albeit still significant,
point is that people are more likely to empathize with others from their own group
than with persons who are different, if a choice must be made (as it must be in multiracial homicide cases).
630. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 194 (1966,
Phoenix ed. 1971) (stating that "[i]n many instances the jury reaction ... rests on
empathy of one human being to another"). Indeed, this phenomena plainly underlies
the long-standing practice - now constitutionally condemned, ironically so in contrast to McCleskey - of seeking to strike potential jurors of the defendant's race (by
prosecutors) or not of the defendant's race (by defense counsel). See Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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Acceptance of a concept of unconscious racial empathy gives
new meaning to Kenneth Culp Davis' famous observation that "the
power to be lenient is the power to discriminate. '63 1 For it is in the
exercise of leniency that prosecutors produce racially disparate
capital punishment statistics. Not filing capital charges and accepting non-death guilty pleas are beneficent acts in the minds of
prosecutors. By declining to charge, or accepting pleas from, white
males they can identify with,632 or by aggressively pursuing capital
charges when the victim is white, white prosecutors act not out of
bad motive but rather from benign, understandable human feelings
of empathy. But meanwhile, minority defendants and victims do
not benefit as often from such discretionary acts flowing from empathy. There is no conscious discrimination here * but the inevitable result is like asking volunteers for the death penalty to step
forward, and then helping the whites to take one step back.633 Left
standing and exposed are black defendants and victims. In this
manner, racial disparities such as those detected by Baldus and
other studies 634 are created without a hint of the "purposeful discrimination" that the McCleskey court held to be a constitutional
sine qua non.635
631. DAVIS, supra note 548, at 170.
632. Because women are generally absent from the class of capital defendants, except in rare and usually very aggravated cases, I assume a male death-eligible defendant in text.
633. Indeed, a stark example of unconscious racial empathy, while of course possibly explicable by other factors, could be the differing results in McCullah and Jones.
In both cases the appellate courts found that the jury had improperly been allowed to
consider impermissible, duplicative aggravating factors. Yet the McCullah court, addressing a white defendant, vacated the death sentence, while in Jones, where the
defendant was black, the courtaffirmed the death sentence and found the error to be
"harmless." Interestingl , neither court mentioned the defendant's race - it was not
(consciously) relevant to the legal issues. The race of the defendants is revealed in the
Death Penalty Information Center's data, see Federal Death Row Prisoners,supra
note 6.
634. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 180, at 280-305 (discussing other studies);
Bhagwat & Lee, supra note 610, at 114 n.11 (noting other studies); 1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 180, at 5. The phenomenon of unconscious racial empathy is also
consistent with my own anecdotal observations as a federal prosecutor.
635. 481 U.S. at 292, 298-99. See Linder, supra note 627, at 893 ("Empathy may...
explain the persistence of racism."). The majority opinion in McCleskey readily acknowledged that, "[o]f course, the power to be lenient is the power to discriminate."
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312 (quoting DAvis, supra note 548, at 170). But without
further analysis, the Court then noted only that "a capital punishment system that did
not allow for discretionary acts of leniency 'would be totally alien to our notions of
criminal justice."' Id. at 312 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 200 n.50.) The Court said
nothing more on this point. Yet 15 pages earlier, the Court had conceded that if
statistics showed a 100% correlation between race and discretionary prosecutorial relief in capital cases, the Court would grant constitutional relief: it simply demanded
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Recognition of a concept of unconscious racial empathy can help
to explain not only racial disparities in capital punishment, but also
the intriguing point noted by Baldus that there is no significant racial disparity in homicide cases that are ranked as most culpable or
most aggravated, nor with respect to those ranked as least aggravated (although still death-eligible). That is, prosecutors and juries
make consistent choices between life and death in such "low-end"
and "high-end" cases "regardless of racial factors.

'636

This demon-

strates that unconscious racial empathy may be a strong, but not
overwhelming, force. When facts in aggravation, or their absence,
are clear and extreme, prosecutors and juries acting in good faith
can see beyond their incipient racial identification impulses to the
clarity of the correct result. However, in "close" cases, when facts
in aggravation or mitigation leave fact finders as uncertain (either
because the facts are not extreme or because competing factors tug
forcefully in both directions),637 unconscious empathy with samerace defendants or victims, or a failure to empathize with different"exceptionally clear proof" before "infer[ing] that [prosecutorial] discretion has been
abused." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297. Thus, in fact, direct evidence of "purpose" is
not demanded in McCleskey, but rather only "the clearest [inferential] proof." Why
such a high proof standard was imposed here, as opposed to other important social
contexts, was not further developed. The Court, however, seemed to lack the psychological explanation of the inferential link that empathy can provide between acts of
leniency and race discrimination. Indeed, the fact that these two passages occurred 15
pages apart in the Court's opinion is one indication of how unlinked they were in the
Court's perception of the case. But if the power and commonality of racial empathy
is accepted, it can provide persuasive evidence that racial bias is at work. Accord
Bahgwat & Lee, supra note 610, at 117-21 (arguing that "purpose" must mean "causation" in the Equal Protection context and that, so understood, it was well proven in
McCleskey).
A rather stunning discovery after the opening of Justice Marshall's papers in 1993
provides an ironic denouement to McCleskey. See Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the
Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies From the Perspective of Justice Antonin
Scalia's McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1036 (1994). In an internal
memorandum to the Court regarding the McCleskey case, Justice Scalia wrote that "it
is my view that unconscious operation of irrationalsympathies and antipathies,including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this Court, and ineradicable." See Chemerinsky, supra note
218, at 528 (quoting the memorandum in full) (emphasis added). When this view is
added to those of the four McCleskey dissenters, it appears that a majority of the
Court agreed that race discrimination had been proven by McCleskey. But in the
published disposition, Justice Scalia ultimately remained silent. The irony of the
Court's rejection of McCleskey's claim on the ground that discriminatory "purpose"
was not proved is stinging.
636. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 180, at 144.
637. Baldus and his associates call such cases "midrange" cases, because they fall in
the middle ranges of their various culpability indices. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note
180, at 85-96, 401-02.
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race defendants or victims, can make the difference. Thus the fact
that, in Professor Baldus' words, "patterns of racial disparity" manifest themselves "primarily in cases in the mid-aggravation
range ' 638 can be explained not only by the classic "liberation hypothesis" of Professors Kalven and Zeissel, 639 but also by the phenomena of unconscious racial empathy.64 °
Turning back, now, to the administration of the federal death
penalty, the question becomes what can the DOJ do to guard
against the unintentional, yet insidious, effects that unconscious racial empathy may have on the exercise of federal prosecutors' discretion in capital cases. Again, an initial answer would seem to lie
in the direction of broader review of potential capital cases, declinations, and plea bargains, 641 as well as development of specific,
racially-neutral standards for the filing of federal death penalty
charges. The Attorney General and her protocols are avowedly
concerned that racial factors play "no role" in federal death penalty decision making.642 But if unconscious racial empathy is affecting decisions in the field to decline or accept certain murder
cases as federal cases, or to later accept non-death pleas or not,
Main Justice reviewers must be aware of the entire universe of
cases in which such unconscious effects might manifest themselves
before they can address them.64 3
Again, a temporary, experimental study founded on expanding
the category of required Main Justice submissions to all potential
federal capital cases could prove useful.644 This would include all
charged cases in which a death resulted, as well as all declinations
of such cases. After review of all such cases over a sufficiently long
period, the Department could attempt to develop race-neutral
638. Id. at 145.

639. Id. at 145, 403; see KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 627, at 164-67 (When the
evidence is close, "[tlhe closeness of the evidence makes it possible for the jury to
respond to ...sentiment by liberating it from ... the evidence;" "doubts about the
evidence free the jury to follow sentiment.") (emphasis in original).
640. Or less grandiosely, the concept of unconscious racial empathy advanced here
and by Professor Kennedy is merely a different way of describing Kalven and Zeisel's
hypothesis. See supra note 630 (noting that Kalven and Zeisel discuss juror empathy).
641. See supra notes 375-77 and accompanying text.
642. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.080.
643. Again, it must be noted that the Department can do nothing to control such
influences on other actors, such as judges and jurors, in the system. Thus racially
disparate statistics might still result no matter how race-neutral the decisions of federal prosecutors are.
644. See infra Part II.B.2.
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evaluative standards.645 Whether manageable, specific, and useful
linguistic death penalty standards can ever be developed is debatable; I briefly examine that issue below.6 4 6 Surely the effort would
be difficult, resource intensive, and for the DOJ, unprecedented.
Yet the initial race statistics generated by the Department's efforts
to administer the new federal death penalty without bias - 76% of
its death penalty authorizations and fifteen of twenty federal death
row occupants are non-white - are discouraging. For an Attorney
General committed to the concept of racial equality in the justice
system, and a Congress that endorsed a bias-free capital punishment system when it enacted the FDPA, the cost and effort of at
least an experimental program to attempt broad case review and
development of specific capital case standards ought to be worth it,
even if success is not guaranteed.
3.

The Inevitable Manipulability of Language

Aside from uneven submissions and racially disparate results, a
final problem I observed while serving on the Attorney General's
Capital Case Review Committee turns on the inevitable manipulability of linguistic standards. By this I mean that so long as the
selection process for which murderers live and die depends on application of written "narrowing" factors, the selection process will
remain somewhat arbitrary because all language can be manipulated by talented lawyers. For example, "especially heinous," even
'
if defined as involving "serious physical abuse," 647
can be made by
skillful employment of language to apply, or not, to virtually any
intentional killing. Similarly, creative writing can make almost any
murder seem committed "for pecuniary gain," depending on how
far the inferential chain of motivations is permitted to reach. Thus
written capital punishment standards are "different in different
men," which
is what Lord Camden described as "the law of
648
tyrants.
645. One possible way to begin to do this would be to ask hundreds of federal
prosecutors across the country to respond to race-neutral (and also racially mixed)
capital charging and bargaining hypotheticals. Another would be to ask U.S. Attorneys from around the country to comment on drafts of specific, race neutral, capitalcharging standards, in the factual context of real cases that the Department has
reviewed.
646. See infra Part II.B.3.
647. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6) (Supp. II 1996).
648. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 285 (Brennan J., dissenting) (quoting
Hinson and Kersey, in 8 HOUSTON's LAW OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITs 57).
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The semantic manipulability problem is not one for which I have
an easy solution. Nor do I believe that it renders all capital punishment unconstitutional.649 Instead, committed policymakers must
continue to attempt drafting precise linguistic standards that capture highly aggravated murders but do not unintentionally absorb
other non-aggravated, but graphically described, killings. Concrete
experience in applying the linguistic aggravating factors written by
Congress in the FDPA persuades me that language manipulability
is a problem that should be openly recognized and discussed,
rather than embarrassedly ignored. The Attorney General's Review Committee necessarily attempts to regularize the manipulation of statutory standards by its prosecutors, and thus (whether
consciously or not) Main Justice becomes the articulator of specific
national death penalty policies within Congress's more general language. 650 Because of the manipulability problem, institutional interpreters of capital punishment statutes like the DOJ must selfconsciously struggle to articulate more and more specific interpretive standards.
By way of background, as a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Furman and Gregg, present-day capital sentencing statutes
depend upon written "narrowing" standards. Prior to Furman,
most jurisdictions provided little or no guidance to jurors about
how to distinguish convicted defendants who should die from those
who might instead receive imprisonment terms. 651 Rather, capital
juries were typically told "you are entirely free to act according to
your own judgment, conscience, and absolute discretion. '652 A
century ago, the Supreme Court affirmed this practice with regard
to the federal death, penalty statutes then in place. 653 Despite repeated challenges'to standardless capital sentencing and the American Law Ifistitute's promulgation of recommended written
649. Accord, Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 473-74 (1993).
650. Professor Dan Kahan has made a similar point regarding federal prosecutors'
concrete application of general statutory language, and he recommends that this common law interpretive role be self-consciously transferred to the DOJ, rather than allowing it to be exercised more randomly by individual federal prosecutors around the
country. See Kahan, supra note 375, at 489-90.
651. See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 202-03 (stating that despite recommendation from
the American Law Institute that capital sentencing discretion should be guided by
written standards, "[n]one of the States have followed the Model Penal Code and
adopted statutory criteria for imposition of the death penalty.").

652. Id. at 189-90 (quoting from the jury instructions given in McGautha's case).
653. See Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 312-13 (1899) (upholding 1897
statute which allowed jury in most capital cases to qualify their guilty verdict by adding "without capital punishment"); see supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
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standards in 1959, state and federal appellate courts uniformly rejected a constitutional need for definition.654
In Furman, of course, the Court set out on a new path, striking
down standardless capital sentencing statutes because they produced random, arbitrary, and discriminatory results. There was
"no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which
[death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. ' 65 5 The
swift reaction of thirty-five states was to reenact death penalty statutes that responded to Furman's concerns.656 Those that were later
upheld. in the 1976 Gregg-Proffitt-Jurektrilogy followed the ALI
recommendation (to greater or lesser extents) and provided written statutory criteria for juries to apply in determining when to sentence to death.657 Unless at least one of the written criteria were
found to be present, the judge or jury was directed not to impose
the death penalty.658 As Gregg summarized it, in death penalty
cases "Furman mandates ... that discretion must be suitably directed and limited ...
659
Necessarily, the mechanism for providing such direction and limitation is written criteria, which represent attempts to capture linguistically those factors and feelings 660 that are thought to justify
imposition of death in the first place. Since Gregg, the Supreme
Court has steadily refined its jurisprudence of written capital criteria.661 One point it has repeatedly made is that written death penalty standards must "genuinely narrow" the class of persons that
654. See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 196 n.8, 202-03 (collecting cases).
655. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White J., concurring); accord id. at 309-310 (Stewart
J., concurring) (holding that death penalty recipients are "capriciously selected"...
[and] "systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed" are unconstitutional). Justice Stewart noted that "if any basis can be discerned for the selection of [those] few sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)).
656. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80.
657. Id. at 194-95; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-50; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.
658. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-66; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-51; Jurek, 428 U.S. at
269.
659. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
660. Feelings are relevant. Whatever some Supreme Court Justices may formally
maintain, capital sentencing simply is not wholly "objective." For example, the aggravating factor of "heinous, cruel or depraved" persists in the law not because it is truly
objective or subject to uniform application, but because it truly captures retributive
feelings thought to justify the death penalty that we as a society are unwilling to
abandon.

661. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and MitigatingFactors: The Paradoxof
Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 Wm. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 345, 356-58 (1998).
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may receive the death penalty.662 A valid written factor must "not
of a murder," but rather must
apply to every defendant convicted
663
apply "only to a subclass.
In addition, as the Court noted fifteen years ago in Zant v. Stephens, written criteria must "reasonably justify" the distinction between those consequently placed in the death eligible class and
those not.664 The requirement that written criteria provide "reasonable justification" is separable from, and as important as, the
"narrowing" function. It deserves elucidation. Written criteria
must, in Justice White's words, rationally help separate out those
murders which are "particularly serious or for which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate .... ",665 We are attempting to capture
in words those "particularly serious or ...peculiar" crimes or killers who, in some rationally justifiable sense, "deserve" to die.
Of course, a written factor must clearly separate death from nondeath crimes, or it is held "unconstitutionally vague. ' 666 This is the
"narrowing" function. But the "justification" function endorsed in
Zant is different: to "justify" imposition of death, a written factor
must describe some reasonable basis for placing heightened moral
opprobrium on the defendant or his crime, as well as to separate
them clearly. For example, prior criminal acts, cold-bloodedness,
torture, particularly evil motives, or the special status of a victim
are all factors which, in some general way, can be said to make a
murderer rationally seem more culpable, more "deserving" of
death, than other killers. 667 The same can not be said, however, for
662. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
663. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) (citing Arave, 507 U.S. at 474).
664. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877:"
665. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 222 (White, J., concurring). Justice White addressed only
the category of "murders," and imposition of the death penalty for non-killing crimes
such as espionage or treason is of unsettled constitutionality. See discussion supra
notes 229-231 and accompanying text. Justice White's reference to other crimes "for
which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate" was likely intended to capture such
non-killing crimes. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 222-23.
666. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. 967 (1994); accord Arave, 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980).
667. See, e.g., Arave, 507 U.S. at 472-73 (approving "cold-blooded" and "pitiless");
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364-65 (1988) (approving "some kind of torture
or physical abuse"). See also State v. Djerf, 959 P.2d 1274, 1288 (Ariz. 1998) (approving victim "less than fifteen years of age", "mutilation," "helplessness of victim,"
"senselessness of crime," and "gratuitous violence"); People v. Bacigalupo, 862 P.2d
808, 814 (Cal. 1993) (approving prior conviction of a felony offense); Cruse v. State,
588 So.2d 983, 991 (Fla. 1991) (approving previous conviction for "violent felonies,"
"present[ing] a great risk of death to many persons," "cold, calculated, and premeditated," and "committed to prevent lawful arrest"); Trimble v. State, 478 A.2d 1143,
1152-53 (Md. 1984) (approving "victim was a hostage taken or attempted to be taken
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the color of the killer's shirt (e.g., green shirted killers only), use of
an accent while killing (e.g., persons who speak as though from
South Jersey), or model of car (e.g., drivers of Chevy Suburbans).
While such factors may clearly separate one group of offenders
from others, they are irrational on the "just desserts" prong of the
inquiry. They are not logically connected to special culpability.
They do not "justify" death.
Now understanding that written capital criteria must be both
"genuinely narrowing" (not vague) and "rationally justifying" of
death, my conception of the problem of language manipulability
may be best described by example. While serving on the Attorney
General's Capital Case Review Committee, I had to apply the written statutory criteria of the FDPA to the facts of real cases. Because the statute directs the government attorney to initially apply
the statutory criteria to the case at hand and determine if s/he "believes" that the facts "justify" the death penalty, 668 federal prosecutors, no less than jurors, must employ the written criteria of the
death penalty statute to determine whether and how to exercise
their discretion. Only if this determination is made does the statute permit the prosecutor to file a death penalty notice in the case.
In performing this statutory exercise, two of the factors that consistently gave me trouble were whether the killing had been committed for "pecuniary gain," or committed "in an especially
heinous, cruel or depraved manner in that it involved torture or
serious physical abuse to the victim. ' 669 Both are aggravating factors that must be considered by the jury in federal homicide cases if
properly noticed and supported by evidence.67 °
"Pecuniary gain" is an aggravating factor, well-accepted (in various variations) in the capital structures of thirty-hree of the thirtyin the course of a kidnapping or abduction or an attempt to kidnap or abduct") (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 413(d)(4)(1984)); State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320, 327
(Mo. 1993) (approving "killing for monetary gain," "helplessness of victims," "multiple murders," and "murder of witnesses"); State v. Compton, 726 P.2d 837, 846 (N.M.
1986) (approving aggravating factor that the victim was a "peace officer"); State v.
Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 262 (Utah 1980) (approving of preventing a witness from testifying, or a person from presenting evidence, or a person from participating in any legal
proceedings or official investigations). Of course, some have criticized endorsement
of these factors and there have been dissenting opinions in almost every case. See
Kirchmeier, supra note 661.
668. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994).
669. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6), (c)(8) (1994 & Supp.II 1996). Other statutory criteria
caused similar difficulties; the two in the text are discussed as examples only.
670. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (1994 & Supp.Il 1996). Actually the statute permits
such aggravating factors to be proven by "information," a category potentially
broader than "evidence" under the federal rules. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (1994).
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eight states that permit capital punishment.67 ' In the federal statute, the factor is more fully described as committing "the offense as
consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of
anything of pecuniary value."67' 2 One question that immediately
arises is whether "the offense" refers to the offense of conviction
(e.g., large-scale drug dealing, car-jacking, or bank robbery) or,
more narrowly, just to the killing. State judicial decisions673 and
the "offense" language itself quickly clarify that the underlying offense, and not specifically the killing, must have been committed
"in the expectation of" pecuniary gain.674 This broadens the application of the factor to some extent, and also slightly attenuates the
"justification" relationship between the killing itself and "deserving" death.675
Aside from this point, problems arise in determining the proper
breadth of application for the "pecuniary gain" factor. Of course,
the central aim of this factor is to "get" contract killers (i.e., people
who kill in cold blood for money); however, the descriptive words
of the factor encompass far more that just contract killers.6 76 In
fact, it turns out that through the use of creative rhetoric, it can
plausibly be argued that very few crimes are committed without
some expectation of pecuniary gain. Not only crimes involving
stealing money, like bank robbery or fraud, but also crimes like
drug-dealing, witness-tampering and kidnapping, are often committed with the "expectation" of financial gain, if not directly then
671. See Kirchmeier, supra note 661, at 410 & n.367. Notably, the factor has been
court-approved in Florida, where Janet Reno was a state prosecutor for many years.
See, e.g., Henry v. State, 328 So.2d 430, 431 (Fla. 1976).
672. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8) (Supp.II 1996).
673. One might questidh whether interpretation of the federal statute should be
influenced at all by reference to state cases. Because the federal statute was developed with reference to state models and Supreme Court decisions regarding state
death penalty statutes, we concluded at the Department that state case law is properly
relevant, albeit not conclusive, in interpreting the federal statute's language.
674. This initial question may not matter in many cases, since the killing will have
been done in furtherance of the underlying offense. However, particularly since the
federal statute can be applied to unintentional but reckless killings, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3591 (a)(2)(D) (1994), this will not always be the case. That is, in some cases the
killing might not have been committed for pecuniary gain, even though the underlying
"offense" was.
675. If death is the penalty for the killing, but the killing itself was not committed
for pecuniary gain (rather, it was unintentionally reckless in the course of, say, a bank
robbery), then the relationship between the bad motive (pecuniary gain), then the
killing itself is less direct (although, many would argue, still direct enough to remit the
death penalty).
676. See United States v. Walker, 910 F. Supp. 837, 848-49 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting narrow construction of "pecuniary gain" factor).
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indirectly. The factor as written is not limited to "direct" gain, nor
to "money." Given this latitude, many crimes seemingly motivated
by politics or even pure passion can nevertheless be argued also to
include some expectation of indirect gain of something of value.
These problems can be seen in two hypothetical cases (vaguely
modeled on cases actually confronted at the Department). First,
take the case of a man who murdered his wife.677 While the crime
appeared to be one of passion, a small insurance policy naming the
husband as the beneficiary was also discovered. The statutory factor does not say that the "primary" motive must be pecuniary gain.
Thus, an aggressive U.S. Attorney with talented writers on his or
her staff can argue with force that the statutory aggravating factor
is fulfilled here. Charging the case as a death case then becomes a
prosecutorial judgment call, arguably permitted, but not required,
by the statute.
Or consider the case of a mid-level gang member who killed a
rival gang leader for "dissing" the killer's sister, where both gangs
are involved in large scale narcotics distribution. While the CCE
offense itself carries a lengthy imprisonment term, if a person
"working in" the enterprise "kills ... or causes the intentional killing" of another, death "may" be imposed.678 Motive is irrelevant
under the CCE statute. The chain of argument is inferential, but
not very long, that killing the rival leader will increase the killer's
stature in his own gang and eliminate some drug-dealing competition, so that "pecuniary gain" will accrue to the killer in the future.
Again, the death penalty here is arguably permitted, but certainly
not mandated. While the facts do not seem to fit the implicit
"theme" of the pecuniary gain factor, creative writing, forceful advocacy, and a pliant Review Committee can turn this case into a
death penalty case.
Of course, reasonable people can disagree about whether the
foregoing cases "should" be charged as death cases. That reasonable ground for disagreement is my point: normative judgment
677. We can posit a number of jurisdictional "hooks" for prosecuting this crime in
federal court: use of a mail bomb, see 18 U.S.C. § 1716 (1994 & Supp.II 1996), the wife
was a federal official or member of military, or the crime was committed on federal
property, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 351, 930, 1111, 1114 (1994 & Supp.II 1996), or it was committed at an airport that handles international flights, see 18 U.S.C. § 37 (1994 &
Supp.II 1996), or overseas, see 18 U.S.C. § 1119 (1994).
678. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1) (1994). One can also alter the hypothetical to make the
victim a local police officer who once "dissed" the gang lieutenant, and see if the
change alters one's conclusion regarding filing a death penalty notice. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(e)(2) (1994).

1999]

FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

497

calls remain to be made. Most prosecutors (indeed, most people)
have immediate and strong reactions to these hypotheticals, ranging from "that's not the sort of case Congress had in mind" to "of
course it's a death case." Similarly, when the Department's Committee debated the real-life versions, it too- reached firm conclusions on both. The problem is not that decisions cannot be made,
nor is it that the language produces ambiguities. Ambiguitites are
inevitable, and the Capital Case Review Committee can and does
develop "common law" policies, produced by confronting such real
cases, which over time lead to fairly equivalent treatment for like
cases. Rather, the problem is how, and how self-consciously, to
come up with specific interpretive standards based on such manipulable statutory factors.
Of the many cases spread across the United States, different
prosecutors will reach different "common law" solutions to the ambiguities that written standards necessarily create, when they apply
the written criteria to innumerable real-life fact scenarios. What I
saw at the Department was that some aggressive prosecutors with
talented writing skills could transform virtually any killing for
which federal jurisdiction existed into a potential death penalty
case. Yet other prosecutors would not even submit the same case
for review, perhaps out of conscious antipathy for the death penalty, but more likely because it simply would not occur to them that
the case should be considered death-eligible. Neither decision is
made in bad faith, but a lack of uniformity results nonetheless.
Thus, the problem of language manipulability in the federal system
is, again, unequal treatment of like cases at the earliest, individual
prosecutorial discretion stages.
The same problem can immediately be recognized in applying
the "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" factor, specified in the
federal statute to mean that the killing "involved torture or serious
physical abuse to the victim."67' 9 Although the Supreme Court has
condemned the initial, general phrase as too vague, the Court has
approved it when further defined as involving "torture or serious

679. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6) (1994 & Supp.II 1996).
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physical abuse."6 ' Variations of this factor are accepted in the

capital punishment structures of some twenty-nine states.681
Note, however, that the approved phrasing effectively reduces
the factor to "serious physical abuse." "Torture," a slightly more
objective and less broad term, need not play any role in applying
the factor. Many, many murders would seem to involve "serious
physical abuse" of the vicitms. Nevertheless, the fact that an aggra-

vating circumstance might apply to many murders does not render
it unconstitutional, so long as it does not apply to all.68 2 Surely
some murders do not involve "serious physical abuse" before
death, but rather are "instantaneous killings.

' 68 3

Thus, under the

Court's precedents, the federal factor of "involved... serious physical abuse" appears to be lawful,684 meaning that discretionary
prosecutorial application is necessary.
Once again, while some intentional killings may not involve "serious physical abuse," it is likely a small class. The phrase is plainly
broad and somewhat vague. Once the talented writing skills of an
680. Compare Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64 (1988) (condemning "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"), and Godfrey v. Georgia 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) (condemning "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman"), with Maynard, 486
U.S. at 364-65 (approving a definition that would limit the factor to murders involving
"some kind of torture or serious physical abuse"), and Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 654-55 (1990) (approving limiting definition of inflicting "mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death").
681. See Kirchmeier, supra note 661, at 400 n.348.
682. This is the import of Arave, which approved "cold-blooded," "pitiless slayer"
as a "close" question but ultimately "narrow[ing] in a meaningful way" the category
of death eligible defendants, because some killers "do exhibit feeling." Arave, 507
U.S. at 475-76.
683. But see Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1086-88 (1985) (denying cert.)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the agony of electrocution).
684. Whether this should be so, as a matter of constitutional law, strikes me as
fertile ground for deep debate. There surely is merit to Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Arave, for example, that with regard to "utter disregard for human life," "the language's susceptibility to a variety of interpretations ... makes it (facially) unconstitutional." (emphasis added) 507 U.S. at 481-82. Moreover, if "clear and objective"
language for aggravating capital factors is truly required by the Constitution, then the
Court's consistent (and consistently non-unanimous) approval of such emotion-laden
factors, which taken together do indeed seem to encompass almost every murder,
seems deeply flawed. Compare, e.g., Arave, 507 U.S. at 475-76 (approving "coldblooded, pitiless"), with Arave 507 U.S. at 476 (noting that Walton approved death
eligibility for defendants who "take pleasure in killing"). The combination of Arave
and Walton does not produce the "narrow subclass" envisioned by Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg, at least. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 982 (Stevens, J. and Ginsburg, J.
concurring). The only killers left after Arave and Walton are those few killers who are
neither cold-blooded nor pleased, but rather who genuinely exhibit pity in their killings, such as a relative's mercy-killing. This is a very small class, which is unlikely ever
to be charged with, let alone sentenced to, death.
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aggressive prosecutor are brought to bear on a killing, virtually any
non-instantaneous death can be described as involving "serious
physical abuse." See, for example, the gruesome descriptions that
various judges have written of electrocution, hanging, and lethal
gas executions - the chosen methods of the government for implementing death.68 5 Because the application of the factor turns on
the ambiguity of facts and how aggressive the prosecutorial proponent is, the system is ripe for disuniformity.
The potential of this factor was brought home to the Attorney
General's Review Committee in a case involving a beating death in
the course of a robbery on federal land. The beating lasted only a
few minutes and did not seem "especially" gruesome, - is not
every single beating death gruesome? - except that the impact of
one kick dislodged the victim's eyeball from the socket and it
"hung" on his cheek. Unsurprisingly, this fact was repeatedly
stressed in the prosecutorial documents advocating for the death
penalty.
While some urban jurisdictions such as New York might take an
"average" beating death in stride as a deplorable but not capital
crime,686 it is not difficult to describe any beating death as involving
"serious physical abuse" if one is so inclined. More rural districts
that see relatively fewer federal homicides, or federal prosecutors
in states that fully accept capital punishment, may be more likely to
decide to pursue such a beating death case as a capital case. A
685. See Glass, 471 U.S. at 1086-87 (1985) (denying cert.) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(describing death by electrocution: "Witnesses routinely report that, when the switch
is thrown, the condemned prisoner 'cringes,' 'leaps,' and 'fights the straps with amazing strength.'... 'The hands turn red, then white, and the cords of the neck stand out
like steel bands .... [T]he prisoner's eyeballs sometimes pop out ....
The prisoner
often defecates, urinates, and vomits blood and drool." (citations omitted)). See also
Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1404 (N.D.Cal. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.
1996), vacated 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996) (describing death by lethal gas: "[I]nmates suffer
intense, visceral pain, primarily as a result of lack of oxygen to the cells. The experience of 'air hunger' is akin to the experience of a major heart attack, or to being held
under water"); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing the
effects of death by hanging, including "occlusion of the airway," "tearing, transection,
trauma, or shock to the spinal cord," and "fracture or separation of the cervical spinal
column").
686. See, e.g., David Rhode, Suspect Says Second Man Killed. Teacher, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 1998, at B1 (reporting a case in which a defendant was tried in New York for
the point-blank gunshot murder of a former teacher). A "chilling" description of the
crime included multiple pre-death knife wounds in the chest and neck. Surely this is
"serious physical abuse," but the state prosecutor "chose not" to seek a death penalty.
Id. See also John Sullivan, Man Is Guilty in Three Attacks, Including a Woman's Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1998, at B1 (no death penalty sought); John J. Royster, No
Death Penalty in Park Avenue Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1996, at B3 (same).
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painstaking, second-by-second account of the beating, reasonably
supported by autopsy reports, can easily meet the "gruesomeness"
level that this factor, frankly, demands.687
My point is not that this beating did not merit the death penalty,
but rather that some federal prosecutors might well conclude that
it did not. Those prosecutors then could, in complete good faith,
not charge the case federally, or not submit it for Main Justice review, or later accept a non-death guilty plea. The "language's susceptibility to a variety of interpretations ' 68 8 leads to unequal
prosecutorial application, before or despite Main Justice review.
C. The DOJ's Role, Revisited
The problem of indeterminacy of language when applied to facts
in criminal cases is neither new nor avoidable. Writing for the
Court in McGuatha, Justice Harlan famously suggested that to
identify characteristics that call for the death penalty and then to
"express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied" are "tasks which are beyond present human
' 689
ability.
Yet, while conceding the basic point in McGautha, Justice Brennan nevertheless dissented from the judgment upholding standardless capital discretion because "[t]he Court neglects to explain
why the impossibility of perfect standards justifies making no attempt whatsoever to control lawless action. ' 690 Justice Brennan's
view on this middling ground later prevailed, of course, in
Furman.691 When the Court later approved capital sentencing statutes in Gregg, Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens agreed that
written capital punishment criteria are constitutionally required,
even if they are "by necessity somewhat general. ' 692 The Court as
a whole has more recently refined (some might say conceded) this
latter point: the "definition of an aggravating factor ...is not susceptible of mathematical precision. 693
687. See, e.g., Arave, 507 U.S. at 465-68 (recounting the Idaho Supreme Court's
description of a beating murder, labeled, with good reason, "extremely gruesome").
688. Arave, 507 U.S. at 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
689. McGuatha, 402 U.S. at 204.
690. Id. at 282.
691. By the time it was endorsed in Gregg, however, Justice Brennan dissented.
See 428 U.S. at 227.
692. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-94.
693. Walton, 497 U.S. 655. Accord Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 980-81 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
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Justice Brennan's argument in McGautha may today be redirected to the DOJ: the impossibility of perfect standards does not
justify complacency with silent disuniformity. The DOJ is in a position to accept the inevitable indeterminacy of language and yet
not be satisfied with it. Its unique position as a national monitor
and administrator of capital punishment enables it to demand as
much determinacy and consistency from prosecutors around the
country as is humanly possible.
In fact, this is one role played by the Capital Case Review Committee. It applies the words of the statute to diverse cases from
many different districts. It decides what potentially ambiguous
statutory language should, and should not, mean. It necessarily decides what cases truly are "death eligible," often on a categorical,
yet narrowing, basis (e.g., not all car-jacking killings, all federal
parkland killings, or all drug gang killings, but only such killings
with multiple victims, only such killings with torture, etc.). The
Committee also repeatedly performs the statutory weighing exercise Congress has mandated, and it recommends to the Attorney
General that a death penalty notice
be filed only when it forms the
694
justified.
is
"death
that
belief
The repeated, fact-specific engagement of the Capital Case Review Committee with the federal death penalty statute is unique.
Capital juries are one-shot actors; federal judges are likely to confront only a handful of federal capital cases over years; and members of Congress do not confront real cases as decisionmakers. But
by necessity, over time and many cases, the Department's Review
Committee is creating an internal "common law" of federal death
penalty evaluation. Its decisions regarding the meaning of statutory language are already creating, in effect, specific national standards for the application of federal capital punishment. And
because its recommendations are generally memorialized in writing, this is a body of data and precedent that can be referred to, in
difficult or seemingly repetitive cases. This is particularly important as Committee membership changes - and as the occupant of
the Attorney General's chair changes, as is inevitable.695 This body
of precedent is not public, a confidentiality which I believe is, on
balance, a public good.69 6 But there is no reason the Department
694. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (Supp. II 1996).
695. Janet Reno is already the longest-serving full-time Attorney General in history. See supra note 389.
696. See Zacharias, supra note 475, at 1182-85 (noting benefits that flow from internal, nonpublic prosecutorial guidelines).
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could not study its written death penalty memos, internally, and
attempt to develop some specific, workable standards. If the venture were successful, or even useful in failure, the Department
could then confront whether to publish its results. But in any case,
the body of written precedents is immensely valuable: it can serve
to inform all governmental actors in the national, discretionary system of capital punishment that is administered by the Department.
Problematically, however, the Department does not yet appear
to be developing its policies and precedents based on a full national
sample of all potential federal capital cases. Silent regional disparity in case acceptance and review submissions is a flaw that is potentially quite serious. As suggested above,697 now that the
Department has institutionalized its Main Justice capital review
process, it should expand its net to capture for oversight all cases
that might be chargable as federal death penalty cases. Only then
can it truly claim to be698
pursuing uniform national policies of "confairness.
and
sistency
Moreover, because U.S. Attorneys who are now skeptical about
or silently opposed to capital punishment would have to participate, such an expansion would compel an explicit, national dialogue among federal prosecutors about standards for charging and
pursuing death penalty cases. Such a dialogue could be conducted
candidly in confidence - it need not be public. But it necessarily
would lead to development of more precise, nationally acceptable
charging and plea policies and standards. At some point, the Department could publish the fruits of its talented labors, and become
a leader among jurisdictions seeking to fairly administer capital
punishment. State prosecutors, not to mention legislators, could
learn much from such an ambitious national analysis of capital
punishment standards. Not only would this improve administration of the federal death penalty, but it could add invaluable,
thoughtful substance to the still ongoing capital punishment
debate.
D.

The Emerging "Stevens Solution"

One final point must be made about the reality of the Department's Capital Case Review Committee. In its unavoidable development of national capital punishment standards by applying the
FDPA to specific cases, the Department is, in my view, uncon697. See supra pp. 455-462; see also supra note 452 and accompanying text.
698. UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 12, § 9-10.080.
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sciously but inevitably giving effect to some version of the "aggravated cases" solution advocated by Justice Stevens in McCleskey.
Unlike Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stevens did not condemn all capital punishment in McCleskey. Rather, he concisely
noted that the Baldus data indicates that "there exist certain categories of extremely serious crimes for which prosecutors consistently seek, and juries consistently impose, the death penalty
without regard to ...race. "699
Or, as Professor Baldus put it in the McCleskey evidentiary hearing, there is a category of killings so aggravated that "everybody
would agree that if we're going to have a death [penalty], these are
the cases that should get it."7° The remedy that Justice Stevens
therefore offered for race disparity in capital punishment was not
to abolish the death penalty completely, but rather to direct Georgia to "narrow the class of death-eligible
defendants to those
'70 1
[highly aggravated] categories.
My assertion, unprovable given the non-public nature of the data
(and possibly not provable in any case, due to arguments about
what cases are "highly aggravated"), is that by attempting to treat
like cases from different districts alike, the Department's Review
Committee often screens out "low-aggravated" cases and is, for the
most part, authorizing death penalty notices only in those more aggravated cases in which there is general agreement that death is
appropriate. This is not the same as "everybody would agree," and
the agreed-upon level of death-appropriate aggravation within a
Committee of prosecutors is likely lower than Baldus' most culpable category.70 2 Nevertheless, the Department is authorizing death
in a category of cases with aggravating levels that are higher than
merely the statutory minimum necessary to be "death eligible."
Although there may have been some federal death penalty prose699. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Blackmun). See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 180, at 385 (stating that "prosecutors consistently seek and juries consistently impose it without regard to the race of the victim or
of the defendant"); see also McClesky, 481 U.S. at 287 n.5 (majority opinion) (quoting
Prof. Baldus' stating "when the cases become tremendously aggravated ... the race
effects go away."); id. at 325 & n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that in the first
two and the last categories of aggravated culpability, "the strength or weakness of
aggravating factors usually suggests that only one outcome is appropriate"). For a
description of Professor Baldus's culpability scales, see BALDUS ET AL., supra note
180, at 92, 144-45, 154; Bhagwat & Lee, supra note 610, at 130-32.
700. 481 U.S. at 287 n.5 (quoting Baldus' testimony in the district court).
701. Id. at 367.
702. Baldus used a scale of culpability that ranges from one to six, with one as the
least culpable and six as the most. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 180, at 144-45, 154.
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cutions since 1994 that might appear to fall on the low-aggravation
side of an informal line, by and large the cases authorized for pursuit of the death penalty by the Attorney General "cluster" around
some conception of highly aggravated cases. Thus, case-by-case
and possibly unconscious of the general effect, the DOJ
is in fact
'70 3
implementing something like the "Stevens Solution.
This result is not inconsistent with the Federal Death Penalty
Act. Some might argue that Congress intended that the death penalty option be given to juries for every defendant that technically
can be argued to meet the minimum criteria of mens rea and one
aggravating factor. The DOJ, this argument goes, has no right
under the statute to preliminarily implement a standard of eligibility higher than the statutory minimum. But while such an argument likely expresses the intent of some pro-death penalty
members of Congress who voted for the FDPA (i.e., members who
did not intend the DOJ to be a lenient gatekeeper for federal capital punishment, implementing even in a weak version the dissenting views in McCleskey), this vision of the DOJ's role is simply not
consistent with the more moderate, compromise statute that was
enacted with the support of some long-time capital punishment
opponents.0
It must be remembered that the FDPA was passed, after two
decades of Congressional deadlock, only with the support of some
members who were far less sanguine about the prospect of federal
executions after thirty years. The resulting legislation bridged
staunch opposition to a federal death penalty that had been effective in opposing the topic for years. Thus it should be no surprise
that the resulting statute directs the "attorney for the government"
to play a gatekeeper's role. The prosecutor must "believe ...that
a sentence of death is justified under this chapter" before permitting the case to go forward, and in order to responsibly form such a
"belief," the prosecutor must go through the process of applying
the statute's evaluative standards to the case.70 5 This includes not
only the identification of aggravating and mitigating evidence, but
also a determination that aggravation outweighs mitigation, and a
final decision that death is justified after all is said and done.70 6
Just as the jury always retains discretion under the statute to recommend no death, so too does the statute require the prosecutor to
703.
704.
705.
706.

The phrase springs from Justice Stevens' dissent in McClesky.
See supra note 224.
18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1985 & Supp. 1998).
See id. at § 3593(e) (1985 & Supp. 1998).

1999]

FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

505

exercise such discretion in appropriate cases, where death is
viewed as "unjustified."
Of course, establishing a high culpability or aggravation level for
murder cases that almost "everybody" can agree on is a multi-dimensional effort, extremely difficult in practice and perhaps impossible.7 °7 But the Department so far has not consciously set out
even to attempt such a project. Rather, a rough "Stevens Solution"
is only an unintended side-effect of the Department's responsible
effort to apply the statute, which necessarily results in the screening-out of some lower-level culpability, albeit technically death-eligible, cases.
In addition, because a large number of the cases that the Attorney General authorizes for death are later terminated by either
plea or by a jury which does not impose a death penalty, a Justice
Stevens-like "extremely serious" class of cases where death is actually imposed appears to be the result of the overall federal system. 70 8 As described above, even among the 135 federal
defendants authorized for death penalty prosecution from 1990 to
January 1999, only twenty (14%) have received the death
penalty.7 °9
Is the unconscious, emerging reality of the "Stevens Solution" a
bad thing? Not at all. In fact, among moderate observers of capital punishment - persons not entirely pro or con, who are accepting of Gregg and yet concerned about the McCleskey
arguments - there appears to be a growing convergence of views
that reserving the death penalty for an "extremely aggravated"
murder category provides a sensible solution to many systemic
problems resulting from current capital punishment regimes. Perhaps most prominent among advocates of such a solution is Judge
Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit. Judge Kozinski is a Republican
appointee, sometimes mentioned as a Supreme Court nominee,
and certainly not a capital punishment abolitionist.710 In a 1995
707. Professor Baldus does not think so. He describes one purpose of his research
effort as seeking to refute the "impossibility thesis" advanced by Justice Harlan in
McGautha. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 180, at 2.
708. Note, however, that this begins to bear some resemblance to the lighteninglike randomness condemned in Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), although after Gregg,
428 U.S. 153 (1976) and McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), it appears not to be
unconstitutional.
709. See chart, supra p.429. This number is likely to increase, however, as at least
32 more authorized capital defendants are awaiting trial and one is waiting re-sentencing. Id.

710. 2

ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

18-22 (Aspen Law & Business 1999)

(description of the Ninth Circuit) (appointed by Pres. Reagan); Robin Toner, Vacancy
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article, Judge Kozinski and Sean Gallagher recommend a "political
solution" (as opposed to one that is constitutionally required) for a
number of ills in the capital punishment system: "differentiating
only the most depraved killers" and then narrowing capital punishment statutes so that only these killers are eligible for the death
penalty.7 1' Judge Kozinski acknowledges that "[t]his would not be
an easy task" but argues that it yields numerous advantages: reducing the money, time, and judicial resources spent on hundreds of
capital cases each year in which society does not have "the means
and the will to execute"; "greater deterrent and retributive effect";
"ensur[ing] that the few who suffer the death penalty really are the
worst of the very bad"; possibly removing the "latent racial biases"
identified by Baldus; and returning "meaningful control" over the
process to "the people, through their elected representatives...
rather than letting the courts and chance perform the accommoda'
tion on an ad-hoc, entirely irrational, basis."712
Thinkers about capital punishment as diverse as former Chief
Justice Burger and Professor Baldus have suggested similar solutions.713 Other scholars, both for and against capital punishment,
have suggested something like the Stevens Solution as a palatable
middle ground. 1 The task of actually designing such a system
would be monumentally difficult but not, many seem to think, impossible.715 To the extent that the DOJ, by simple application of
on the Court: Two Sides Preparefor Hard Battle on Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 1990, at Al ("Judge Alex Kozinski... is also regarded as a possible choice"); Alex
Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, NEW YORKER, Feb. 2, 1997, at 48 ("Brutal facts have
immense power ....Those who commit such atrocities, I concluded, forfeit their own
right to live."); id. at 53 ("I believe that society is entitled to take the life of those who
have shown utter contempt for the lives of others.").
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the FDPA to. specific case over time, may be unconsciously implementing such a system, we should applaud its efforts and urge it to
continue the enterprise, perhaps only more self-consciously.
Conclusion
As Justices Stevens and Ginsburg have recently conceded, so
long as we embrace prosecutorial discretion and capital jury sentencing, the risks of disproportionate (as compared to the severity
of the offense) or unfair (because influenced by impermissible factors) death penalties "can never be entirely eliminated. ' 71 6 They
can only be "diminished," by careful monitoring of potential capital cases for instances of improper imposition.717 Today, the DOJ
is acting de facto in the role of national death penalty monitor. It is
moving progressively along the path to performing this task fairly
and effectively. Charged with administering a capital punishment
statute that is national in scope and which requires prosecutors to
718
believe the death penalty to be "justified" before they seek it,
the Department has implemented a centralized, high-level review
process for federal cases in which U.S. Attorneys in the field wish
to seek the penalty. The process at Main Justice is race-blind and
self-consciously aimed at achieving consistency. The Attorney
General and her staff deserve great credit for establishing the Capital Case Review Committee, providing it ample resources, and imbuing the enterprise with a sense of seriousness and moral
responsibility.
Yet some serious problems remain and improvements should be
considered. This Article suggests that a broader scope of review
for the Committee, to include all federal cases involving killings as
well as all declinations in such cases, could lead to greater national
consistency, reduction of unconscious "racial empathy" in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and. the conscious development of
national "common law" standards that would uniformly raise the
floor for federal capital punishment imposition. Each of these
goals is within the range of discretion Congress has provided to the
Department in the FDPA719 and consistent with Supreme Court
holdings on capital punishment. Moreover, the Review Committee
has created a wealth of data in its written memoranda for the Attorney General, which the Department should now open, at least
716.
717.
718.
719.

Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 982 (Stevens and Ginsburg, J.J., concurring).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1998).
See generally Kahan, supra note 375, at 471-88.

508

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI

internally, for self-conscious study and debate. Specific national
standards reflective of the views of all federal prosecutors should
be adopted by the Department or at least studied on an experimental basis. The issues of life or death in our criminal justice system
are too important for us to be satisfied with the progress the Department has already made.

